

Form 64 (Revised)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 27 January 45

FROM PARIS, FRANCE

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 8501

## DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

CASERTA

FOR INFORMATION

SI, DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MACRUDEB,  
INTECH, FIELD SECTION, X-80 C&A

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27522-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#5964. To 148 From Por:an. Action: Caserta, #3064. Information:  
154, Washington.

Kennell

Please forgive delay replying to your Caserta-Washington  
#20054. Colonel Douma very loath to leave France where he feels  
his experience is most valuable. Matter still under discussion.  
Will advise definitely later.

FOR: 1627 27 Jan 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

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Form 88 (Revised)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 18 January 1945

REC'D 1895 18 Jan 45

TO

[REDACTED] FOLLOW

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

81

Downs R. 12.512

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRDER,  
BRIEFING, FIELD SECTION, O'GARA, X-2

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-27545-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

#3834. To London. (OUT 1483)  
#20954. To Caserta. (OUT 1484)

SECRET

154 to Casey. Information: 148, Caserta.

Following message received from 148. Could Lt. Colonel  
Kenneth Downs be made available from ETO for Balkan assignment?  
Several important posts requiring first class intelligence  
officers must be filled. Foreign newspaper experience and  
language qualification command Downs.

Reply action Caserta information Washington.

THE COPY

SECRET

BHH HA WBS JDN DDdB

TOD: Caserta 2346 18 Jan 45  
London 2106 18 Jan 45

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE 17 JANUARY 1945

FROM CASERTA, ITALY

PRECEDENCE

TO OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

ACTION 81

INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDEN, BICKELON, FIELD SECTION,  
X-2, O'CARA, PPD.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#26584. 154 FROM 145.

SECRET

COULD LT. COL. KENNETH DOWNS BE MADE AVAILABLE FROM ETO FOR  
BALKAN ASSIGNMENT? WE HAVE SEVERAL IMPORTANT POSTS TO FILL SUCH  
AS REPLACEMENT FOR WISNER, EVENTUAL REPLACEMENT FOR THAYER AND SE  
MAN IN SOFIA. TOPNOTCH INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS REQUIRED FOR THESE  
POSTS. FOREIGN NEWSPAPER EXPERIENCE AND LANGUAGE QUALIFICATIONS  
WOULD COMMEND KENNETH DOWNS.

SECRET

TOR:

0843

17 JAN 45

FILE COPY

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PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER CO., LONDON, ENGLAND, U. K. A.

Form 88 (Revised)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE November 5, 1944

FROM

PARIS, FRANCE

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 24747

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

C1544. 109 from 105.

Capt. Dawson, who has reported here, is being sent to Washington at once. Klots will depart from here in two weeks. I strongly recommend that Dawson accompany Klots and Gale to the Far East after he has a month's leave; he is badly in need of a rest. I agree with Downs' reasons for not going to the Far East. I should like to have him confer with you concerning an idea of his which I feel would prove not only interesting but valuable to OSS. I recommend that he complete the history of the field detachments here. He could finish this within a month's time and then leave for permanent duty in Washington where he could confer with you.

TOR: 11/5/44 12:58 AM

SECRET

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|                              |                              |                                 |
|------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES |                              | OFFICIAL DISPATCH               |
| DATE                         | October 24, 1944             |                                 |
| FROM                         | PARIS, FRANCE                |                                 |
| TO                           | OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES |                                 |
|                              | DISTRIBUTION                 | PRIORITY<br>ROUTINE<br>DEFERRED |
| (FOR ACTION)                 | (FOR INFORMATION)            | IN 23703                        |
| DIRECTOR                     | SECRETARIAT                  |                                 |

✓ #1034. To **RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER**

**SECRET**

Kenneth Downs will not be free for 2 weeks. Is now in Germany and cannot reach him. Will discuss your cable as soon as can contact him. However known has strong desire return civilian status for reasons wishes explain to you which he feels will be helpful OSS.

*Informed M. Beine  
of contents*

TOR: 10/24/44 5:29 P.M.

**SECRET**

**FILE COPY**

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FORM 8-44 (11-1-44)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE

October 23, 1944

REC'D

TO

PARIS, FRANCE

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

Downs, Kenneth  
DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57284-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#864. 109 to Bruce.

Is Kenneth Downs free? We have a very important intelligence post in China in conjunction with 14th Air Force. It is a very challenging job and I hope he is available.

TOD: 10/23/44 7:01 p.m.

WJD:LP

SECRET

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

12, 31/12  
Donovan, Mr. Buxton  
\* 10 am Capt. Donovan

3 December 1943

FROM: Colonel Buxton  
TO : Mr. Cheston

Major Downes saw me early this afternoon. I think you have not met him. He was transferred to us from the 1st Division. He was with it in combat for approximately five months. He has been in his present grade of Major for eleven months. He is going with 201, leaving shortly for England and will be a part of the Sussex Plan. He is a splendid officer; was, I believe, on General Allen's staff, and his transfer was secured by General Donovan who met him at the time of the Sicily landings.

He is, of course, about to undertake a dangerous and important mission, and I think we should secure his promotion if possible. I have told him that we would be interested in doing so and that I was sending this memorandum to you. He is with Major Scalfe this afternoon in the latter's office. I wish you would talk to him and get from him any information which you need.

(13)

4 November 1963

Major Kenneth Downs  
Command and General Staff School  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Dear Ken:

I am glad you have finished.

Be sure to take your leave and get a good  
rest. Then I will look forward to seeing  
you.

I enclose orders.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Inclosure

E.J. Putzell: Birchard

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Oct. 11, 1943

Dear General:

Ray wrote that you returned from Italy some time ago. I hope things went well for you and for our people there.

This course ends Nov. 11. It has been tremendously interesting and worthwhile, but I must confess I shan't regret its conclusion for it has been a rough grind. I was in hospital for nearly three weeks with something akin to pneumonia. Since the course is quite intensive, it required considerable effort to keep abreast and make up back work.

If possible, I should like very much to spend a short leave with my family at Balboa Island, Calif., before reporting back for duty. If you desire my immediate return, I am fit and ready. But if there is no urgent reason for me to report at once I should appreciate a brief rest.

Am enclosing a copy of my orders.

With all best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Kenneth Downs

P.S. General Allen has the 104th Div. at Camp Adair, Oregon, now.





COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

Dear General:

May wish that you returned from Italy some time ago. I hope things went well for you and for our people there.

This course under Major Gen. [unclear] has been tremendously interesting and worthwhile, but I must confess I don't regret its conclusion, for I have had a rough grind. I was hospitalized for nearly three weeks with something akin to pneumonia. Since the course is quite intensive, it required considerable effort to keep abreast and make up back work.

If possible, I should like





COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

very much to spend a short leave with my family at Balboa Island, Calif., before reporting back for duty. If you desire my immediate return, I am fit and ready. But if there is no urgent reason for me to report at once I should appreciate a brief rest.

I'm enclosing a copy of my orders.

With all best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Kenneth Downs

P.S. - General Allen has the 104<sup>th</sup> S.W. at Camp Adair, Oregon, now.

ALM 207 1045  
OFF H-ALM-PH 70075.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
The Adjutant General's Office  
Washington

In reply  
refer to: AO 210.63 C&GS Sch.  
(18 Aug 43)PO-A

24 August 1943.

Subject: Orders.

Thru: Director, Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

To: Major Kenneth T. Downs, Infantry.

1. Major Kenneth T. Downs, 0903121, Infantry, will proceed at the proper time from Washington, D. C. to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and report not earlier than 4 September 1943, nor later than 2000Z, 6 September 1943, to the Commandant, Command and General Staff School, on temporary duty for the purpose of pursuing the Fifteenth General Staff Course beginning 6 September 1943, and upon completion of this temporary duty will return to his proper station.

2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. I-5000  
P 432-02 A 0425-24.

By order of the Secretary of War:



*A. L. Martin*  
Adjutant General.

Distribution:

10-Comdt, C&GS Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kans.  
CO, Army Ground Forces, AG of S, G-1, AWC.  
Officers' Br Record Section, Rm 2429, Munitions Bldg.  
1-Officer's 201 File.

*Donovan Magruder*  
*X West Dept. Personnel*

17 August 1943

**MEMORANDUM FOR Major Dearing**

*Wk 10*

Attached is a letter just received from David Bruce, although written July 30. I note that he expresses the hope that Major Kenneth Downes will return to London as quickly as possible. I understand that you will discuss with General Donovan whether or not Downes should be allowed nine weeks in the Leavenworth Staff School plus his two weeks in California. If he is to go to Staff School it will be necessary to find out how this can be accomplished.

Are you preparing the monthly letters to Colonel Bruce and the other OSS offices as requested by General Donovan by cable? I recollect that the Branch Heads and Theater Officers were to give you the material on which to base the monthly letters to the several theaters.

I think this letter should go to General Magruder.

G. Edward Burton

*Donovan, General - 12, 3*  
*X War Dept. Personnel*

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: 25 August 1943

TO: General Donovan  
 FROM: Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Major Kenneth Downes

*bx*  
*177*

With reference to the attached memorandum concerning Major Downes, Major Downes has been accepted for the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and is scheduled to report on 6 September 1943. We have telegraphed him to this effect and we have also notified Mr. Shepardson, suggesting that he cable the information to Colonel Bruce.

*Col Miller also was advised*

*Robert T. Thuman*  
 R. T.

*OK*

*2*



From Message Center  
Confirmation copy will be sent to you.

Would appreciate your checking with  
Colonel Hoag on status Levenworth  
thing and wiring reply.

From: Major Kenneth Downs

to go to  
C + 4.5. at  
Levenworth  
on Sept 6.  
1266

not by  
London  
+ all

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SECRET

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

To: *Chief, ST*  
 From: *Wag*

DATE: August 23, 1946

FROM: Francis P. Miller, Lt. Col., AGS

SUBJECT: Major Kenneth Downes

We received a cable from London this morning saying that Major Kenneth Downes' services were needed and the impression given was that they were needed immediately. Major Downes is, as you know, in California. I reached him on the telephone and told him about the cable. He said he was waiting to hear from Colonel Hoag in regard to the possibility of his attending the Army Staff School at Leavenworth. He added that he expected to hear from Colonel Hoag in a couple of days. I asked Major Downes to let me know at once what decision he took after he had heard from Colonel Hoag.

I have the impression that Major Downes has his heart set on going to the Leavenworth School and that if the opportunity is offered to him he will accept it. In that event he will not be available for service in London until the middle of November. I told Major Downes on the telephone that though it was highly probable that there would still be a post for him in London at that time, I could not make any promises this long in advance since events were moving too rapidly.

F.P.M. *Wag*

AG 201-AGP-Downs, Kenneth T. (AGP)

17 July 1947

SUBJECT: Orders

TO : Commanding General, 1st U. S. Infantry Division

1. Major KENNETH T. DOWNS, 0920181, 1st AG, is relieved from assignment and duty with Headquarters, 1st U. S. Infantry Division, and is assigned to Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C. He will proceed without delay by most expeditious air transportation or other means to Washington, D. C., reporting upon arrival to the Director of Strategic Services, for duty. Upon arrival in the United States he will report to the Control Officer, Air Gateway, before proceeding to Washington, D. C.

2. Travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft is authorized. In lieu of mileage and subsistence a per diem of \$0.00 is authorized in accordance with existing law and regulations. Baggage allowance of 55 lbs is authorized. ID 1-3500 P 431-02 1 0425-24. OM 100 P-01-03-07-08 A 0500-34.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

S/ FRANK A. RANTER,  
1st Lt., AGD,  
Asst Adj Gen

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|-----------------------|---|
| Officer-----          | 6 |
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| CG II Corps-----      | 1 |
| CG 1st US Inf Div--   | 1 |
| Air Priority G-4---   | 2 |
| AC of S G-1-----      | 1 |
| AG 201 File-----      | 1 |

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Form 49 (Revised)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 23 JUNE 45

FROM

USTRAVIC, LONDON

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

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ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN 14789

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-37405-9

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#36557. CHESTON AND DOERING FROM 109.

SECRET

JACKSON HAS STRONGLY URGED TO FORRESTAL IMMEDIATE SPOT  
 PROMOTION OF JIM DONOVAN. I CONCUR COMPLETELY. IF REFERENCE  
 MADE TO US PLEASE SUPPORT THIS.

SECRET

FILE COPY

TOR: 1411

23 JUNE 45

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 WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT



**CONFIDENTIAL**

17 June 1947

Justice Robert H. Jackson  
Supreme Court  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Justice Jackson:

It would be of great assistance to us, and would improve his position in the set-up if Lt. Donovan could obtain a spot promotion in the Navy during the period that he is carrying on this work of war crimes.

If you agree with us, would you send a note to Jim Forrestal asking for this promotion.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM ONE on NavComd, OCS  
1st, BuPers/NA2 over ENHWP  
(277601), dated 1. Feb. 1945.

14 February 1945.

From: Director of Strategic Services.  
To : Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subj: Lieutenant (jg) James S. Donovan, A(L), USNR;  
Recommendation for promotion of.

1. Forwarded.
2. I concur in the recommendation that Lieutenant (jg) James S. Donovan, USNR, General Counsel to the Office of Strategic Services, be granted a spot promotion to the rank of Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve.
3. While I believe that the basis recommendation in this case is more than sufficient to warrant the promotion, I wish to say that Lieutenant (jg) Donovan is making an outstanding contribution to the work of this Agency. His professional ability, sound judgment and complete devotion to duty have made him of invaluable assistance to me in the key post of General Counsel.
4. The handicap of rank under which he now labors is well indicated in a letter recently received from Brigadier General Jean M. Seir, USA, Assistant Judge Advocate General, War Department, a copy of which I attach hereto. I concur in General Seir's statement that a promotion of Lieutenant (jg) Donovan is for the good of the service, and ask that the instant recommendation be viewed as urgently necessary.

Attachment: (1)

WILLIAM J. BROWDER.



HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL  
Washington 25, D. C.

SPJGI

7 February 1946

Major General William J. Donovan, Director,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Lt. (jg) James B. Donovan, USNR

Dear General Donovan:

For a long time I have wanted to express to you our appreciation of the work of Lt. James B. Donovan, General Counsel of your Office. About a year and a half ago, I became acquainted with him in work of mutual interest to your agency and the War Department. At that time I was impressed with the superior intellect displayed by Lt. Donovan and mature judgment in his solving of important problems most complex in nature.

With the creation of the War Crimes Office there arose many undertakings of international importance, which involved material assistance from your agency. Your designation of Lt. Donovan as the officer to represent The Office of Strategic Services was one of wisdom and one sincerely appreciated by us. We have been more than pleased with the substantial contributions he personally has made to the planning and operations of the War Crimes Office.

I understand that consideration is now being given to Lt. Donovan's promotion. Knowing your own forthright nature, I do not hesitate to mention that throughout all my official associations with him I have made mental note of the fact that he must be handicapped to a considerable extent by reason of his lack of a rank commensurate with his responsibilities and duties. I mention this, feeling certain you will understand that, while it is in part gratitude for the assistance rendered by your agency and him, it is mainly that I believe his outstanding services and devotion to duty deserve recognition and higher rank for the best interests of the service.

Very sincerely yours,

Certified to be a  
true and correct  
copy.

John M. Weir,  
Brig. General, U.S. Army,  
Asst. Judge Advocate General.

C. A. Bane, Lt., USNR

# NAVAL COMMAND

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D.C.

In reply refer to  
Initials and No.

Refers/2682  
RSM:amp  
(297601)

14 February 1946.

From : Commanding Officer.  
To : Chief of Naval Personnel.  
Via : Director of Strategic Services.  
Subj: Lieutenant (Jg) James B. Donovan, S(L), USNR;  
Recommendation for promotion of.

1. It is respectfully recommended that Lieutenant (Jg) James B. Donovan be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve. He was commissioned an Ensign on 26 June 1943, and reported for active duty with this Office on 2 August 1943. Shortly thereafter he was appointed Assistant General Counsel to the Agency. His Naval indoctrination includes completion of a course of instruction at the Naval Training School (Indoctrination), Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

2. The General Counsel to this Agency has complete responsibility for all legal matters in connection with its activities within the United States and abroad. He is required to maintain close relationship with high-ranking officers and officials in the Navy and War Departments, Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, General Accounting Office, Office of Scientific Research and Development, the Congress, and with other agencies of the United States and Allied nations, representing the Director of Strategic Services on many confidential matters of extreme importance to the Agency.

3. In addition to the above, the responsibilities of the General Counsel to the Office of Strategic Services also include:

- (a) Rendering of opinions with respect to the legal powers and duties of OSS, the Director of Strategic Services, and all others on duty with or employed by the Agency, including responsibility for advice on the relationship to OSS of pending and approved Federal legislation, decisions of the Attorney General, the Comptroller General and the courts.

Refers/4402  
 (277601)

14 February 1963.

Subj: Lieutenant (Jg) James B. Donovan, 9(L), WARR;  
 Recommendation for promotion of.

3. (continued)

- (b) Direction and supervision of all legal matters pertaining to the finances of the Agency, including service as counsel to the Board of Review, advising with respect to the preparation of agency budgets and Congressional appropriations, advising on compliance with domestic and foreign laws, and ensuring proper legal controls and records within OGS, with respect to all finances.
- (c) Direction and supervision of all contracts executed by the Office of Strategic Services, all damage claims by or against the Agency, and all legal matters relating to its acquisition and disposition of Government property.
- (d) Direction and supervision of all matters concerning patents and copyrights, including all inventions by persons on duty with or employed by this Agency, contract clauses, licenses, royalties, secrecy orders and infringement claims, and necessary liaison with other Government agencies on such matters.
- (e) Direction and supervision of OGS problems relating to international law and military law, and other necessary research on all legal questions arising in the course of the Agency's operations in the United States and overseas.
- (f) Direction and general supervision of all legal matters pertaining to personnel, including certain confidential matters and legal assistance arising out of the employment, death or disability of secret civilian agents required for duty in operations overseas.
- (g) In coordinating all of the foregoing to eliminate duplication in the interests of the Government, and on other matters of inter-agency interest, exclusive OGS liaison with the offices of the Judge Advocates General of the Navy and War Departments.
- (h) Representation on the Personnel Reassignment Board, the Medical Board, the Training Board and the Property Survey Board, within the Office of Strategic Services.
- (i) Direction and general supervision of the Theater Counsel, representing the Office of Strategic Services in each theater of operations.

SECRET/NOFORN  
 (S) (NOFORN)

Subj:

Lieutenant (jg) James E. Donovan, 1(1), (NR)  
 Recommendation for promotion of.

14 February 1944.

-----  
 4. In addition to the duties and responsibilities already described, it should be noted that:

(a) The General Counsel to the Office of Strategic Services directly commands a staff of thirteen attorneys and numerous other personnel, and is responsible for the ultimate direction and review of various activities outside his immediate office. Among the army officers under his present and immediate command are several of field grade.

5. There is no officer or civilian in the Office of Strategic Services possessing the qualifications and abilities of Lieutenant (jg) Donovan who is available for assignment to the position of General Counsel to the Office of Strategic Services. Further, it would be virtually impossible outside of the Office of Strategic Services to secure an officer of the rank recommended, or a civilian, who would adequately assume the responsibilities of such a position, since an intimate acquaintance with and knowledge of the policies, operations and projects of this Agency is essential.

6. Lieutenant (jg) Donovan is uniquely qualified for the position he holds. Following private practice of the law, he served for thirteen and one-half months as Associate General Counsel to the Office of Scientific Research and Development, reporting to the Assistant Solicitor General of the United States. On 1 April 1944 he was appointed General Counsel to this Agency, succeeding a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army. He is physically unfit for sea duty. Lieutenant (jg) Donovan is expected to leave shortly for overseas, on a confidential mission of international importance, with high-ranking officers of the War and Navy Departments.

7. Throughout his tour of duty with this Agency, Lieutenant (jg) Donovan has performed in a superior manner duties and responsibilities far above those ordinarily attached to his rank. In the discharge of these duties, he has amply demonstrated his fitness for advancement to the rank of Lieutenant. If, at a later time, it becomes apparent that the position he holds requires that he have the rank of Lieutenant Commander, a recommendation for a further promotion will be made.

8. It is urgently recommended that Lieutenant (jg) James E. Donovan be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve. The important position which he is so uniquely qualified to fill, and the duties which he is at present fulfilling with such distinction, will be greatly facilitated by his promotion to this rank.

H. S. HENRIK,  
 Commander, NR,  
 Acting.

May 28 1944

From: The Director of Strategic Services  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
Subject: James B. Donovan

1. Mr. James B. Donovan is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in Scientific Research and Development.
2. He is being released for service with the armed forces.
3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.
4. Mr. Donovan is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 28-42.
5. The nature of Mr. Donovan's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.
6. Mr. Donovan's address is:  
  
Office of Scientific Research & Development,  
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan  
Director

SECRET

27 January 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. Patrick Dolan

SUBJECT: Orders

You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to London, England, where you will report to the Strategic Services Officer, European Theater of Operations. You are, thereafter, to act under the instructions of the Strategic Services Officer for the European Theater.

J. Edward Buxton  
Acting Director

SECRET



ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 11 1943

In reply refer to  
FA

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services and acknowledges the receipt of a letter dated May 1, 1943 from Mr. William A. Kimbel, Special Assistant to Director, regarding the assignment of Mr. Patrick Dolan to its office in London.

The Department of State informs the Office of Strategic Services that Mr. Dolan's assignment has been approved and that appropriate instructions have been issued to the American Embassy at London.



4 September 1944

From: Director of Strategic Services

To: Chief of Naval Personnel  
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Lieutenant Russell H. Dorr, USNR, #307194 -  
Supplementary Information re Award of Legion  
of Merit

Encls.: (a) Citation of Lieutenant Russell H. Dorr for  
the Legion of Merit;

(b) Ltr Hq 2677 Regt OSS (Prov) and 1st Infocorps-  
ment AG 200.6/040-P.

1. Lieutenant Russell H. Dorr, USNR, #307194, has been assigned to duty with the Office of Strategic Services since 15 September 1943 and during the period covered by enclosure (a) was serving with this organization in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

2. Enclosure (a) includes a citation of Lieutenant Dorr for his work as a member of the USS "Oil Survey Blimp." This mission was despatched to Romania by the Office of Strategic Services on 1 September 1944 for the purpose of securing intelligence from all available sources in Romania as to the status of oil and aircraft industries for immediate operations and to the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. It involved two hours of flight in daylight over enemy-held territory in Albania, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania. Scheduled fighter escort failed to rendezvous but the mission continued and landing was made at Popesti Airfield near Bucharest, Romania, on 1 September 1944. At the time the mission was under way, it was known that the Romanian government had determined to resist the German forces which had been occupying the country, that fighting was taking place between Romanian and German forces and that the Romanians appeared to have control of Popesti Airfield, south of Bucharest. The progress and outcome of the fighting were still uncertain at the time when the party of six officers attached to the Office of Strategic Services, of whom Lieutenant Dorr was one, took off from Italy.

Chief of Naval Personnel

- 2 -

4 September 1944

It was then believed, and is now known, that the German authorities had issued orders that any members of the Allied Forces found behind German lines on such missions as this should be executed. One member of the Romanian mission, PhM 1/c Nelson Paris, 6548047, USNR, on a later similar mission into Slovakia was captured and executed pursuant to such orders.

The fighting between the Romanian and German forces, in fact, turned out favorably for the Romanians so that when the OSS Oil Survey Mission arrived the Germans had been driven out of Bucharest and Ploesti 30 miles to the north. The early arrival of the OSS group made it possible to take advantage of the confused state of affairs to secure statements and a large volume of documents and other information of great value either as immediate operational intelligence or as strategic intelligence which could not have been obtained had even a few days' delay occurred. The skill, energy and resourcefulness with which Lieutenant Dorr and the other members of the OSS party carried out this mission is, of course, a subject of the Legion of Merit citation, enclosure (a).

3. The combat nature of the Oil Survey Mission has been officially recognized in enclosure (b) 1st Indorsement, paragraphs 1 and 2, which authorizes the wearing of the Bronze Star on the European Theater Ribbon for "Ground Combat," Romania, 29 August - 12 September 1944" by Lieutenant Dorr and by other members of the OSS Oil Survey Mission.

4. Lieutenant Dorr's important contribution to the planning of air attack on Italian railroads, which is the subject of the other part of his Legion of Merit citation, was made in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations at Mediterranean Allied Air Force headquarters at Caserta, Italy, and at operational headquarters of the Tactical Air Forces.

5. The above facts are matters of record in the Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan  
Maj Gen USA

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE December 27, 1944

FROM

CASERTA, ITALY

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

READ TO

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SERVICES, WASHINGTON,  
DEPARTMENT OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
CITIZENSHIP, 12/27/44

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

16-27000-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#21741. - Warehouse to Coppock.

CONFIDENTIAL

We have details of Lt. Russell Dyer, ITN R, achievements in Bucharest and several excellent letters of recommendation to support recommendation for decoration. Trying to get better than Bronze Star for him and need ~~some~~ explicit details on his war work other than Plonesti operations. Is he available? If not, and RGA or S) files already returned supply data?

FILE COPY CONFIDENTIAL

TOR: 12/27/44 9:47 AM

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE  
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

W.R.H. Don 37111  
13250 Macomb St  
Washington DC

17/10/11



Central Intelligence Agency  
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20505

7 Oct 1944

Regulation Room of the  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington D.C.

Dear General.

copy of attached  
 letter to the  
 for commandation  
 of subject 58 P. 1/11

The enclosed letter (copy)  
 from Major General Twining  
 may be pertinent in regard to  
 the matter you were discussing  
 with me when I last saw  
 you. I should have mentioned  
 it to you then. I should be  
 glad to have it back when  
 you have finished with it.

Needless to say I am thor-  
 oughly enjoying my leave.

With best regards

Russell H. Love

E D 2 X

## FIFTEENTH AIR FORCE

Office of the Commanding General  
A. F. O. 280

201.22

21 August 1944

SUBJECT: Commendation

TO : Commanding Officer, Co. B, 2677 Regiment (Prov.),  
Office of Strategic Services, APO 612, U.S. Army

1. Lieutenant Russell J. Dorr, 307194, USAR has rendered extremely valuable services to the Fifteenth Air Force in the analysis of transportation target systems in the Balkans, Italy, and Southern France during the period of March 1944 to date.
2. Lieutenant Dorr's background and experience plus his whole-hearted cooperation and hard work have contributed to the efficiency of the A-2 Section, this Headquarters.
3. It is desired that Lieutenant Dorr be commended for his outstanding work with the Fifteenth Air Force and that this commendation be made a part of his official record.

H. F. TRIMBLE  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

Dr. Langer  
Executive Office

1 October 1944

General Donovan recommends that the promotion  
of Lt. (J.g.) Russell H. Dorr and 2nd Lt. Philip Coombs  
be instituted through channels.

F. J. Putzell Jr.  
Lieutenant (J.g.), USNR  
Assistant Executive Officer



*One copy to Mr. Derr  
\* Mr. Derr's file*

June 9, 1944

From: The Director of Strategic Services.  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel.  
Subject: Russell M. Derr

1. Mr. Derr is applying for a commission in the U. S. Naval Reserve. He is employed in the Office of Strategic Services.
2. He is hereby released for service with the armed forces.
3. If qualified for appointment and is appointed, it is requested that he be certified and ordered to the Office of Strategic Services for assignment.
4. Mr. Derr is recommended as being qualified under Special Program No. 28-42.
5. The nature of Mr. Derr's duties will be such as to warrant a waiver of any non-organic physical defect and it is requested that such waiver, if required, be granted.
6. Mr. Derr's address is:  
  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

William J. Donovan.

BME/rab

April 20, 1943

TO: Director, Officer Procurement Service,  
War Department,  
Washington, D.C.

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

SUBJECT: Mr. Russell H. Dorr

I am very glad to endorse the application of Russell H. Dorr for a commission as a Major.

He is a graduate of Harvard University and Columbia Law School. He was Assistant U.S. District Attorney for the southern district of New York. He was with my law office for three years and worked on very important cases. He subsequently became a member of his father's firm and has an excellent reputation at the Bar.

He has been with this office since January 7, 1942. He has been working in London in connection with economic intelligence and air target intelligence for the Enemy Objective Unit of the Eighth Air Force, and is now organizing work along similar lines for our Special Operations here.

He is a man of the highest integrity and ability and would make an excellent officer.

William J. Donovan  
Director

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

17 April 1943

TO: Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan  
FROM: Russell H. Dorr *RHD*

In accordance with your suggestion, I am giving the following particulars about myself in connection with my application for a commission as major.

I was born on January 17, 1907 at New York City. I was graduated from Harvard in 1929 and from Columbia Law School in 1932. My first job was with the U. S. Attorney's office for the southern district of New York where I worked with Tom Dewey on some of the early racketeer cases.

I came with Donovan, Leisure in January, 1935. You will recall that the main cases I worked on were the Madison oil case, the St. Louis Motion Picture case and the R.C.A.-Erpi case. In March, 1938, I went with Hines, Rearick, Dorr and Hammond in which firm I became a partner on January 1, 1939.

I joined OSS on January 7, 1942. I was in London in connection with economic intelligence and air target intelligence from June through October, 1942. Since my return I have been engaged in procuring intelligence and

Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan  
17 April 1943

Page 12

"making target analyses for the Enemy Objectives Unit in London which is working for the Eighth Air Force, and in organizing work along similar lines for SO here in Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTONIn reply refer to  
FA

June 13, 1942

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Coordinator of Information and acknowledges the receipt of a letter of June 4, 1942 concerning the appointment of Mr. Russell Dorr to do certain work in London.

The Embassy at London has been notified by telegraph of Mr. Dorr's appointment and a copy of the letter under acknowledgment has been transmitted to the Embassy by air mail. The Embassy has been authorized to pay Mr. Dorr \$150 per month of his monthly salary in addition to allowances provided the vouchers covering the payments are approved by a certifying officer of the London office of the Coordinator of Information.

*Subd*

C  
O  
P  
Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington

In reply refer to  
PA

June 13, 1942

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C  
O  
P  
Y

## COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBLE  
TO: COLONEL DONOVAN  
SUBJECT:

DATE: JUNE 3 1942

At my meeting at the State Department yesterday evening, the following memorandum was handed to me:

"Referring to Colonel Donovan's letter of June 4, 1942 to Mr. Shaw, the assignment of Mr. Russell Dorr to the office of the COI in London for three months has been approved by the Department.

"Notification of Mr. Dorr's impending arrival is being sent to the American Embassy in London."

WAK  
W.A.K.



June 4, 1942

The Honorable  
G. Howland Shaw  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

We would like to send Mr. Russell Dorr to London for about three months. Will you please grant him the courtesy and assistance of the American Embassy in London, although he will not be attached thereto.

During his absence from Washington Mr. Dorr will be paid, in addition to his annual salary of \$6,000.00, an allowance of \$6.00 per diem within, and \$7.00 per diem outside of the continental limits of the United States. It is requested that the Embassy pay Mr. Dorr \$180.00 per month of his monthly salary, in addition to his per diem allowance, the remainder of his monthly salary to be paid by the Coordinator of Information in Washington, D. C. We will reimburse the State Department in accordance with Section V-48 of its Foreign Service Regulations for all payments made by the Embassy in his behalf.

I shall appreciate it if you will notify the American Embassy in London regarding Mr. Dorr's status. He is leaving the United States in about a week by plane.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

cc-Col. Donovan (2)  
Mr. Strom (State)  
Mr. Birdsall  
Mr. Barnes  
Mr. Opsata  
Mr. Woodring

Jan 3 1947

Mr. Russell Dorr  
Office of the Coordinator  
of Information  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dorr:

You are hereby designated to go on a special mission to London in your capacity as my confidential assistant. You will specially concern yourself with the interests of the Research and Analysis Branch of my office in maintaining close relations with the British Ministry of Economic Warfare. In this function you will be continuing the work of Mr. John D. Wilson, who will return to Washington shortly after your arrival. You should secure directly from him before his departure all possible information that will assist you in your task.

You may expect two or three cables a week from Washington containing specific questions to be answered by British Ministry of Economic Warfare material. But you should assume the initiative in securing from them and sending to Washington data and information of importance to Research and Analysis studies and in informing the British Ministry of Economic Warfare of Research and Analysis work that interests them.

You will be attached to the staff of the Coordinator's office in London. Mr. Allan Evans is the permanent Research and Analysis representative on the London staff, and, during the period of your stay, you will be Research and Analysis representative with the special function described. You should maintain close liaison with Mr. Evans at all times and look to him for further direction. If, at his request, you should at any time act as substitute for him at a meeting of the British Joint Intelligence Committee when he is unable to attend, you should cable a summary of the proceedings at the meetings.

- 2 -

It is expected that you will remain in London about three months, and, during your absence from Washington, you will be paid, in addition to your annual salary of \$6000.00, an allowance of \$6.00 per diem within, and \$7.00 per diem outside of the continental limits of the United States. It is our understanding that you wish \$150.00 per month of your monthly salary, in addition to your per diem allowance, to be paid to you by the American Embassy in London, and the remainder of your monthly salary to be paid to your account in the Friendship Branch of the Riggs National Bank, Washington, D. C.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

WJD:all:msj  
6-2-42

*file*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

**FROM:** Russell L. Doer, Director, Coordinator of Information  
to Col. Donovon  
**TO:** Col. William J. Donovan  
**SUBJECT:** Liaison Land-Case.

As I told you, at the last meeting "Land-Case" meeting of the Land-Case Administration I was asked by Mr. Stettinius to say something as to the activities of this office. At that time I pointed out that I had only been associated with the organization for a few days and would prefer to postpone any such statement until I knew more about the situation at first hand. It is now this that the request Mr. Stettinius made will be repeated at the meeting tomorrow morning. If so, I propose to follow the following outline in reply.

*This is a weapon*

1. FOREIGN INFORMATION SERVICE. This division is perhaps the best known to persons outside the office. Function to make sure that the American side of news is presented in foreign countries (other than Latin-America), and to spread ideas which we believe will create sympathy for and be helpful to the United States War effort. Necessarily this involves also keeping track of foreign and particularly Axis broadcasts, analyzing their entire output every day and preparing counter material.

The main channel used, of course, is short wave radio network, although other media particularly printed

material are also used.

can be stressed as showing the importance of information and ability to play a decisive part in the struggle and to assist the defense. The division has prominence in foreign broadcasts and in providing information concerning Lend-Lease activities as by the fact that without danger of disclosure will be secret or aiding the enemy.

2. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION. This division though less known outside of our organization and some of our most important work and seems to be our work which could be most helpful to Lend-Lease. The Office of the Coordinator of Information endeavors to keep one hand ahead of current developments and to have as embodied in convenient form for the use of the President, the Army, Navy and other Government departments, information which may become of importance in the war effort from a broad strategic point of view. The division of Research and Analysis is primarily charged with this responsibility of securing and presenting such facts.

Research and Analysis is staffed mainly with a group of scholars including many of the foremost historians, economists, geographers and psychologists in the country. It can handle material in thirty-six different languages. Its mission is to supply important and not readily available fact material on foreign countries.

*here  
is the  
core*

terms - questions of security and military facilities - of strategic importance of a given region, economic and political conditions, etc. - as well as the situation of certain islands, some in connection with the capacity of transportation facilities. This is particularly with the lend-lease program.

Secret and confidential material already contained in intelligence files of our own and other agencies, published matter of general circulation and so forth, are coordinated and supplemented, where that is feasible and desirable, by original investigation and reports from particular observers who have been in the locality in question.

Certain work ~~exists~~ already, and bears particularly on lend-lease, supply routes to Russia, etc., of railroads connecting with Turkish Mediterranean ports, routes connecting with Burma Road.

We are naturally anxious that our facilities, which we believe in many ways to be unique, should be fully employed by other government departments ~~desiring~~ help. If lend-lease administration has any fact or research problems in regard to foreign areas on which it thinks we might help it, will find us thoroughly cooperative. R.A.D. will endeavor to keep in touch with both organizations and to call to lend-leases' attention any material which might be ~~helpful~~.

If any member comes up to the  
 activities of this or that, I am going to be  
 Nationalities Division. I am going to be  
 stating generally that the two main and usually involved  
 were the only ones with a say to the intelligence  
 activities. Intelligence work is such a thing that it is not  
 publicly discussed, and I suppose it would be very hard to  
 state if the question should come up.



Washburn, Scotland.  
13 June 1944

Major Russell D'Oench  
Claridge's  
London, England

Dear Russ:

I want you to know how much I appreciate your  
courtesy and help during these last few days.

I hope that you are going to get off very soon  
to the place you want to go, and I will be sure to see  
Mrs. D'Oench to find out if she will be willing to help  
you there.

Best of luck.

Sincerely,

WJD:frp

31 October 1964

Mr. Lauchlin Currie  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lauchlin:

Thank you very much for your letter about Donald Downes. I was sorry to let him go, but I hope that he will keep in touch with us in his new work.

You wrote me some time ago about Col. Preston Goodfellow. Is there anything further on this matter that I could do?

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1944.

Dear Bill:

I believe that Donald Downes has seen you and has asked to be permitted to resign. It was with great reluctance that I gave my assent, as his recent detail to my office has been a great help to me. His exceptionally broad knowledge of individuals and situations peculiarly qualified him in checking on various people who have been suggested for work in connection with the occupation of Germany and in connection with various Mediterranean countries. My chief concern in all these cases is to assure that only loyal Americans truly devoted to our democratic institutions and ideals receive consideration in connection with these foreign posts. I am therefore most appreciative of the loan of Mr. Downes.

Sincerely yours,

  
Lauchlin Currie

Major General William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Colonel W. L. Rehm

32 December 44

The Secretariat

On 14 December Mr. Donald G. Downes sent to General Donovan his resignation from OSS. The General accepted the resignation in a letter dated 19 December.


We pass this information along to you in case it is needed for Special Funds purposes. The resignation is attached. If it is not required for your records, could you return it for the General's files.

C. A. Bane  
Lt., USNR  
Chief, Secretariat

Attachment

ea

LT B. inc



Charlie,

I am indebted to MDD  
(my sincerest but most  
helpful critic) for the  
suggestion that the  
suggestion be sent to  
the proper person  
i.e. board (if any) &  
Special Funds. Will you  
check & advise, please?

RT

12 November 1944

Mr. Donald C. Downes  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Don:

✓ I am sorry that you feel compelled to leave the organization. You have done fine work for OHS, particularly in the days when we had few personnel and you were obliged to be a host to yourself.

You should have great satisfaction in your service in this war, and I hope that you will keep in touch with us.

Looking forward to seeing you soon, I am,

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dec. 14, 1946

Major General William J. Donovan, Director  
The Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Donovan:

In the light of the conversation I had with you in your office early in November at which I expressed my desire to leave government service, I am enclosing my resignation from O.S.S. I am as I indicated in that conversation taking a writing job. You told me at that time that you could see nothing inconsistent with my having been with O.S.S. and my doing newspaper and magazine work.

I shall of course be extremely careful not to divulge anything of a military nature, -- about methods, military operations, equipment, training, equipment, etc. If I feel that anything I am handling borders on such information before the fighting is over, I shall submit it to you or your representatives for advice.

My real reason for making this change is that I feel I can by so doing be of more service from now on to our country. I was very pleased that when I talked with you you did not disagree.

I most sincerely hope that from time to time I may have the advantage of talking to you and getting your advice on my new undertaking.

Again I want to express to you my profound gratitude for the opportunities you have given me, as long as it was workable, to be of some small service in the war. The jealous fervor of O.S.S. in those early days of 1942-1943 will always remain as the hardest working and the pleasantest days of my life.

Sincerely, and gratefully,



Donald C. Downes



To: Major General [illegible]  
 From: [illegible]

[illegible]

1. I hereby tender my resignation from the [illegible] Services, effective [illegible].
2. I have taken no part in [illegible] activities, as stated, and I have not been shown to be [illegible] to work for [illegible].
3. I hope you will call on me [illegible] and may be of further usefulness to [illegible].
4. This is done in agreement to [illegible] House.

[illegible]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 December 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Lt. Charles A. Kane  
FROM: Captain W. V. Jones  
Special Funds Branch

(1) I return to you herewith memorandum from Mr. J. L. Downes to General Donovan, subject designation.

(2) Special Funds is sending Mr. Downes a report on his services through 15 December 1944.

C-2  
S. W.

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

To: Major General William F. Downes  
 From: Donald L. Downes

Subject: Resignation

1. I hereby tender my resignation from The Office of the Adjutant General, effective December 13, 1961.
2. May I take this opportunity to thank you for the many opportunities, courtesies, and considerations which you have shown me? I consider it a great privilege to have been allowed to work for you these three years.
3. I hope you will call on me if, whenever, and wherever I may be of further usefulness to U.S.A.
4. This is done in agreement with Mr. Currie of the White House.

*Donald L. Downes*

24 November 1944

Mr. Donald Downes  
The White House  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Donald:

Thank you for sending me a copy of Lillian Mowrer's report. I have found it very interesting, although it is not quite the job which it would have been if Mrs. Mowrer had had all your expert knowledge available to her.

I am also grateful for your kind words about my nomination for promotion. I hope that it will not take similar events before we hear from you again.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Handwritten notes:  
Main  
Account  
(D)

book seen in ...

DATE  
TO: MR. O'DONOGHUE

Thanks for letting me see  
the attached file.

JOHN TORRESON

*Mr. Shaw's home telephone  
number is Adams 6248  
jrt*

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_

(12816) \_\_\_\_\_

EXT. \_\_\_\_\_

Form 88 (Revised)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 14, 1944

REC'D 10/14/44 3:11 PM

TO

PARIS, FRANCE

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

DIRECTOR ✓

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-57443-1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#494. To 105 from 109 only.

SECRET

*Donnell*  
 Donnell now working for White House Secretariat. We have no control over him. Your message of his impending arrival is first we know of it. Sorry we cannot be of help.

SECRET

TOD: 10/14/44 4:41

FILE COPY

WJD/JP

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE  
 WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

OCT 11, 1944

FROM

PARIS, FRANCE

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

(FOR ACTION)

DISTRIBUTION

DIRECTOR

(FOR INFORMATION)

SECRETARIAT

PRIORITY  
RECEIVED  
DEFERRED

IN 22715

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

#474. Action: 109, Washington. From 105.  
Information: Armour, London #9494.

SECRET

Informed State Dept. has notified Embassy London of  
Donald Downs impending arrival there. Unless this is by  
your orders request and hope he will not be sent.

*over*

SECRET

TOR: 10/13/44 4:52 PM

FILE COPY

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE  
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT



DD FORM 112  
Rev. 1-22-43

SECRET

REVENUE REPORT

TO: Special Funds Branch  
ROOM:

10 November 1944  
DATE

I hereby certify that the expenses stated below were incurred in connection with official business of a confidential source of the Office of Strategic Services, and that I have not been reimbursed for such expenses from any other government or source.

|   |       |           |
|---|-------|-----------|
| Transportation . . . . .                              |       |           |
| From Washington . . . . . To New York & Return        |       | 12.13     |
| Commencing Oct. 6 . . . . . Ending Nov. 2, 1944       |       | 12.13     |
| Hotels and Meals . . . . .                            |       |           |
| (Not over \$6.00 p.d. domestic or \$7.00 p.d. abroad) |       |           |
| Messages . . . . . Telephone                          |       | 46.35     |
| Taxis . . . . .                                       | N. Y. |           |
|   | Wash. | 1.30      |
| Obtaining Strategic Information . . . . .             |       | 2.40      |
| Special Activities . . . . .                          |       |           |
| Others (Specify) per diem N. Y., 14 days at \$6.      |       | 84.00     |
|   | Total | \$ 135.31 |

Remarks: *re 1792*

Project No. \_\_\_\_\_

(SGD) DONALD C. DOWNS

Branch \_\_\_\_\_

(23064)

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Funds  
Attention: Mr. J. J. A.  
Executive Officer

Mr. Donald Lowmes, Jr., as you know, was named by the Director of Strategic Services to the position in connection with certain special services to be performed for the President.

During the term of his assignment to the position, Mr. Lowmes will incur certain expenses on behalf of the United States Government which the Director desires to be reimbursed out of special funds. It is requested that the contribution by Mr. Donald S. Lowmes' salary will be continued, continue to be paid by OSS.

L. J. Nuttall Jr.  
Lieutenant (J.G.), USN  
Assistant Executive Officer

CC: Ensign Donovan

CONFIDENTIAL

17 October 1944

Mr. Lauchlin Currie  
Administrative Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Lauchlin:

This is to confirm that we shall be happy  
to make Donald Downes available to PMA on a reimbursable  
loan basis to undertake the work about which  
we have talked. I understand that we will continue  
his status when this immediate job is over.

Yours sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

018 Pura 111

20 Sept.

MAJOR LHM

"Could you have someone get hold of Donald Downes and see that he knows of this, and also advise whoever is necessary in our own organization. I don't understand about the T.O. since I believe Downes is a civilian."

*(Handwritten signature)*

Office of the Executive Officer

(10449)

To Col. Doering

19 Sept.

Laughlin Currie has requested that Donald Downs be made available to him (FEA) and continue on our rolls - until he can include him on his own T.O.

I agreed

Donovan (sgd.)

Sept 11 1977  
To Col Dunning,  
Langhain Cruise

has requested  
that Dunnell  
Dunn be

made available  
to him (F&A)

+ continue on  
our rolls - until

He can write  
him on his  
own T D  
I speak  
Dinner

SSO

1944 SEP 20 AM 10 57

SECRETARIAT  
9/29 38

1 Sept 1944

Mr. Cheston

Donald Downes talked to me yesterday from Maine where he is on a Holiday in accordance with Col. Buxton's suggestion. Downes inquired as to the reason for my calling him at the New York office and I told him that you had a message from the General which you wanted to relay to him. He asked the general nature of it, which I indicated, and he then said that, if convenient with you, he would wait until his return to Washington in the near future rather than make a special trip down here to see the message and discuss it. I told him that I felt sure this would be agreeable with you.

4-11  
Ned

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)



Form 88 (Revised)

4-10-44

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE August 28, 1944

FROM

CASERTA

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

IN 18494

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT

**SECRET**RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER#22. 109 to Cheston for *Pneled* ~~Dennis~~

106 has told me of your chance to go with Curie. I am truly sorry that we do not have the same field of activity for your extraordinary talents as we formerly did. Although I hate to see you go, I am sure that with Loughlin Curie you can find an opportunity for real service which you should not fail to accept. I hope you will be in such a position that we will meet frequently. Please accept our appreciation for your great contribution to our work and our best wishes go with you.

**SECRET**

TOR: 8/28/44 2:55 PM

**FILE COPY**IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE  
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

**CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Washington (SS), D. C.

23 August 1944

From: Donald C. Downes, Lieut. I-V(S), USNR,  
c/o Director of Strategic Services,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington (SS), D. C.

To: Bureau of Naval Personnel  
via Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.  
and the Chief of Naval Operations

Ref: Letter from Bureau of Naval Personnel 7 March 1944  
Reference Number Pers-01547-GNL, 37062

1. I have returned to the Continental limits of the United States.
2. While outside of the Continental limits of the United States I reported to the Naval Attache at Cairo, Egypt and to the Naval Observer Beirut, Republic of Lebanon.
3. I had a physical examination on Form 1 while in Cairo, which is being forwarded to the Navy Department by the Naval Attache at Cairo.
4. I am still employed by the Office of Strategic Services.

022

1344 WNC ST BW 2 51

Donald C. Downes  
Lieut. I-V(S), USNRc/o Director of Strategic Services  
c/o Naval Command

Encls.  
10 July 1944

TO: Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
Director of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.  
FROM: D.C. Downes

Dear General Donovan:

I am enclosing a letter for George Bowden which I feel for security purposes should go by pouch. For that reason I am sending it to you with the request that you read it and pass it on to him.

When you were last in Algiers, I tried to get there to see you to discuss this matter of myself with you but I apparently did not get my message there until you had left.

It is apparent to me that I am not of much use to OSS as it is presently organized for war purposes. Possibly I may be useful again when the European armistice has been signed and the emphasis returns to building up a permanent intelligence service in Europe. I have felt that I have been kept on, rather out of charity, because of some accomplishments in the infancy of OSS. With that in mind, I have considered getting into some other work connected with the war until the armistice and then seeing if I could again be of any use to OSS. There is nothing I detest like inactivity.

I have kept Arthur Goldberg advised of these decisions and of my correspondence with Mr. Bowden relative to other activity. I am at present awaiting instructions from him. I would deeply appreciate your personal as well as official advice.

Sincerely,

*Donald Downes*

102

100 173 10 12

DATE 1 April 1944

SUBJECT: Right to Wear U.S. Naval Uniform in an Oath-taking

1. This memorandum is written as a result of my conversation with you at your house on Sunday April 2, 1944 and at your direction.
2. In case I have the opportunity or necessity to enter enemy or enemy occupied territory, I would like permission to wear the uniform of the U.S. Navy.
3. I am a Naval Reservist not on active duty as you arranged with the Navy Dept. in 1942.
4. My rank in the Naval Reserve is Lieut. Senior Grade. I suggest that the rank of the uniform I be permitted to wear be Commander because if I have the opportunity to use it, that rank would be necessary for the type of contact I shall have in the countries concerned.
5. I request that I be notified by wire when this request is granted.

R.T.

FM

2 April 1944

From: Donald G. DOWNES, Lieut. I-V(3), USNR,  
c/o Director of Strategic Services,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington (25), D. C.

To: Bureau of Naval Personnel  
via Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.  
and the Chief of Naval Operations

Ref: Letter from Bureau of Naval Personnel 7 March 1944  
Reference Number Pers-51547-GNL, 57944

1. I am leaving the Continental limits of the United States on or about 4 April 1944.

Donald G. Downes  
Lieut. I-V(3), USNR

c/o Naval Command  
c/o Director of Strategic Services

104 VbB 3 12 12

3A 12

February 28, 1966

TO: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
 FROM: Lieut. Donald G. Brown, U.S.N. 1-0(2)  
 via Director of Strategic Services  
 SUBJECT: Change of Address.

1. I desire to change my official residence  
 from 84 Rockham Place, New York, New York, to:

8 1/2 Pleasant Street  
 Yarmouth, Maine

2. My mailing address is:

c/o Director of Strategic Services  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D.C.

Signed Donald G. Brown

Forwarded: \_\_\_\_\_

William J. Donagan  
 Director

February 22, 1944

TO: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
 FROM: Lieut. Donald C. Donovan, U.S.N.R. 1-9(B)  
 via Director of Strategic Services  
 SUBJECT: Permission to Leave the Continental Limits  
 of the United States.  
 REFERENCES: (a) Letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel  
 December 18, 1943.  
 (b) Letter from the Chief of Naval Personnel  
 December 21, 1943.

1. I am still employed by the Director of Strategic Services.
2. I have been given a foreign mission of a secret nature.
3. It is requested that I be given permission to leave continental United States to fulfill this mission and that I be continued on inactive service for the duration of this mission.

Official Residence:  
 8 1/2 Pleasant Street  
 Yarmouth, Maine

Mailing Address:

c/o Director of Strategic Services  
 Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D.C.

Signed



Forwarded

and Approved:

William J. Donovan  
 Director

21 January 1946

Air Mail

Mr. Donald Downes  
c/o L.W. Lambert  
P.O. Box 176  
Upper Lake  
Lake County, California

Dear Donald:

✓ Your letter to the General has come to my desk. He has been delayed for one reason and another and we now expect him in Washington sometime around the 6th or 7th of February.

During all the time he has been away we have had no word from him as to his plans for you.

I assume that you want to talk with him personally and therefore, I am asking the Secretariat to show him your letter promptly on his return.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Burton  
Acting Director

GEB FS

RECEIVED



just a small part of the story  
 the family, the  
 many, many, many

Dear Mr. [unclear]

I have been very much  
 that you are the best man to  
 with a most delightful sense of humor  
 and I am sure that you will  
 let me know by word to the same address  
 when I can see you in Washington or  
 New York to discuss my next assignment.

I am sure that you will  
 that I came to the states when I did so  
 I understand they are sending someone away  
 home for treatment purposes.

Sincerely,

Edward [unclear]

101

P. O. Box 110,  
Upper Lake,  
California.

January 1, 1945.

Dear General Donovan:

Ever since you left, I have been ill. At present I am out here getting the excellent nursing of my sister. After six weeks of puzzling and endless tests I have been diagnosed definitely as having amoebic dysentery, and in addition I have a fish-tape worm which boasts the elegant name *lyphiliobolus* *latum*. Apparently I picked them both up in Italy. My doctor tells me that of the treatments are successful, I shall be ready for work in from two to four weeks.

Though the San Francisco office of OSS where my brother-in-law Lloyd Lambert works on oriental matters, I have had news of your trip. It sounds very interesting from what I heard and every time I am raring to go and get on with the job.

Sincerely,


/s/ Donald.  
Donald C. Downes.

OGS FORM 1001a

Date 17 Jan. 1944To: Col. Huston.

The attached letter from Mr. Donald C. Downes has arrived for General Donovan. A copy has been sent to Mr. Lennihan, who carries out the financial arrangements with Mr. Downes; Mr. Lennihan gave me his views that since Mr. Downes' activities are so directly under the guidance of the General himself, no further circulation of the letter would seem to be required.

It would seem that we ourselves should take no action, but should hold the letter for the General to see upon his return.



C. A. B. M.  
C. A. Bane.  
Office of the Secretariat

996

(9139)

January 7, 1945

Dear General Donovan:

Ever since you left, I have been ill. At present I am out here getting the excellent nursing of my sister. After six weeks of puzzling and endless tests I have been diagnosed definitely as having amoebic dysentery, and in addition I have a fish-tape worm which boasts the elegant name *dyphilaobothrium latum*. Apparently I picked them both up in Italy. My doctor tells me that if the treatments are successful, I shall be ready for work in from two to four weeks.

Though the San Francisco office of OSS where my brother-in-law Lloyd Lambert works on oriental matters, I have had news of your trip. It sounded very interesting from what I heard and I envy you; I am raring to go and get on with the job.

Sincerely,

  
Donald C Downes

RECEIVED  
JAN 10 1945  
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE

January 1, 1945

Dear General Donovan:

Ever since you left, I have been ill. At present I am very well getting the excellent nursing of my sister. After six weeks of pusling and endless tests I have been diagnosed definitely as having amoebic dysentery, and in addition I have a fish-tape worm which boasts the elegant name *typhloboothrium latum*. Apparently I picked them both up in Italy. My doctor tells me that if the treatments are successful, I shall be ready for work in from two to four weeks.

Though the San Francisco office of OSS where my brother-in-law Lloyd Lambert works on oriental matters, I have had news of your trip. It sounded very interesting from what I heard and I envy you; I am raring to go and get on with the job.

Sincerely,

*Malv*  
Donald C Downes

RECEIVED  
JAN 1 1945

December 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Donald C. Lowner

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed from Washington, D. C. to Algiers, Tagier and such other North African points as may be found necessary in order to complete your mission and prepare a proper report. You will leave as soon as transportation can be arranged after today and will go first to England and from there to North Africa.
2. You are included as a part of the Survey Mission being sent by this office to North Africa, under approval of the Theatre Commander. You will report to Colonel William A. Eddy, USMC, and such other officers as he may designate.
3. Your transportation between England and North Africa will be arranged by the head of this office in London. Your transportation within North Africa will be arranged by Colonel Eddy.

---

William J. Donovan  
Director

December 14, 1942

IN WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

The bearer, Donald C. Downer, is proceeding to England and other points on official business for the Office of Strategic Services. He will carry official mail and documents of that office. I shall appreciate his being accorded the courtesy of any public authorities or officials with whom he may come in contact in order that censorship or examination of mail, documents or baggage may be avoided.

William J. Donovan  
Director

*Downs, Donald* 8509  
*Navy Dept.*

First Lieutenant  
 on St. L. C. Downes,  
 I-7(C), USN, 1st and 2nd.

December 2, 1942

From: The Director of Strategic Services  
 To: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
 Subject: Lieutenant Donald C. Downes, I-7(C), U.S.N.,  
 deferment from active duty.

1. Returned.
2. It is urgently recommended that the request of Lieutenant Downes for deferment from active duty be approved.
3. Lieutenant Downes is currently employed in the Office of Strategic Services, has been given special training and is expecting to leave the country shortly upon a foreign secret assignment.

William J. Donovan

*Form letter*



November 25, 1943

From: Director, Office of Strategic Services  
to: Chief of Naval Personnel  
Subject: Donald C. Downes, Lieutenant, U.S.N.T. I-V(S)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

1. Forwarded for action.
2. Approval is recommended.
3. Lieutenant Downes has been employed by OSS, given special training and is expected to leave the country shortly upon a foreign secret assignment. It is believed that approval of his request would be in the national interest.

---

William J. Donovan  
Director

to: Big Smith  
South Valley

Would you call  
 Com. Mansfield  
 & ask that the  
 matter be held up  
 pending decision  
 by J.C.S. on our  
 military situation.  
 We must not lose  
 Downes & be prepared  
 to stay on a mission  
 (3308) to take an Army of  
 or communication

Director's Office

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Donald C. Downes

DATE: September 25, 1942

TO: James R. Murphy

SUBJECT: Availability for active duty with the Navy

When I finally received word from Mr. Bowden on September 24th to hold my reply to the Navy's questionnaire, I had already sent it an hour or two before and was unable to rescue it from the clutches of the mail room.

Attached is a copy of my reply.

Mr. Bowden suggested that it might be wise to take the matter up with the Navy in advance, so that we would not get caught at the last minute with an order to active duty which might possibly be very much easier to prevent than to have resinded after it has once been issued.

Many thanks for all your trouble on my behalf.

D. C. D.

Attachment

From: Lieutenant Donald G. Downes I-V (S)  
To: The Chief of Naval Personnel  
Via: The Commandant, THIRD Naval District  
Subject: Availability for active duty.

1. I do not request deferment. ☐  
I can report for active duty at the expiration of days  
after receipt of orders.

2. I request deferment from active duty for the  
following reasons (type your reasons):

- My  
reply
1. I am employed by the Office of Strategic Services.
  2. I feel I am of more value here than elsewhere.
  3. I refer you to William J. Donovan, Director of  
the Office of Strategic Services, Washington,  
D. C.

Official resident:

{ 24 Beekman Place  
New York City, N. Y.

Mailing address:

{ Office of Strategic Services  
Que Building, Washington, D. C.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

**COPY**

Address communications to  
the Commandant Third Naval  
District

In reply refer to No.  
P16-1/QR

Telephone Room 4017

Headquarters of the  
COMMANDANT THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT  
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street  
New York, N. Y.

August 21, 1942.

From: The Commandant, THIRD Naval District.  
To: All inactive Naval Reserve Officers,  
THIRD Naval District.  
Subject: Availability for duty.  
Reference: (a) BuPers ltr Pers 369 GLC NDS/P16-1(1203)  
dated August 14, 1942.  
Enclosure: (A) Form letter (two copies).

1. In reference (a) the Bureau of Naval Personnel requested information concerning the availability for active duty of inactive Naval Reserve officers who were commissioned prior to January 1, 1942.

2. Therefore, it will be necessary that you fill in and return to this office, without delay, enclosure (A), in duplicate. The original thereof will be forwarded to the Bureau, and the duplicate will be retained for the files of the Commandant.

3. This letter is not applicable to officers of the Merchant Marine Reserve, or to other officers appointed subsequent to January 1, 1942 and should not be submitted by officers in those categories.

(s) F. R. Lackey

F. R. LACKEY,  
By direction.

May 8, 1944

To Col William J Donovan

From Allen W Dulles

This is in reply to your request for a report on Donald Downes. This man has been of real value in obtaining information for us, ~~acting in a very confidential capacity. He has had no authority to represent himself as having any connection with the Coordinator's office, and in fact his ability to do his work depends upon avoiding any appearance of such connection.~~ We have introduced him to FBI, which has found him helpful, and he has also rendered, I believe, a considerable amount of service for G-2, ~~in fact in the present situation I consider that he is a person of rare qualifications.~~

With regard to his trip to Mexico, the situation is as follows:

Some weeks ago we ascertained that a group of Spanish Republicans in Mexico had certain information, particularly lists of names, which we were anxious to secure in order to complete certain reports on which we were working. It seemed unwise to trust these lists to the mails. The disclosure of the names would, we felt, not only impair the usefulness of the individuals but also imperil their lives. It was, therefore, necessary to have a messenger who could go to Mexico and bring back the information. ~~This might have been handled by the Spanish elements concerned, but had that been done we could not have been sure of securing all the benefits for our own Government. Because Downes had friendly relations with the Spanish group here in New York and enjoyed their complete confidence, he was able to approach the personalities in Mexico in a way no stranger could have done.~~

Accordingly, we facilitated his trip to Mexico City and secured the necessary airplane priorities, after having previously conferred with the FBI's liaison man with us. I subsequently ascertained that this FBI man made a full and accurate report to Washington.

AWD to Col WJD - 8

May 6, 1944

I suggested to Downes that when he was in Mexico City he might present my compliments to my good friend George Messersmith, and that, if he obtained any information which could be of any value to Messersmith, he should advise him fully. Downes told me that he called on Messersmith, and I also had a letter from Messersmith, very largely on other matters, in which he mentioned Downes' visit.

It was originally contemplated that Downes would only stay in Mexico over one plane in order to pick up the material that we desired; however, because of difficulty in obtaining plane accommodations, he spent four days in Mexico.

This matter seemed to me to be of such a routine character that I did not consult with you before Downes left New York. I may add that Downes acted solely as a messenger and in this, as other matters, had no authority to hold himself out as a representative of COI or to take any action whatsoever other than to secure the desired papers and bring them back to the United States.

In passing, I may add that my experience of the past two months here in this work convinces me that our task in obtaining information with regard to the Axis countries will be made infinitely more difficult if some arrangement cannot be worked out which would permit us, in some way or another, to tap sources of such information available in certain South American countries, particularly, countries such as Argentina and Chile which continue to maintain diplomatic relations with the Axis. I appreciate that this is now beyond the scope of assigned work. However, in view of the pressure of work which our regular diplomatic and consular officials have in handling the relations with the South American countries to which they are accredited, it is possible that they will not have the time to develop the sources of information on Axis countries which exist in many parts of South America, and should that prove to be the case COI should be able to render very valuable service in that field.

April 8, 1942

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
United States Department of Justice,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

The person mentioned in your letter of April 7 is in New York and has, I believe, been here for the past week. My people in New York tell me that he went to Mexico to pick up some papers from Spanish and Italian sources in connection with some investigations relating solely to these two countries which our New York office is making. Before he went to Mexico our New York office, in accordance with their usual procedure and following the very cordial and mutually cooperative relations they have worked out with F.B.I. in New York, told Mr. Thurston, who is acting as contact man with them, of the man's trip and in a general way of the purposes. I believe he was in Mexico some four days, which was the minimum possible to permit him to pick up these papers and get a return plane. He is not a representative of our organization.

I may add that the man in question has been able to be of assistance to your people in New York on several occasions.

Faithfully yours,

BILL LONOVAN



COPY

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 7, 1948

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Coordinator of Information  
25th and E Streets, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bill:

I have been advised through Mexican sources that there is presently operating in Mexico one Donald Downs, who is representing himself as being a representative of your organization in Mexico.

Downs is apparently engaged in conducting investigative work upon the representation that he has been empowered by you to do this work. I assume, of course, that Downs has no connection with your organization since the Bureau has received no notification of his employment by you or of the fact that he is operating officially in Mexico. Appropriate steps are, therefore, being taken to bring about a termination of this man's misrepresentations.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar

By special messenger

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan  
Coordinator of Information  
25th and E Streets, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 8, 1942,  
concerning Donald Downs.

In checking into the matter I find that information  
concerning Downs' entry into Mexico from this country was re-  
ceived from arranged contacts in Mexico prior to the time your  
representative in New York City contacted Mr. Thurston of this  
Bureau and advised him of the proposed Mexican trip of Downs.  
Consequently, no advance notice could be given to our Mexican  
contacts that Downs was on an official mission for your organi-  
zation.

In this regard it is suggested that before any  
representative of your organization leaves for Mexico or South  
America, the matter be cleared with the FBI for the reason that  
this Bureau has made definite arrangements with the authorities  
in these Latin American countries to arrest any person claiming  
to represent the American Government, unless he has previously  
been cleared by the FBI.

Sincerely yours,

*Edgar*

*Copy sent Major Bruce*

OSS Form #001

## OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

| TO | Name                     | Initials |
|----|--------------------------|----------|
|    | O. C. Doering, Jr.       |          |
|    | <del>W. B. Donovan</del> |          |
|    | D. C. Lee                |          |
|    | G. S. Platt              |          |
|    | P. F. Pugliese           |          |
|    | E. J. Putzell, Jr.       |          |
|    | A. W. Sulloway           |          |
|    | R. Thrun                 |          |
|    | Files                    |          |

Will you see that  
(23695) this is done. Tell them ahead of time.

To: \_\_\_\_\_

The enclosure, a letter from Sada Tshang has already been given to Colonel Buxton by Major Tolstoy and copies were sent to FEA and the State Department.

Director's Office

(9908)

*William J. Donovan*  
*Don Wgt. Donovan*

24 May 1944

201 Dolan, Brooke

SUBJECT: Letter of Commendation

TO : The Adjutant General

1. Inclosed is a certified true copy of a letter written to Captain Brooke Dolan, AG, AGO 0001154, by Brigadier General William J. Donovan, USA, Director of Strategic Services, dated 25 February 1944.

2. Request that said inclosure be placed in subject officer's 201 file in The Adjutant General's office.

1 Incl  
Incl 1. Subject ltr dated  
25 Feb 44

Devonan G. Lee  
Major, AGO  
Chief, Secretariat

23 February 1944

Captain Brooke Dolan  
XI Bomber Command  
Smoky Hill Army Air Field  
Salina, Kansas

My dear Captain Dolan:

Thank you very much for your note which I found today on my return. I am glad that you are going on in work not only of importance but which is of interest to you. I greatly appreciate the kind of service you have rendered your country through the work you did with us and wish you the best of luck in your new assignment.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

C  
O  
P  
Y



*William L. ...*  
*...*

Mr. Gen. William L. ...  
 Director, The Office of ...  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I would appreciate it if you could ...  
 indicate in my file with the AEC, Washington, D. C.

I am enclosing a ...  
 a Tilted ...

It contains the ...  
 around ...  
 please the credit position of Tilted ...  
 tion is our Report ...

That it is important to ...  
 of strategic importance in Middle East.

It should be pointed out ...  
 author of this letter ...  
 is hardly a disinterested party.

I pass this letter along to you with ...  
 represents a loose thread in my work for you.

Sincerely yours,  
*Brooks ...*  
 BROOKS ...  
 Captain, Air Corps.

*MOS*

60 143  
 Forward Tibetan Questionnaire  
 to Director General  
 GPO 116, 1 Richmond  
 New York, New York  
 6 May 1944

Mr. Gen. William J. Donovan  
 Director, The Office of Strategic Services  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Many thanks for your letter of 25 February 1944. I would appreciate it greatly if you could have a copy inserted in my SOI file with the OSO, Washington, D. C.

I am inclosing a letter which I received from a Tibetan of high standing who was of great service to us last year.

It concerns the Tibetan wool exports which amount to some 4000 tons only per annum. Upon these exports depends the credit position of Tibet. You will find part of a section in our Report devoted to the Tibetan wool trade, I believe.


Major Tolstoy and I both felt, as you know, that it is important to try to help Tibet, since she will certainly be of strategic importance in Middle Asia.

It should be pointed out however that the author of this letter Saka Tshang - as Tibet's greatest wool trader - is hardly a disinterested party.

I pass this letter along to you since it represents a loose thread in my work for you.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM DONOVAN,  
 Captain, Air Corps.





Head Office,  
LHASA (TIBET)

# SADU TSHANG

41711000

EXPORTERS  
TIBET WOOL.

Telephone:  
STOUT-HILL.

Cable:  
Hontley & Hontley.

KALIMPONG (SHENKAI).

11th February, 1944.

To,

Breoke Delan Esqr.,  
Academy of Natural Science,  
Philadelphia U.S.A.

Dear Sir,

We have wrote you a letter last on dated 21st  
January 1944, hope you might have received the same duly.

As regards our Tibet Wool business there has been  
no transaction so far. Not a single buyer has come forward  
to make purchases of Tibet wool this season. Our all the  
money is blocked in wool, and if it cannot be sold out  
then we the Tibetians will have much difficulties. In this  
respects it would be much appreciate and grateful to you  
if you will make an arrangement to import our wool at your  
end. Your kind co-operation and guidance in this matter will  
be ever thankful.


We are all well and hope you are also enjoying  
the same health.

We are anxiously awaiting to receive your favourable  
reply.

We remain,

Yours very truly,  
Sadu Tshang.

L. Gedun.



25 February 1944

Captain Brooke Dolan  
XI Bomber Command  
Smoky Hill Army Air Field  
Salina, Kansas

My dear Captain Dolan:

Thank you very much for your note which I found today on my return. I am glad that you are going on in work not only of importance but which is of interest to you. I greatly appreciate the kind of service you have rendered your country through the work you did with us and wish you the best of luck in your new assignment.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

C  
O  
P  
Y

*William J. Donovan*  
*25 February 1944*

25 February 1944

Captain Brooks Dolan  
XX Bomber Command  
Snoky Hill Army Air Field  
Salina, Kansas

My dear Captain Dolan:

Thank you very much for your note which I found to-day on my return. I am glad that you are going on in work not only of importance but which is of interest to you. I greatly appreciate the kind of service you have rendered your country through the work you did with us and wish you the best of luck in your new assignment.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

*Order, Serial 2743  
1st Lt. Capt. Donovan*

23 January 1944.

Capt. Brooke Dolan,  
IX Bomber Command,  
Smoky Hill Army Air Field,  
Salina, Kansas.

Dear Capt. Dolan:

General Donovan is away at this time,  
but I should like to acknowledge on his behalf  
your letter of 22 January 1944. When the General  
returns we shall call your letter to his attention,  
and in the meantime, we all wish you the greatest  
success in your new assignment.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Duxton,  
Acting Director.

Bane:rlc

HEADQUARTERS  
XX BOMBER COMMAND  
Smoky Hill Army Air Field  
Gallatin, Montana

*Dolan, George H. 1713*  
*January 21, 1944*

21 January 1944

General William J. Donovan, Director,  
The Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Donovan:

It was with regret that I was assigned away from your command. I regret further that I was unable to tell you in person what a role I take in the confidence invested in me as part of the mission directed by you and led by Major Tolstoy to Asia in 1942-43.

My new assignment is to a mission of great importance to the war effort and with a current priority that left me no alternative but to enter on my new duty without delay.

Assuring you of my sincere gratitude for the opportunity to serve and for the responsibilities of my mission for O.S.S.

Respectfully yours,

*George H. Dolan*

GEORGE H. DOLAN,  
Capt., AG, USAF.

**SECRET**

Date: 12/28/44

To: General Donovan  
TO BE HELD FOR HIS RETURN

After further discussion with Mr. Cheston and Col. Connely both of whom talked with Dolan, it seemed desirable to let Dolan go and talk with the Air Corps and if it appeared to be something he was especially anxious to do or actually the work of A-2 for the Squadron, it was decided that Dolan should be allowed to accept; as he expresses a desire to do.

It is believed that you would not wish to block what he regarded as an opportunity for promotion and more responsibility.

G. Edward Buxton  
Assistant Director

(12678)

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## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

27 December 1947

SUBJECT: Captain Brooke Dolan

TO: Colonel G. Edward Dixon, Acting Director, OSS

1. In accordance with your instructions, I talked to Capt. Dolan this morning about the Air Corps proposition. I asked Capt. Dolan if he had any conversations with the Air Corps and he said quite frankly that he had not from the angle of "seeking a job". He did say that he had talked from time to time with some of his Air Corps friends and that, of course, many of them were familiar with not only his prewar activities in China, but also were familiar with the fact that he had been on a secret mission for OSS.
2. I explained to him what the Air Force had in mind for him and he was quite frank in his statement that on the face of it, he would like to have a chance to go to the 20th Bomber Force provided it did not in any way conflict with plans that General Donovan might have upon his return. He stated that the job for which he was to be returned to China for OSS was one for which he felt himself unqualified and he did feel that the Air Force job gave him a better opportunity to render real service.
3. I have informed the Air Corps that a decision relative to Capt. Dolan may have to wait until General Donovan returns, but you might like to consider the desirability of sending the General a cable outlining the request to the Air Corps and asking for an expression of opinion as to how he wanted the matter handled.
4. The Air Corps would like to have a cable sent and if possible some indication of how the General feels about the matter for I gather that they might want to seek a replacement if they can't get Capt. Dolan.
5. You will recall that I told you that he would be used by the Commanding General of this newly activated Air Force for two purposes. (1) To serve as liaison between this Air Force and the Headquarters of Generalissimo and (2) To serve as A-2 officer with particular emphasis on target designation.

E. F. CONNELLY,

Colonel, FA,

Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch

**SECRET**

201-Dolan, Brooke  
(C-1-42)

7201  
1942

Subject: Promotion.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Under the provisions of Circular No. 161, War Department, May 26, 1942, it is recommended that:

|                     |                      |                 |                       |
|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| <u>Brooke Dolan</u> | <u>2d Lieutenant</u> | <u>O-2011-4</u> | <u>(Army Service)</u> |
| (Name)              | (Grade)              | (Serial No.)    |                       |

be promoted to the grade of 1st Lieutenant and that he continue on duty at his present assignment with the Coordinator of Information Service Unit (C.O.I.-S.U.), Washington, D. C.

2. Lieutenant Dolan entered on active duty on April 1, 1942, with the C. O. I. Service Command. His date of rank is April 1, 1942. Since entry on active duty he has consistently demonstrated ability to perform the duties of the next higher grade and capacity for its responsibilities. Lieutenant Dolan has been selected for a task which is commensurate with the grade of 1st Lieutenant.


3. A position vacancy exists, and the promotion of this officer and those previously recommended will not exceed the authorized officer quota.

William J. Donovan,  
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION.



DoDZ-1943

DoDZ-11943



Date: 2 December 1953

To: COLONEL BURTON

Copies of the attached were sent by Commander Woolley to Mr. Scribner, Captain King and Lieutenant Roberts. It is submitted to the Director's Office for information.

C.A.B. *ana*  
C. A. Bane



of the Secretariat

(9159)

Form 2202

SECRET

FROM:

*Commander Woolley*

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

AB 1044:10 N.Y.

Date Rec'd: 11/11

| To                   | Room No.        | Date  |       | Officer's Initials |
|----------------------|-----------------|-------|-------|--------------------|
|                      |                 | Rec'd | Fwd'd |                    |
| 1. <i>Signal Ad.</i> | <i>Room 214</i> |       |       |                    |
| 2.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 3.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 4.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 5.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 6.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 7.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 8.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 9.                   |                 |       |       |                    |
| 10.                  |                 |       |       |                    |

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20640)

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*Personal Distribution*  
**SECRET**

1 December 1948.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: The use of packs of dogs in jungle warfare.

1. I enclose the project by Mr. William A. Prestre, a Swiss who served as an officer in the Swiss Army.
2. I received this paper through the British consul's office in Los Angeles. It is understood that the project was tried to some extent by the United States Government. The consul's office believes that Mr. Prestre is reliable and he states that the trials were unsatisfactory because of the failure to supply equipment and other facilities when required.
3. Mr. Prestre recommends a Canadian, Jack Henson, who he says is an expert in training dogs.
4. The paper is circulated for information in case it may be of any interest to OSS particularly in connection with the operations possibly of operational groups.

Commander H. G. A. Woolley.

CC: Mr. Serimner  
Capt. S. King  
Chief, MH

For information:  
Gen. Donovan

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**SECRET**THE USE OF PACKS OF DOGS IN JUNGLE WARFARE

PURPOSE: This project aims at the formation of dog units trained to deal with, and reverse onto the enemy, such jungle tactics as:

Infiltration  
 Ambushes  
 Snipers  
 Hidden machine gun nests  
 Suicide squads  
 Night harassing  
 It would mean as well a great saving in human lives.

The following organization is not theoretical. Its feasibility has been proved (at least in its major features) although it was not tested in actual action.

Tactical formation: The combat group would be the pack, composed of ten attack dogs controlled by a packmaster and a whipper-in. The dogs would be trained to work in pairs. To avoid dogfights and achieve better team work, the pairs would be formed by one dog and one bitch (spayed). The bitch, lighter and faster would be trained to go for the right arm, thus making an opening for the dog to lunge at the throat and kill. The pack, being composed of 5 pairs, could handle 5 Japanese at a time. The sole function of the pack is to kill on command, and remain under control until such command is given. The reconnoitering is done by a scouting dog attached to the pack-master. A reserve scout is attached to the whipper-in.

The advantages of packs on individual attack dogs as now being used are numerous:

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Ten dogs attacking together make a very confusing target. At close quarters a man will face one dog. He will not face a pack.

In packs dogs are much more aggressive.

Combat discipline is easier on dogs used to work together.

With one pack master for ten dogs there is unity of leadership.

The protection of the pack by a scout enables the pack master to detect the enemy position without giving his own away.

One human life is risked with each individual attack dog. In pack formation one human life is risked with ten dogs.

In the course of the training it will generally be found that 30% of the dogs training for attack will prove unfit because of lack of control or lack of aggressiveness. These dogs would not be discarded. They would be used as TNT carriers. They would be trained to carry a pack of 20 to 30 lbs. of TNT and drag an electric wire. On order they would go onto an enemy position, and bark upon arriving on top of it, thus signalling to their master that the moment has come for him to send the current and blast their load of TNT.

The complete formation of a pack will be:

In vanguard - a scout.

On the lead - the pack master

Behind him - ten killers

Behind them - the whipper-in with the reserve scout.

Behind the whip - 4 to 5 TNT carriers.

Eventually a fire support of riflemen.

There would be 5 such attack packs in a dog unit. The dog unit would comprise as well

One pack of greyhounds

One pack of Irish wolf hounds. Both packs to be used as either fast TNT carriers or fast attack dogs.

Two packs of ten to twenty foxhounds each. These foxhounds would be trained to hunt nothing but Japanese scent.

The dog unit would be in charge of an officer to whom messenger dogs would be attached for liaison with the packs. Thus

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there is the right tactical number of nine packs in one unit.

### TACTICAL USE

(a) Of the pack. The pack can be used in day time as vanguard or in any fighting task. But its use should be restricted at night, because then the dogs will have the advantage of seeing and scenting without being seen and scented.

The pack will proceed under the protection of the scout ranging from 50 to 300 yards ahead according to cover. Upon finding the enemy position, the scout will silently come back and report to his master by lying down at his feet, pointing at the enemy. The pack master will then put his scout on a leash and allow him to lead him back to the enemy position. (Incidentally the scout will be trained to dodge mines.) Upon arriving within 30 to 40 yards of the enemy, the scout will lie down and refuse to go any further (as he has been trained to). The pack master will then send his pack to attack. The 5 pairs will be trained to attack each their own man and hold on until he lies motionless. Five pairs - five Japanese.

The pack master, and he alone, will go in with the dogs, keeping his scout at heel as his personal bodyguard. Thus he will be in the ideal position to be the sole white man in the battle. He will know that anybody he sees or hears is an enemy. Guided by the growls of his dogs, he will creep up to the man held by a pair, knife him, and make for the next man held by the next pair. As soon as the man they hold is killed by their master, the pair will

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go and look for another victim.

This picture, of course, is purely imaginary. In real action there would be great confusion. But the fact remains that the confusion would be all on the side of the Japanese. The dogs can make no mistake. They can see and smell. The pack master is guided by the growls of his dogs and knows that every man is a foe. The Japanese cannot see. If they shoot in the direction of the noise, they may hit their own men struggling with the dogs. Furthermore the flashes of their rifles will reveal their position. The whipper-in (and eventually accompanying rifleman) who stand behind in fire support, will simply have to fire onto the flashes of the Japanese rifles. In order to avoid being hit by his own rifle support, the pack master will crawl on the ground, keeping below the trajectory of the bullets. In case an enemy were to stumble onto him in the dark, his accompanying scout would defend him.

In many cases, before the action begins, the pack master will realize, upon the report of his scout, and upon his own observations, that a preliminary blasting by his TNT dogs might be judicious. (In case of a Japanese camp, entrenched positions, camouflaged machine gun nests, etc) In such cases, he will, according to his judgement, send one or more of his TNT dogs. As soon as their barks inform him that they have reached the position, he will blast their TNT loads through the electric wire they drag after them. And before the enemy can recover of the shock, the pack master will rush him with his attack dogs.

Those TNT dogs should prove useful against pill-boxes, spotted in day time by the scout to be destroyed at night.

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DTACTICAL USE OF THE WHOLE UNIT**SECRET**

Without attempting to describe special tactical situations, the general use of a dog unit should be understood as follows:

First the pack of greyhounds, deployed in line, will swiftly close onto the enemy position. They may carry light loads of TNT to cause an initial disorganization, or they may be used as attack dogs. In any event they will be a swiftly moving curtain that will draw the enemy fire and allow the other packs to close in with less losses. The next wave, close behind them, would be the pack of Irish wolf hounds, that will represent either heavier loads of TNT or heavier attack dogs. These two packs should enable the five attack packs to reach the enemy in good order and proceed to the actual destruction of the enemy. The tactics used to this effect would be similar to those used in the Infantry. Enveloping should very probably prove itself favorable to the dogs. At any rate, it should be decided upon, and carefully directed by the unit commander himself in view of the situation and of the reports sent to him by his pack masters through messenger dogs. Confusion could be even more detrimental to the packs than it would be to the enemy.

The last phase would fall to the two packs of hounds. One pack would be sent casting out to the left flank, the other to the right. As the hounds pick up the tracks of fleeing (or infiltrating) Japanese, their pack master can either send his whole pack in pursuit, or dispatch a man to track down the enemy with one or two hounds on leash. In such cases a pack of attack dogs should go in support to do the killing when the hounds have bayed up their quarry.

The hounds will probably prove themselves very useful to take full advantage of the panic the use of such war dogs is bound to

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cause at first.

They will be even more useful against infiltration. Take for instance the following case.

We have our advanced position at point A. The Japanese infiltrate under the cover of darkness in both flanks, between AB and AC. One pack is sent out casting from A and the other from A to C. At every point B1 B2 B3...C1 C2 C3...where the hounds pick up a scent, a few hounds are dispatched to track down the infiltrators. The voices of the hounds following the scent, will describe openly the enemy maneuvers. They will be heard converging onto the assembly point D from where the enemy purposed to attack our rear. Given away by the hounds the surprise of the Japanese will become a trap for them.

Hounds will be useful, too, in baying enemy snipers on their trees. But it will be found that ordinary scouting dogs will report them to their masters. Their noses raised, the direction of their looks will plainly indicate the location of the man on his tree. However, it may prove useful to have dogs trained especially to spot treed snipers. They could pack TNT, too, and be blasted as they bark at the foot of the tree.

A dog unit such as proposed, could deal with most of the tactical situations met in the jungle. It would have other advantages.

It would be self-sufficient. In the field, the dogs could carry themselves the supplies and ammunitions for the whole unit, including their own food. In cases of emergency the dogs could be

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fed on the enemy they killed. The larger dogs could transport their own wounded master in jungle made litter or sledges. The liaison would be insured by messenger dogs, the night watches by the pack themselves. Night, in, space would be reduced 1 to 2.

A dog unit would be very mobile especially if the men were mounted.

It is difficult to imagine the effect the use of such dogs would have on jungle warfare. It could be turned into a real war of nerves against the Japanese. They would know no rest. To the present day fighting could be added night harassing, which so far seems to have been mostly their privilege. They would be all the time expecting kills to leap at them out of the night without warning. Such a situation can be understood only by the man who has waited for a machan for a man-eating panther. He knows that the panther might surprise him before he surprises her. At any moment she might drop on him from a tree upon which she has climbed without being heard. It is nerve-wrecking.

#### METHODS OF TRAINING

The coming explanations will be followed by the word "tested" when the method has been ascertained by the writer. If the method is mere speculation it will be followed by the word "untested".

Training of the scout: The necessary qualities are - nose, alertness, range. The ideal scout is a cross between Airedale and setter. German shepherds are very silent and alert. Setters are good but noisy. Pointers are less noisy, but more temperamental in man hunting. Collies seem to have a racial habit of going around their quarry. Airedales are hard to control. As a rule the choice should be made on individual qualities.

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After a short and simplified recall training, the scout will be trained to quest forward, right, left and back. The master flags him. Not a sound must be heard. Only a flag whistle is used. One long blast - forward. Two short blasts - forward (tested).

The scout is then trained to find for himself, and nothing else. Each find is rewarded with a piece of meat. It will be the dog's only food, so that he will become a hunt for him. (tested).

Next a Japanese is hiding. (friendly natives of other yellow races can be used in training.) When the scout discovers him, the 'Jap' will drive him off with sticks and stones, and at the same time, the master will recall his dog. The scout will soon learn to come back to his master upon finding a Jap. The master will then put the dog on leash and go with him up to 50 yards away from the hidden man, no further. (A few slingshots from the Jap will teach the dog to keep his distances.) Having shown his dog, the master will pretend to go up to the Jap, shoot him and bring back from the 'body' a piece of meat for his dog. This training will soon be a hunt for the scout. Gradually more difficulties will be worked in (wrong wind, Jap on a tree, night hunts, etc.) The dog is a trained scout. (tested).

The difficulties of this training are to teach the dog to keep his distances and to tell plainly what he has found. Some dogs will report by whining, or bristling, or pulling at their masters' sleeve. A definite technique for both, reporting and keeping distances should be drilled in by frequent repetitions at the beginning of the training. (untested).

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Scouting dogs should also be taught to avoid mines and poisonous baits. It is easy. As the dog of any breed is brought into the area after they have been caught once or twice, he should be treated with tear gas. As to poisonous baits, the dogs will have to be tempted with baits connected with an electric shocker. After they learn to leave them untouched, (untested).

Training of attack dogs: Weight and steadiness are the qualities required of attack dogs. Aggressiveness can be developed in apparently very timid dogs. German shepherds, although the first suspected in them the yellow streak belonging to German breeds, have shown good results. On the other hand Alouales when the first had learned to trust through his jungle experiences, have been a disappointment. But it might have been due to the fact that they were too "blue blooded". Bouviers and cattle dogs are excellent. Doberman are good but tricky. Irish wolf hounds should be great but were not tested in real attack work, neither were Bull-terriers. Boxers are staunch but slow and hang on stubbornly to whatever they get hold of. Specialized breeding should be the answer to the right type of attack dog.

Attack dogs have no other function but kill on command, and up to that moment remain under control. So, they will be taught nothing but control and attack. Of the two control is the most important. One dog breaking at the wrong moment may jeopardize a surprise attack.

Obviously the dogs will have to march through the jungle in Indiana fashion. This is an excellent formation to practice control. Each dog will be assigned a place in the Indian file as number 1, 2, 3... and be made to keep it. In the beginning force-training with

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spike collars will be used. Later the dog will be tested off leash. If he breaks the whipper-in will whip him back until he learns that there is no safety for him outside of his assigned place in the pack.

A pack will become a file of ten dogs marching, downing, maneuvering like one dog. A perfect discipline is condition sine qua non before fighting can be considered. (tested - pack, with three bitches in heat amount them, was handled off leash with good control, which is an even harder test than enemy fire.)

The next discipline training will be for the pack master to down his pack, move away, call them from a distance with his silent whistle and have them reforming in correct pack order as they come up to him. This maneuver, besides being excellent training, is foreseen for the case where the pack master must go ahead alone with his scout to reconnoitre. (tested)

The last step will be to swing the pack from the Indian file into a frontal line. Besides being a discipline training, this movement will as well:

Bring the pack in frontal line for attack.

Put side by side the pairs used to work together. Deploy the pack against enemy fire. Give the pack a sector so that they should not all bunch up onto the same enemy.

This deploying drill will be found to be much easier than expected. It will be gradually worked in by swinging the pack from the Indian file into line at feeding time. (tested).

It would be advisable to consider from the beginning of the training the pack being formed of five pairs instead of ten dogs. Each pair should be kennelled, fed and worked as though they were one (untested).

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This formal drill might appear ridiculous since the pack will later be thrown into the utter confusion of jungle battles. It is necessary though to enforce on the dogs a discipline that will make out of them the robots they will have to be. Furthermore, it will be very useful as a test, not only for the dogs' discipline, but also for the efficiency of the trainers. It will show whether they are qualified to take their pack into action.

The pack being now trained to maneuver into position under good control, the next phase is attack.

Attack training: It must be recalled that attack training is the last training that can be given to a dog. Through attack a dog learns to fight back pain by fighting the pain dealer. He may apply his acquired aggressiveness to his own trainer when his trainer uses the whip or the spike collar to teach him new lessons. Thus attack training must be the last lesson. Besides an attack dog is a dangerous animal whose ferocity should be developed only when it can be turned against the enemy. Yet, the dog has to be taught the technique of killing. It can be done without awaking his dormant ferocity.

A dummy will be made whose throat will be a rope. Under that rope-throat a piece of meat will be hidden. To get at it, the dog will have to pull off the rope. As he does so, he releases a catch and trips the dummy which falls. Then only can the dog get at the meat. Thus the dog will learn to tear a throat and throw a man to get at his meat. Then he will do it without meat. Then the pull at the rope will be made harder so that the dog will learn to put all his might in his stroke. Then the dummy will be dressed in an attack suit (previously worn by a Jap to be im-

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pregnated with his scent.) Next the suit will be worn by a Japanese trainer. The dog will learn to throw him as he throw the dummy. Gradually the Japanese trainer will resist the dog, force him to fight. This training will teach the dog the technique of attack without exciting his ferocity. After that the dogs will be trained to attack the Japanese trainer in pairs, one going for the arm, the other for the throat. (tested).

This system could be improved by the use of a double action dummy permitting to train the pair of arm and throat dogs together from the very beginning. (untested).

Once the pairs have acquired the technique of attack, the five pairs will be trained to attack together. They have learned to march, swing into position and attack as a pack. (tested).

A difficulty that will be met with is that the dogs, attacking in pack formation, have a tendency to bunch up all on the same enemy. This however might be corrected by stricter training from the beginning and intervention of the Japanese trainer during the attack. (untested).

Another difficulty with some dogs is that they don't seem to respond to dummy training. They must be teased according to the usual methods of attack training. The writer must admit that he is not very conversant with those methods. His idea is that, to keep true to the nature of the dog, fighting must remain a hunt, with Japanese as the new game. As little teasing as possible should be given to the dogs during their training. It is when they have reached the fighting grounds, a week or two before action, while they are getting acclimated, that they should be driven fighting mad by the "teasing" of a real Japanese. Then they should be poured into action and consumed as fast as possible, before the climate gets them.

Training of TET carriers: It is very easy. They are simply taught

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to "speak" for their food, by a Japanese trainer hidden in a pill box. On their master's orders, they will naturally make straight for a camouflaged pill-box and bark. They don't even have to find the pill-box. The scout will locate it for them. (tested).

TNT carriers should, of course, be given proper pack dog training.

It might be also advisable to give them a little attack training so that they should not allow the Japs to frighten them away. (untested).

The only difficulty is that the wire that connects the TNT carrier with his master gets caught in snags and breaks. This problem could be solved by letting the wire unwind from a fishing reel fixed in the pack of the dog himself. However tangled the wire might get it will go on unreeling from the dog's pack. (untested).

Training of greyhounds and Irish wolf hounds: As TNT carriers they simply must be taught to run and tear a piece of meat off Japanese trainers. As the pack dogs they have no way to know that, when they do it on real Japs, it will be the last of them.

They soon learn to go straight for the sound of the guns (tested). But they should be trained to the report of Japanese rifles. (All attack dogs should be.) Japanese weapons have a different sound which the dogs should learn to differentiate. (untested).

These hounds should also be given pack dog training.

These hounds could also be used for straight attack, especially the Irish wolf. (untested).

Training of Foxhounds. Besides control, all the hounds have to learn is to follow nothing but Japanese scent. To this effect they will be fed in their kennels by a Japanese trainer. Next feeding time the Jap will move a distance away from the kennels. The hounds will learn to follow his scent to get to their meat. Gradually it will be worked

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...the available number of ...  
 ...trained for attack, and ...  
 ...in England itself to treat ...  
 The writer is certain that the ...  
 ...from other white races ...  
 ...from other yellow races. In fact, ...  
 ...could not be used against the ...

...be advisable during the training of the ...  
 ...with blood (extracted from Japanese under the ...  
 ...treatment) so as to give them a taste for Japanese blood.  
Swimming dog training: There is nothing new in that,  
 ...heads could be considered, although control and silence ...  
 ...small floating torpedoes, which they would, once they ...  
Training of the unit: Throughout the training, the packs should ...  
 ...gradually brought together and drilled as a unit, in order to ...  
 ...dogfights and disorder when they go to the jungle in unit formation.  
 Yet, it will be surprising how little trouble there will be when the  
 dogs are in the real situation. Like hounds going to the net, they

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into a real hunt. (tested).

It is essential to break the hounds from breaking any other scent but Japanese'. It can be done like this. The Japanese' trail will be crossed by a drag (fox or other animal). When the hounds leave their line to follow the drag, they will be ambushed by men who will drive them back with whips and tear gas. They will soon learn.

Considering the size and the available number of English fox-hounds, they could be trained for attack, too. In fact, they could be a marvelous weapon in England itself to track down and bay up any German parachutist. The writer is certain that the hounds could learn to differentiate Germans from other whiter races just as they can differentiate Japs from other yellow races. In fact, there is no reason why war dogs could not be used against the Germans, especially the TNT dogs.

It might be advisable during the training of the hounds to smear their meat with blood (extracted from Japanese under the pretence of medical treatment) so as to give them a taste for Japanese blood.

Messenger dog training: There is nothing new in that.

Swimming packs: Even the formations of swimming packs to establish beach heads could be considered, although control and silence would be hard to obtain. Yet, it might be possible to train retrievers to tow small floating torpedoes, which they would, once they landed on the beach, drag like sleds into enemy positions.

Training of the unit: Throughout the training, the packs should be gradually brought together and drilled as a unit, in order to avoid dogfights and disorder when they go to the jungle in unit formation. Yet, it will be surprising how little trouble there will be when the dogs are in the real situation. Like hounds going to the meet, they

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will sense what is up and, like them, think of nothing else but the hunt to come.

A dog unit trained in this fashion could be a precious adjunct to jungle commandos. They could be a jungle commando in itself.

Of course, the problem has more angles than have been considered. Besides the dogs themselves, dog men would have to be trained to new dog tactics, including jungle shooting, jungle signalling, all sorts of jungle wiles.

Although scouting dogs can be made to work in any conditions, the right wind would be an important element to them. New tactics might have to be developed to gain the advantage of the wind.

The Japanese will have their own watch dogs. To outwit them our packs might have to be smeared with the scent of jungle animals (river cats, buffaloes.)

To insure silence some types of dogs will have to be debarked.

Besides the snares, mines and poisonous baits mentioned above, the Japs will find new ways to fight back the dogs (scent-lures, traps, prickly stuff spread on the trails, etc.) It will be a war of wit. But, we can beat them at it. Anyway, the dogs, with their instinct, can.

Although the writer had many setbacks when gaining the experience that enables him to write this report, he can recall some very encouraging pictures.

A scouting dog came to his master, snarling and bristling. His master followed him. The scout led him through 400 yards of scrub, up to a lagoon, and pointed at a boat full of Japanese 200 yards away. (Such situations must have occurred in Malaya).

The sight of a pointer questing in open ground was revealing. Scenting a hidden white man, he went straight up to him wagging.

**SECRET**

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Further she scented a hidden Jap, 200 yards away. He went up to a hundred yards, to make sure that it was a Jap, and swooped at full speed to report to his master. It showed with what certainty a dog can differentiate racial scents. There is another example of it. A trainer got into an attack suit to fight his own loss. Although the suit was impregnated with Japanese scent, the dogs refused to attack.

A scollie hunting for a sniper, kept on reporting that he had found. Everybody knowing that the sniper was treed half a mile away scoffed at the dog. Yet the dog was right. There was a Japanese among the observers.

The team work of German shepherds in attack was very inspiring. The first pair to down their man rushed to "lend a fang" to the next pair.

A pack of Bouviers, charging in a dense mass, looked like a ball in a nine pin game. They threw one man, and another, and another - then started all over again as the men attempted to rise. The pack was "bunching up" in the worse possible manner. Yet one could not help feeling sorry for the Japs who would have met them, at night, in the jungle, in light khaki.

The sight of a pack of greyhounds coming in Indian file, swinging into line, and charging into enemy fire at full speed, closely followed by Irish wolf hounds is beautiful to look at, but it must be terribly awe-inspiring to Japanese targets.

As to the pack of foxhounds? Well, they were a sure winner.

Such results, obtained in unfavorable conditions should give anyone faith in this use of dogs. Yet it still remains to be done. But that - as Kipling says - is another story.

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There are yet other angles to be considered in this problem. To get the full advantage of the surprise, the first dog attack would have to be made in large number, with reserves ready to exploit the first panic the packs may cause. (Japanese are afraid of large dogs). In the last war the success gained by the first use of gas and tanks was limited because the surprise was on too small a scale.. Thousands of dogs would be needed. They can be produced.

The training of a dog unit will take three months, (even less once the training methods have been systematized). Fifty men (maybe one hundred with the proper help) would come out of it qualified trainers. If they are the right type of men (sportsman and officer material) they should be able to train each his own unit during the next three months. 75,000 to 150,000 dogs could be ready for action at the end of the first six months. Now there are in allied countries an estimated 20 to 40 million dogs, out of which several millions of sizable dogs could be drafted and be ready for action within a couple of years. And this is the one weapon that the Japs cannot avail themselves of.

The reader must not look at these figures as being dreams, or plain raving. He must realize in every detail that this project is scientifically conceived. He must see that the whole scheme of training is built like clock allowing for both, military requirements and dog psychology. Yet, it is simple. It works. There is no fancy, only hard thinking and experimenting, in the dummy for attack training or the reel for TNT carriers. The idea of the TNT dogs themselves cannot fail, and it has an unlimited field. The very idea of packs is as old as man. It is as sound to use them to fight Japs as it was to hunt bears or wolves with them. It should appeal to the sportsmen Englishmen. They will see that this project has been made by a man

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who is a hunter himself. He is an armyman, too, as shows his military knowledge. The gadgets he has invented to train his dogs prove that he is an engineer. He has jungle experience and he knows more. But above all, he wants to work for victory. That's the only thing he asks for - the right to work for victory - no glory, no money, no salary. He is willing to come to London at his own expenses just for one hour interview with a responsible Army officer versed in jungle warfare. Objections will be made to this project, technical - and personal, too. The writer is confident that he can answer them. If he fails he is willing to submit himself to a test. He will train a dog unit in three months without asking even for his keep. He is even willing to train a pack, men's and dogs' expenses paid by himself. He is ready to give his life and take this pack into action himself for a decisive test.

The Allies have proclaimed the right for any man to fight at their side. The writer asks for this right. And if his offer were turned down, the man who took the decision would have to bear the responsibility for the thousands of English lives the dogs could have saved.

William A. Prestre  
 Graduated E.F.P. Zurich.  
 Officer in the Swiss Army  
 Author of a book that put him on  
 the German black list.

**SECRET**

1 December 1943

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: The Use of Packs of Dogs in Jungle Warfare

1. In continuation of my memorandum of 1 December, I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from the British Vice Consul at Los Angeles, together with the biographical details of Mr. Prestre, to which he refers.

H. G. A. Woolley

CC: Mr. Scribner  
Capt. S. King  
Chief, MU

For Information:  
Gen. Donovan ✓

HGAW/edj

C  
O  
P  
Y

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL

440 So. Hill Street

Los Angeles, California  
(Room 13)

ABFTAG

3 December, 1943

Dear Woolley,

The other day I met Captain W. Prestre, the author of the treatise on using dogs against the Japanese. There is certainly no doubt as to his sincerity; he is indeed absolutely obsessed with his scheme.

I asked Prestre to let me have some biographical details and this he has done in the enclosed letter. I seem to remember hearing of some of the books, particularly "Toxins dans la nuit", which I believe caused quite a stir. He also sent me some further details regarding his project which I also enclose. Please let me have all the documents back when you have finished with them.

Yours sincerely,

A. Stanley Forham  
/s/ A. Stanley ForhamCommander H. G. Woolley  
British Admiralty Delegation  
Washington, D. C.

C  
O  
P  
Y

7321 FULTON AVEN. NORTH HOLLYWOOD (CALIF.) 10.1.54

Dear Sir,

You asked for my curriculum vitae. Will you allow me to do it in a way that explain the spirit which urged me into this stubborn fight for this dog idea.

I was born in 1895 in Neuchatel (French Switzerland) in one of those strict calvinistic families. My whole education bore on sciences and mathematics. After getting my B.Sc., I graduated in Civil Engineering at the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale, Zurich, concurrently with my Army and Officer training. I travelled all over Europe, spent two years as a professor mathematics in a technical school, and sailed for Australia. There I founded a business which I later extended to New Zealand.

From my childhood my passion had been horses and dogs. During my travels I hunted all over the Pacific, from Australia to Canada with kangaroo hounds, pig dogs, staghounds, bear dogs.

In 1931, when I returned home, I was struck by the uneasy European situation. I took onto writing. My first book, La Lente Agonie, written in defense of the peasantry reached sales whose equivalent in America would be 1½ millions. La Lumière qui tue was taken as French text book in foreign universities. But my real concern was Europe's future. Les Suicides, a warning that French politics were leading to national suicide, was unheeded. War was inevitable. In 1933 I wrote Toxins dans la nuit, prefaced

C

O by General Barillet, Chief of Staff of the French Army, in the an-  
 P ticipation of the German invasion, the surprise attack  
 Y with air bombing, motorized operations, etc. etc. etc. It  
 was meant as a warning to the Germans, but he refused to do so. My  
 own general staff objected to being called a subaltern officer. French critics objected to my German friends  
 Italian friends would see with the Germans. And the Germans put me  
 onto their black list. But two years later, newspapers were pub-  
 lishing articles about "military maneuvers" and the name of  
 the writer prestre".

In 1935 I was sent by the League of Nations as a secretary to  
 the Sino-Burmese Boundary Commission. I became familiarized with  
 big game hunting, jungle fighting and the law of dogs in both.  
 When the Commission was over, Mr. Leung, the first Chinese Commissioner,  
 asked me to join him in the reorganization of the Chinese-Soviet  
 boundary. But the Japanese war broke out.

In Touraine (France) where I had bought myself a place to hunt  
 with the hounds of Champchevrier, I wrote Bequemaure a study of  
 hounds and a dramatic warning of the impending fate of the last  
 packs of France.

In 1939 when the war broke out, I went back to my regiment.  
 When the first fright was over I was dismissed and returned to France  
 where I wrote for the English Ministry of Propaganda a series of  
 French broadcasts on the British Empire. Then I wrote "Nous les"

C

- 3 -

O Neutrest a drama showing the impossibility for man to remain neutral  
 P in the present conflict. My government tried to stop it, and, before  
 Y the Theatre de l'Euvre could stage it, the German Navy in Paris.

Being on the black list I had to leave, picking up on my way wounded women and children. Very war conscious and eager to strike back, I went, through England to America, which country I expected to play a decisive role in the war. I wanted to get in it. For two years I tried to get into the Burma area, the Intelligence Service, anywhere, but I failed.

The reverses of the British in Malaya brought back to me the work of my own Airedales while hunting big game and capturing the headhunters. Dogs were the answer to Japanese tactics. For a year I fought to have my idea of packs accepted by the U.S. Government. Finally I was given a chance.

Before I started on the project itself, I was two months in The Front-Royal training camp, where I became acquainted with the present methods of training Army dogs. But the system I applied was based more on my hunting and jungle-fighting experiences than on professional methods. Since February I lived for nothing but a chance to try again the project which I now know to be feasible.

Yours truly,

/s/ W. Prestre  
 W. Prestre

7321 FULTON AVE. NTH HOLLYWOOD (CALIF.) JUL 11, 1943

P  
Y Dear Sir,

May I thank you for having attended with such speed and directness to the report I sent you. Should this weapon eventually prove of value to the Allies, it would be my privilege to remember that you started it.

The report being now in the hands of your Washington officers, there is a request I must make for the following reasons:

1. For the sake of clarity I omitted in the first report many details that would add to the feasibility of the project (special jungle training to be given to the dog men, their equipment; use of TNT dogs as antitank weapon; the way to keep track of them in the night so that they don't backfire on us; the organization of the scouts in the pack of hounds; different types of scouts in different terrains, etc. etc.

2. The practical requirements for a start on either a small or large scale have not been formulated. (They will be much simpler than expected).

3. The dog tactics. I felt rather self-conscious about discussing it before much more qualified and better informed men. Yet it will have to be faced. The nature of the task influences the whole training and organization of the packs. As the task appears to be definitely offensive (immense territories to be reconquered)

- 2 -

O the weapon should be developed mostly in its defensive qualities -  
 P mobility and aggressiveness. Close quarters at night is a deadly  
 Y form of offensive. It could be utilized to fullest advantage -  
 special tactics; special modes of fighting; the supporting rifleman  
 being flanked each by a personal pair of attack dogs so that they,  
 too, could ultimately join in the corps-a-corps. It could eventually  
 in constant harassing of the Japanese, at night by the dog units, in  
 daytime by our regulars.

As to the mobility, a natural quality of dogs, it could be  
 developed. The packs could be trained for quick, unexpected  
 thrusts, one night here, next night 30 miles further. They could  
 out manoeuvre the enemy, stretch his reserves, permit envelopment -  
 the ideal manoeuvre for dogs. But here again special tactics could  
 have to be devised.

I could not possibly treat all these questions in my first re-  
 port. They ought to be discussed orally. And in case objections were  
 raised, I would like a chance to answer them. To the difficulties  
 our packs might meet, I would like to oppose the difficulties the  
 enemy will meet. What can a Japanese do? Wait for the dogs lying  
 on the ground? Stand up and shoot? At what? It's night. And the  
 flashes of his rifle will make him a target for our rifle support.  
 Use his knife? The pairs are trained to fight knives. Throw a  
 grenade? In the four seconds it will take to explode, the dogs will  
 have covered 50 yards which is more than the average visibility in



- 3 -

0 the jungle allows. Should he chance to run? With the aid of his P heels and later on the hounds? Would a dense defensive line be the answer? It is an ideal target for our TNT dogs. Should he protect his position with barb wire or electric wire? Would he charge us into the jungle. Then he will find out what our dogs are able to go through it or blast it. Would he even give time to think, caught by surprise, shaken by his Oriental terror of dogs, confused by blind shooting and hampered by creepers?

4. There is another question that might arise. The Japs might have developed new tactics that I am not aware of. I think I should be told about them, to see if the dogs cannot combat them. I would like anything to sit down with an informed officer and study scientifically our actual problems from the dog angle. And it would cost not long. I would be only too pleased to go to Washington at my own expenses to defend the project.

5. I have yet another reason for being so anxious to go. Should they need it, it would be very hard for the Washington officers to get first hand information on the results obtained in the first project. No one inspected the final work of the dogs, except the C.O. And he could hardly be "juge et partie".

So Sir, this is my request. Before a final decision is made, I would like to be granted a hearing. It is not asking much for the possibility of evolving a weapon that we need. And we do need it.

- 4 -

C  
O The Secretary of War announced that our losses in the islands were heavy. They will be heavier. The Japanese said: "We are ready to sacrifice ten millions men. How men are you prepared to lose?"

Could not the answer be "dogs"?

Yours truly,

/s/ W. Prestre  
W. Prestre



One  
Form 88OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 27, 1943

TO GUSTAV, CAIRO

OCT 28 15 30

SECRET

FROM DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

SI

(FOR INFORMATION)

OUTGOING HEADING

CLEAR TEXT  
X CODE OR CIPHER  
ACKNOWLEDGE  
X PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE, TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS DEFERRED

TRANSMIT

For Major General Ralph Royce from Duke.

Appreciate your letter. Have discussed matter with  
Guenther and officials here who all enthusiastically  
concur. Will be most grateful for your future help to  
expedite the whole plan.

*This cable cannot be sent until approved by  
Gen. Donovan or me -  
J.E.B.*

*Mr. Sheppardson says that this  
was prepared before arrival of second  
cable from Toulmin on Duke - and believe  
it should not be sent pending your decision*

FD - T.D.  
WES  
WDB

WDB

OPERATOR'S RECORD

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

October 27, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: General William J. Donovan  
FROM: J. Edward Burton  
SUBJECT: Cable No. 11531 Attached

The attached cable from Toninin follows the letter which Whitney Sheperdson tells me he showed you in New York.

I have talked with Whitney this afternoon. I also had a brief talk with Colonel Duke.

Colonel Duke is very anxious to see you on this matter and Whitney and I recommend that you tell Colonel Duke that you approve heartily of his desire to undertake a dangerous mission inside an enemy country and that you would be wholly disposed to grant his request were it not for objections which have been raised by letter and cable on the part of officials in the theater itself.

I think it could be stated that it would be very difficult to perform this task in the face of this critical attitude and you did not wish to place him in such a position.

-2-

Shepardson and I feel that he will be deeply disappointed and that the only thing which can aid his morale would be some expression of <sup>11/14/54</sup>approval on your part for his sincere desire to undertake the assignment which he has, himself, proposed.

GEB FS

G. Edward Burton

CONFIDENTIAL

Form 89 (Revised)

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE October 25, 1943

FROM

Gustav, Cairo

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(FOR ACTION)

GUENTHER

FOR INFORMATION

DIRECTOR, SECRETARY, CHIEF,  
STAFF OFFICE

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER

#11531. Toulmin for Guenther personally reference your letter.

Extremely unfavorable opinions are held by both AFHQ and AFHQ of Dukas activities while he was here. For the sake of protecting OSS, conferred with Mac when we received the first message to us recommending Dolo. GS and Mac would both hold up\* Theater Commander approval. Assure you there is no personal element in this. It is a problem and we would appreciate any orders or advice in regard to the situation.

\*Consult plain text.

TOR: 10/26/43 10:48 a.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

To: General Donovan

Mr. Shepardon is very anxious  
to have this called to your at-  
tention.

I think he would like to talk  
with you about this.

*R.H.B.*

*To Mr. Shepardon -  
that is your  
responsibility*

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

Date: 3/16/68

To: General Dwyer

The attached letter has been prepared for your signature.

In connection with Lt. Doster's citation, Colonel Davis informs that the recommendation was made by the Air Corps on its own initiative and that for this reason the recommendation has not gone through OCS channels.

Colonel Davis had requested the necessary affidavits from the officials at Wright Field with a view toward making the recommendation here and had been promised the affidavits by these officials. However, subsequently Wright Field notified him that Doster had been recommended by them for the DFC and that the recommendation was at that time proceeding through the OCS channels.

*W. L. Davis*  
*W. L. Davis*  
*W. L. Davis*



6 November, 1943

Mrs. Alexis Doster, Jr.  
6161 Temple Hill Drive  
Hollywood, California

Dear Mrs. Doster:

✓  
I have your letter of October 23 and in reply to your inquiry concerning your husband's citation, I can only tell you at this time that he has been recommended for a citation. If, as we hope, it is subsequently awarded, you will be promptly informed.

You may feel proud of your husband's contribution to the work of this organization. His death while on duty overseas is a great loss to our effort.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director

(Reference)

Dear (person) (Name),  
My father in law has  
sent me a copy of the letter you  
wrote to him about my husband.  
I am so glad that you were pleased  
with him. He had great faith  
in the U.S.S. and was very  
proud of the opportunity which  
your organization gave him  
in taking the mission over.  
I have never seen him as  
happy as he was before he  
left for the Middle East - and  
I am deeply grateful to you

all for your belief in his ability,  
I am very interested in his  
mission and in its outcome  
I hope after I return to  
hear the full story of which  
I now know just the beginning.  
I am sorry my husband didn't  
have more time in which to  
prove his great ability - some-  
thing I believe in with a  
pardonable lack of wifely  
modesty. However, he often  
told me what a fine lot of  
men he had under him - and

I am sure that I will carry on  
with the mission successfully.

My husband told me  
before he left that he had  
been cited in a report made  
on the test for the Air Corps.

Is it possible for me to have  
a copy of this citation for  
my son? He is only seven  
months old now, but I know  
that this and other things  
such as the letter to my father-  
in-law will make Alex 3rd  
very proud when he is older.


Many thanks for the

Nice things said about my  
husband.

Very Sincerely,

Barbara Dexter  
(Mr. Alex Dexter)

6161 Temple Hill Drive,  
Hollywood, Cal.



ALEXIS DOSTER  
LIEUTENANT COLONEL

October 13, 1945

General William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

Mrs. Doster and I are deeply grateful to you  
for taking time from your busy life to pay tribute  
to our son, Lt. Alexis Doster, Jr.

If you have hoped to give us some happiness  
you have succeeded well, indeed such are the things  
which sustain us right now.

Wishing you continued success in your brilliant  
work.

Very sincerely yours,

*X Alexis Doster*

AD:RMF

October 18, 1944

Mr. Wadsworth Foster,  
Litchfield  
Connecticut

My dear Mr. Foster:

✓  
Enclosed please find a letter which has just reached us from Commander Halliwell in Cairo and which he has asked to have forwarded to you.

At the same time I want to express, both personally and on behalf of my associates in the Office of Strategic Services, the profound regret with which we learned of your son's untimely death while serving his country on foreign soil.

May I add to this expression of our sympathetic understanding of your sorrow our feeling that you must also have a deep sense of pride for the gallant manner in which your son bore himself throughout his entire association with this Agency. I consider that he maintained the best in American soldierly tradition.

With sincere respect and full appreciation, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

**INFORMATION**

ROUTED TO:

**CONFIDENTIAL**Subject *Initial Report on Costa*

*in 4 on in 10/10/50*  
 Date  
 Address  
 Data

| To                    | Room No.                    | Date | Re: 1 | Pl: 1 |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------|-------|-------|
| <i>Mrs. Liskner</i>   | <i>21080</i>                |      |       |       |
| <i>Mrs. Liskner</i>   | <i>21070</i>                |      |       |       |
| <i>Mrs. O'Donnell</i> | <i>First Floor Assembly</i> |      |       |       |
|                       |                             |      |       |       |
|                       |                             |      |       |       |
|                       |                             |      |       |       |

(15105)



CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: 1st. Lt. Alexis Doster, Medical Report.

TO : Colonel G. B. Puenther

1. 1st. Lt. Alexis Doster was first seen by me on 21 September 1943. At this time he complained of vague pains in the chest, and back, headache and fever, all of one days duration. His temperature was 102° F.; however, a physical examination was negative. He was admitted immediately (21 Sept. 1943) to the 38th General T.I. Army Hospital. The attending physician there reports that his course was as follows: for the first four days there was fever, but physical examination remained negative. His temperature had improved to normal by the fifth or sixth day; he had no symptoms and felt quite well. On the afternoon of 27 September his temperature again became elevated and although the only specific symptom was slight weakness in the legs, he did not feel at all well. On the following day, tremors and weakness were present and a diagnosis of infantile paralysis was made. From then until death, his course was typically that of fulminating infantile paralysis. Tremors and weakness proceeded rapidly to frank paralysis of the muscles of the extremities, those of speech and swallowing and finally those of respiration. He was placed in a respirator and died quietly and painlessly while asleep in the respirator on the morning of 1 October.

2. A complete autopsy was performed and the gross findings confirmed the clinical diagnosis of infantile paralysis, in that the only significant finding was edema and congestion of the central nervous system. Reports on the microscopic sections taken at the time of autopsy are not yet available. In an attempt to isolate the virus of infantile paralysis, suitable materials were inoculated into susceptible animals and the results of these studies should be available within a short time.

3. By an unusually fortunate circumstance, the U.S. Virus Commission in the Middle East is stationed at the 38th General Hospital and all of the skill and facilities at their disposal for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment were made available to Lt. Doster. Dr. Paul from Yale University, a world-renowned authority on infantile paralysis, and now a member of the Virus Commission, was in constant contact with Lt. Doster during his illness. In addition, he was attended by Capt. Paul Havens whom I have known intimately for two years. Capt. Havens has probably as excellent a medical background as it is possible to get and is an exceptionally well qualified physician, especially in infectious diseases, including infantile

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paralysis and other neurotropic virus diseases.

4. In addition, Lt. Doster received nursing care from an individual who had had extensive experience, including a year's training with Sister Kenny, in the care of patients having infantile paralysis.

5. It is my opinion that there is little or no possibility of doubt as to the diagnosis of infantile paralysis. Reports on the microscopic sections and animal inoculations should remove all possibility of doubt. In addition, there have been several other deaths from Infantile Paralysis in the Middle East; and the period of time that Lt. Doster had been here corresponds closely to the incubation period of the disease.

6. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the facilities and especially medical skill available to Lt. Doster could scarcely be surpassed anywhere, and that everything that possibly could have been done for him was done.

7. It is almost inconceivable to me that foul play or the experiments which he is said to have undergone recently could have played any significant part in his illness or death.

ROBERT H. GREEN  
Lt. (M.C.), USNR


1st. Ind.

1304/jwc

O.S.S., Hqs., USAFIME, APO 787, 4 October 1943.

TO: The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

1. Attached is the Medical Report of the OSS Medical Officer, Middle East Mission, covering the death of 1st. Lt. Alexis Doster which is being forwarded as requested in Cable No. 1222, dated 2 October.



G.B. CUENTHER  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
Director, OSS, M.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: 1st Lt. Alexis Joster, 38th General Hospital, 1943

TO : Colonel G. D. Joster

1. 1st Lt. Alexis Joster was admitted to the 38th General Hospital (1943) to the 38th General U.S. Army Hospital. The attending physician reports that his course was as follows: He was admitted with fever, but physical examination remained negative. His temperature and pulse dropped to normal by the fifth or sixth day; he ate and slept quite well. On the afternoon of September 15, his temperature became elevated and although the only physical symptom was stiffness of the legs, he did not feel at all worse. On the following day, tremors and weakness were present and a diagnosis of infantile paralysis was made. Then until death, his course was typically that of infantile paralysis. Tremors and weakness persisted rapidly to the point of paralysis of the extremities, those of speech and swallowing, and those of respiration. He was placed in a respirator and died peacefully while asleep in the respirator on September 16, 1943.

2. A complete autopsy was performed and the gross and microscopic findings confirmed the clinical diagnosis of infantile paralysis, in that the gross finding was oedema and congestion of the central nervous system. On the microscopic sections taken at the time of autopsy, no virus was available. In an attempt to isolate the virus of infantile paralysis, suitable materials were inoculated into susceptible animals. The results of these studies should be available within a short time.

3. By an unusually fortunate circumstance, the U.S. Virus Commission in the Middle East is stationed at the 38th General Hospital and all of the skill and facilities at their disposal for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment were made available to Lt. Joster. Dr. Paul, from Yale University, a world-renowned authority on infantile paralysis, and now a member of the Virus Commission, was in constant contact with Lt. Joster during his illness. In addition, he was attended by Capt. Paul Havens whom I have known intimately for two years. Capt. Havens has probably as excellent a medical background as it is possible to get and is an exceptionally well qualified physician, especially in infectious diseases, including infantile paralysis and other neurotropic virus diseases.

4. In addition, Lt. Doster received nursing care from an individual who had had extensive experience, including a year's training with Sister Kenny, in the care of patients having infantile paralysis.

5. It is my opinion that there is little or no possibility of doubt as to the diagnosis of infantile paralysis. Reports on the microscopic sections and animal inoculations should remove all possibility of doubt. In addition, there have been several other deaths from Infantile Paralysis in the Middle East; and the period of time that Lt. Doster had been here corresponds closely to the incubation period of the disease.

6. Furthermore, it is my opinion that the facilities and amount of medical skill available to Lt. Doster could scarcely be surpassed anywhere, and that everything that possibly could have been done for him was done.

7. It is almost inconceivable to me that foul play or the experiments which he is said to have undergone recently could have played any significant part in his illness or death.

*Robert H. Green*  
ROBERT H. GREEN,  
Lt. (M.C.), USMC.

1st Ind.

HBG/jwf

O.S.S., Hqs., USAFIME, APO 787, 4 October 1943.

TO: The Director, Office of Strategic Services, Washington, D. C.

1. Attached is the Medical Report of the East Mission, covering the death of 1st Lt. Alexis Doster which is being forwarded as requested in Cable No. 1222, dated 2 October.

*G. B. Guenther*  
G. B. GUENTHER,  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
Director, OSS, M.E.

MEMORANDUM OF ACTION TAKEN ON  
MATTERS RAISED BY GENERAL CONYAN

**SECRET**

1. Proposal to Establish a Secretarial School at OSS.

On June 23, 1943, this matter was referred to Commander Vanderbilt for investigation. A report was received and considered by the Executive Committee at its meeting held on July 26, 1943. At that meeting it was recommended that Major Sears ascertain from each Branch Head the present state of his need for secretarial help and that Mr. Cheston investigate the practices of the Army and Navy in this respect. Attached hereto are two memorandums dealing with the subjects one from Commander Cushing in re the Navy and one from Colonel Onthank, who formerly concerned himself with civilian personnel matters for the War Department. These were considered at a meeting of the Executive Committee held on July 29, 1943, and it was recommended that OSS not operate its own school for totally untrained people but that rather refresher courses be given in OSS as the need develops. It was agreed that Lieutenant Commander Cushing's memorandum indicated that there was a real problem in securing personnel for training schools.

The latest written requests of the branches indicates additional requirements of 110 stenographers and 78 typists. As a result of a recent telephone survey of branch needs, these totals were reduced to 49 stenographers and 40 typists.

2. Preparation of Organization Chart and Description of U.S. War Agencies.

The Secretariat ascertained that such chart and description has been prepared by the Office of War Information and copies thereof have been obtained by the Special Relations Office. One copy is attached hereto and others are in the files of the Secretariat.

3. Investigation of Motor Pool, Particularly with a View to Determining Whether Enlisted Men or Uniformed Women Drivers can be obtained to Take the Place of Present Chauffeurs.

At a meeting of the Executive Committee held on June 23, 1943, this question was referred to Commander Vanderbilt. A report was presented by Commander Vanderbilt's office to the Executive Committee on Monday, July 26, 1943, in which it was stated that there was a possibility of securing AWVS drivers. The Committee recommended, however, that such drivers not be used because of (1) a possible lack of full control by OSS of such drivers and (2) security difficulties arising from a rapid turnover.

**SECRET**

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It had also developed that the use of limited service enlisted men in the motor pool would have to be charged against OSS allotments. It was therefore determined instead that an attempt would be made to better the efficiency and appearance of the present chauffeurs and Major Sears has issued an order to that effect.

4. Investigation of OSS Messengers - - Particularly to Determine Whether Limited Service Enlisted Men can be Obtained for this Work Without Being Charged Against our Headquarters Allotment.

After it had been reported to the Executive Committee at its meeting on June 23, 1943, that limited service men could not be obtained without being charged against the OSS Headquarters Allotment, it was the sense of the meeting that no further action be taken on this matter.

5. Availability of Additional Space.

This subject has received the attention of Major Sears and the Executive Committee. The question of including OSS within the Military District of Washington has complicated matters but it now seems that OSS will receive an additional 45,000 feet in the Army Annex Building. In return, however, OSS will give up its space in Temporary M and 8,500 feet in the Auditorium.

6. Steps to be Taken at This Time to Prepare for OSS Activities in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific Theaters.

The proposal for OSS activities in the Southwest Pacific Theater has been denied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the proposal respecting the Pacific Theater has been disapproved by Admiral Nimitz. In anticipation of developments, however, the California Area has been placed under the command of Commander Vanderbilt in accordance with the attached General Order. In respect of Theater Officer personnel, Lieut. Strieffler and Major Harold Jones have temporarily been given other duties.

7. Control of Resistance Groups

No action has been taken on this matter in view of the fact that resistance groups seem to be effectively controlled by their respective exile governments in London, with whom Ambassador Biddle is in close

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

touch and whose reports are available to OSS. In addition close contact is maintained in Washington and London with representatives of such governments.

8. The Furnishing of Transportation for Intelligence Purposes.

This matter was referred to General Magruder who is taking under advisement the entire question of securing intelligence from those engaged in air transportation.

9. Investigation of OSS Training Schools.

Two or more of the following men have visited all the schools except Maritime: Mr. Cheston, Captain Davis, Colonel Hoag, and Lt. Colonel Kenerick. Captain Davis has visited the Maritime School.

After consultation with branch heads and Lt. Miller, Colonel Hoag has arranged for adequate housing facilities. Arrangements have also been made to winterize latrines in Area "P" and, if the Director so desires, to have tents in that area winterized. Since it developed also that additional instructors would be needed, arrangements were made to take care of the situation temporarily by having personnel from the various branches made available for teaching duties, pending the working out of more permanent arrangements. A report from Lt. Miller to Mr. Cheston on this subject is attached, and Colonel Buxton has requested Mr. Cheston to report to the Director on the entire subject of schools and training.

10. Use of Facilities of Air Transport Command for Communications to and from the Field.

Colonel Lowman reported in respect of one project that an interchange of communications facilities had been arranged with the Air Transport Command in a very successful manner. Colonel Lowman further reports that there is no need at the present time for any additional arrangements.

SECRET

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Charles [unclear] DATE

FROM: [unclear]

SUBJECT: Secretarial [unclear]

In [unclear] the various services [unclear] graphic personnel [unclear] respect. This meant that [unclear] women who could type at the rate of 80 words per minute. [unclear] Navy and so in [unclear] 42, they started [unclear] from one to two weeks, for every [unclear] being continued at the present time. The [unclear] in the class of GAK-2 (old 40) for a [unclear] their induction training which covers, [unclear] shorthand, general instruction in the [unclear] By this method they have started [unclear] to a minimum of 45 words per minute for by [unclear] hand. The Navy also conducts re-fresher [unclear] personnel and these courses are of two types: a) [unclear] hours for a period of three weeks, [unclear] other, upon recommendation of the supervisor, [unclear] hours upon a period of two weeks at the rate of one hour [unclear] day.

The Navy has never conducted an actual [unclear] school, that is to say, they do not train clerical help to a [unclear] or secretaries. They admit that it is very difficult [unclear] personnel in this category and that is [unclear] last six months, being now at an all time low. However, from September to June, the high schools throughout Washington conduct free courses in the evenings for all individuals interested in studying stenography in all its phases. There are also schools connected with various departments of the Government, one for example being maintained by the Department of Agriculture. There is a nominal fee connected with this.

The Navy also gives a six hour indoctrination course at various times to new employees which covers the general topics in connection with employment by the Navy and it also trains certain of its typists to become machine transcribers and oper to various labor saving machines.

If any further information is needed, I will endeavor to get it for you.

He  
L. J. C.



## OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF WAR

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Charles L. ...  
 FROM: ...  
 SUBJECT: Stenographic Training School

DATE

1. In compliance with your request, I have investigated the possibility of utilizing one of the existing schools for stenographers and typists in the War Department for the purpose of giving additional training in stenography and typing to OSS employees. Tentative arrangements have been made with my old office, the Civilian Personnel Division, Office, Secretary of War, to permit ten or twelve stenographers and typists to take their stenographic-typing refresher course. This number would constitute a rotating group. I have every reason to believe that final permission will be forthcoming shortly.

2. This stenographic-typing course is under the supervision of a woman who is most efficient and who has an excellent reputation for training in the War Department. The course is aimed at raising the standard of stenographic and typing performance to a certain level which has been fixed by the Office, Secretary of War at 90 w.p.m. for stenography, and 35 w.p.m. for typing. This standard meets the average needs. The course does not aim to train stenographers and typists de novo.

3. The War Department, generally, feels strongly that these training courses are essential because of the mediocre quality of stenographers and typists now being obtained. These refresher or build-up courses are regarded as necessary to bring the stenographers and typists up to an acceptable quality of work level.

4. I shall be glad to complete negotiations if it is desired.

*A. H. Onthank*

A. H. Onthank,  
Colonel, M. I.

AHO/frh

FROM: .

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

RECEIVED  
12 1943  
SECURITY  
OFFICE  
STRATEGIC SERVICES

H Kenneth P. Muller

| To                     | Room No. | Initial | Comments |
|------------------------|----------|---------|----------|
| 1. Mr. Charles Cheston |          |         |          |
| 2.                     |          |         |          |
| 3.                     |          |         |          |
| 4.                     |          |         |          |
| 5.                     |          |         |          |
| 6.                     |          |         |          |
| 7.                     |          |         |          |
| 8.                     |          |         |          |
| 9.                     |          |         |          |
| 10.                    |          |         |          |

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in *To* column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in *To* column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in *Comments* column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(2580)

CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. Charles [unclear]  
 FROM: Lt. Kenneth C. Miller  
 SUBJECT: Instructional Staff at Area E

DATE: 11/17/51

I. PRESENT SITUATION:

The present situation at Area E is none too happy. We are in actual fact trying to handle twice the number of students with a staff of instructors no larger than what we had previously. The following is a list of the instructors now on duty at Area E:

Captain Phillip Allen, Chief Instructor  
 Major Fairbairn (part time)  
 Lt. Ezra Shine  
 Mr. Kloman  
 Mr. Melberg  
 Mr. Crook  
 Mr. Hoffman  
 Mr. Leon

In addition, three M.C.O. assistant instructors:

Cpl. Bauman  
 Cpl. Amunred  
 Cpl. Gorsica  
 Sgt. Honeywell (part time)

What we call the "A" lectures present the most difficult problem. These lectures include the techniques of living under cover, in fact the entire life of an under cover agent, as well as such facts as he needs to know about enemy organizations and their counter-espionage methods. Lt. Shine and Mr. Kloman are attempting to teach this "A" material to three classes of twenty men each.

Police methods, including wire tapping and lock picking are handled by Mr. Crook and Mr. Melberg. (over)

Demolitions are being handled entirely by Captain Allen, who, in addition, must perform all the duties of Chief Instructor.

## CONFIDENTIAL

Weapons and close combat are being handled by Major Fairbairn and in his absence, Mr. Leon teaches close combat.

Maps and map problems are being handled by Mr. Leon and Mr. Hoffman.

Cipher is being handled by Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Crook.

It has been perfectly obvious to me that the instructors are being asked to do more than they can continue to do.

## II. MINIMUM NEEDS FOR NEW INSTRUCTORS:

For our "A" lectures we need a total of three instructors. Such instructors must be of keen intelligence and must be able to act as conducting officers for the classes which they teach. With one more instructor added to the two we have, Lt. Shine and Mr. Kloman, we will be able to get by. However, it seems likely that Lt. Shine and Mr. Kloman will both be sent overseas. In order to make sure that we have a sufficient number of instructors for this most important material, I feel that we should immediately find three new men who can do this work.

Police Methods: Police methods will require one more man with police or investigative background. We have such a man in mind, Mr. Joseph Stanley Sienkiewicz. If he can be commissioned he will be available to us.

To relieve Captain Allen from the job of teaching demolitions, we should have two additional officers. It is impossible to handle twenty men at a time in a demolitions class and conduct them as safely and efficiently as we feel they should be conducted. Two men are, therefore, essential in order that we can divide the classes into smaller groups.

If Mr. Leon is commissioned as we have requested, it will be possible for him to take charge of weapon training in Major Fairbairn's absence. No additional help in weapons and close combat would seem to be necessary at this time.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Since Mr. Hoffman is subject to the Draft, we cannot count on his services much longer. We feel, therefore, that we need two more instructors who could handle maps, sketching and night map problems.

Cipher: For cipher instruction, which must be done in a rather individual way, we need two additional instructors.

## III. MEASURES TO RELIEVE THE IMMEDIATE SITUATION:

Until the necessary steps can be taken to procure and train new instructors, we are taking the following measures: Major Paul Dehn, of the British SOE, has been loaned to us for the month of August. He will be able to handle the "A" material and, because of his past experiences, will bring to our instructors much fresh material. Colonel Skilbeck, also of the British SOE, will be with us during the month of August. We intend to use him to help break in new instructors.

Mr. Scribner of SO, has kindly consented to let us have the services of Major Cheever until his transportation comes through. Mr. Henry Cannon is completing his training this week and will join the staff of instructors immediately. Though he will be of limited use at first, we expect that he will be of increasing value to us.

We are transferring one of our instructors from Area A and just as soon as some new men we have taken on there are broken in, we will shift one and possibly two men to handle demolitions and maps.

## IV. MEASURES OF A MORE PERMANENT NATURE:

In order to find three men referred to above for the "A" material, Major Wickham will, through his contacts with MIS, attempt to recruit the kind of men we need. The necessary additions in demolitions and maps can be found fairly easily at Area A and, if necessary, at Fort Belvoir.

Mr. Sheinwold, of the Message Center, is going to help us find men to teach cipher.

## CONFIDENTIAL

If our request for a commission for new and better methods is granted, we will have our own methods.

We feel certain that by the end of the month, we will have the staff built up to the point where we can handle all the demands put on us and we have a few instructors ready to go overseas to answer the requests that are almost certain to come.

V. STATION COMPLEMENT:

There is a further complication caused by the fact that although our student enrollment has been raised from 32 to 60, the Station Complement has been reduced from 49 to 39. We well realize the problems facing the Hq. and Hq. Detachment, but under the present circumstances, we cannot give as good services to the students as is necessary under the present cramped conditions. It would be appreciated if an addition of ten men to this station complement could be effected.

*Kenneth P. Miller*

KENNETH P. MILLER  
1st Lt., AUS  
Acting Chief,  
Schools & Training Branch

**SECRET**

(25)

7 September 1943

MEMORANDUM TO STERLING DOW

Subject: Orders

1. You are hereby authorized and directed to proceed to Cairo, Egypt, where you will report to Colonel Gustave Guenther, USA, Strategic Services Officer, Middle East Theater.

2. Authority is hereby granted to carry such secret and confidential documents as may be necessary to the proper performance of your mission. These documents may be shown to authorized persons, but must remain in your possession at all times until they are delivered to their addressees, if any.

John Magruder  
Brigadier General, USA  
Acting Director

THRUN:BLACK

APPROVED:

*W. T. H. Beale*  
Middle East Theater Officer

**SECRET**

## BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

CIRCLE 6-8800

480, FIFTH AVENUE  
(ROOM 3500)  
NEW YORK CITY

CHB:40.

BY SAFF HANE

Confidential

Dear Colonel Buxton,


I am informed that Mr. D. M. is attempting to  
England from Canada, on his way  
to come to the United States to see you.

My staff has telegraphed to him  
of his officers from the same area to the  
Brace and stationed is partly applicable. It  
should be more up to date in its knowledge of  
the subject.

He has instructions to place himself  
at your disposal for any examination of him and  
informal talks in which you may, if you wish, include  
him.

Sincerely,  
*G. R. Ellis*  
G. R. Ellis,  
Colonel.

Colonel G. Edward Buxton,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.





## BRITISH SECURITY CO-ORDINATION

CIRULAR 6-0300

100, FIFTH AVENUE  
(100th floor)  
NEW YORK CITY

CHE:dd.


BY NAME NAMEConfidential

July 13, 1961

Dear Colonel Buxton,

In reply to your letter of the 9th instant, I am trying to locate Drage who is on leave in Canada, and will get into touch with you as soon as I have heard from him.

Sincerely yours,

  
C.H. Ellis,  
Colonel.

Colonel G. Edward Buxton,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.

*How L*  
*Mr. Hugh Miles*

July 7, 1953

Confidential

Colonel C.H. Ellis  
 British Security Coordination  
 630 Fifth Avenue  
 New York City

Dear Colonel Ellis:

Referring to my recent request to permit Mr. Charles Drage to come down to our Washington Office for a little visit, let me say that I did not have any thought that he would lecture to any large group about anything.

Mr. Hugh Wilson and others feel, however, that if he could come down and have an informal confidential talk and exchange ideas with the Planning Group and one or two additional people like Brigadier General John Magruder, Mr. Whitney Shepardson and perhaps Colonel Ellery C. Huntington that his general knowledge of a certain area would prove very stimulating to those responsible for formulating plans.

I wanted to do this because it occurred to me that my telephone call was not very explicit..

Sincerely yours

G. EDWARD DIXON

ACTING DIRECTOR

GEB FS



## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Major Deering

DATE: June 23, 1943

FROM: Hugh R. Wilson

SUBJECT

On Friday before General Donovan's departure I left with him a draft of a telegram to Drage in London asking Drage to request the appropriate British to permit Mr. Charles Drage to come down and talk to ~~you~~. Drage is now in New York or Toronto.

Bill said that he would telephone Bill Stevenson for this permission. The subsequent day I sent Bill a memorandum asking him to tell me what, if anything, had taken place. To this I received no answer.

I would appreciate it very much if you would endeavor to ascertain what, if anything, took place so that I can get Suxton to act if Bill did nothing. The matter is somewhat urgent as Drage's leave expires quickly and he will be leaving the country unless we get authorization for him to stay.

HAW

Hugh R. Wilson

*1*  
*31*  
*Col. Deering*  
*Ellis, Mr.*  
*Said he would be glad*  
*to have this matter*  
*330*  
*when he comes down*  
*from a trip*  
*Mr. Hugh Wilson*  
*present in telephone*  
*conversations*  
*7/8/43*

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan  
FROM: Hugh R. Wilson  
SUBJECT:

DATE June 19, 1944

May I trouble you to note on this memorandum whether you found time to take action in respect to our desire to have Charles Drage instructed to talk to us about his work and experience?

I left you a suggested telegram to David Bruce but you stated that you preferred to take it up with Bill in New York.

*Hugh R. Wilson*  
Hugh R. Wilson

*mystery*

SECRET

To David Bruce

Please see \_\_\_\_\_ and state that Mr. Charles Bruce, now in New York or Toronto on leave, is personally well known to Hugh Wilson, and I should be grateful if, on the expiration of his leave, he could be allowed to remain in the United States a month or so in order that we may discuss background information on China and other Far Eastern areas where he has had long experience. Please emphasize that this is purely for purposes of painting local picture for our benefit and no question of exchanging secret information or discussing organizational matters.

(2)

29 June 1945

Reverend Joseph J. Donovan, S.J.  
Loyola University  
1137 South Grand Avenue  
Los Angeles, California

Dear Reverend Donovan:

General Donovan received your letter of the 11th instant shortly before his departure from the City and he asked me to acknowledge it for him.

The second letter referred to in yours of the 11th has not reached us, but the latter letter gives a clear picture of the situation.

General Donovan has requested me of his officers now en route to Chungking to attend to this matter for him. Just as soon as we are in receipt of word as to how we can help Fathers Dunno and O'Brien in reaching their objective, you can be sure that we will communicate with you.

Sincerely yours,

Edwin J. Putzell, Jr.  
Ensign, U.S.N.R.

PUTZELL: NELSON

Colonel Heppner requested the writer to forward the above communication. He stated that he would notify us if and when he learned that we could be of help to the two missionaries.

To:

*Dick Heppner*

*Will you  
see that  
this is  
done with*

Director's Office

(3308)

*D.*

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF LAW  
117 SOUTH BROAD AVENUE  
LOS ANGELES

OFFICE OF THE REAGENT

June 11, 1945

Major General William J. Donovan, S.S.A.  
1647 - 30th Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Donovan:

Many thanks for your wire which I have just received. I assume my second letter reached you wherein I stated that the objective of Fathers Dunne and O'Brien is Chungking. Their purpose in going into that area is to establish residence and to carry on missionary work. As they already have several years experience in China and are now University Doctors, they would be most acceptable to the Chinese even under ordinary conditions. You can imagine how they would be received at this time when practically all missionary zeal is directed towards self-preservation. I mentioned in my letter about the diplomatic value of having men of this type in the Chinese Capital.

As you perhaps know most of the Catholic missionary societies are giving wide publicity to the recent academic honor received by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, notably 'Jesuit Missions', 'The Field Afar' and 'The Far East'. And sending two such men over to China at this particular time would certainly go far towards demonstrating to the Chinese that we are not satisfied with halfway measures where their interest is concerned.

My apologies for dropping you in rank when I wrote you recently. Maybe it was the long association of your distinguished name with your World War I rank, that gave Colonel and Donovan a certain character and indissolubility, which not even a couple of stars could affect. However, Brother Scott set me right with his usual definiteness.

It is needless for me to assure you that whatever you can do to expedite this move of zeal and diplomacy will be sincerely appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

*W. J. Donovan*  
W. J. Donovan, S.J.

JJD:g



Date: 5 June 1943

To: GENERAL DOWMAN

Davies says that if these missionaries go to Nanking they will be immediately captured by Japs and undoubtedly killed since they are coming in from the outside. It may be possible for them to get as near Nanking as possible remaining in safe territory. However, to get to Nanking itself would be impossible.

8/16/43

R. P. H.

Davies working on  
Office of the Secretary  
Passage to Chungking  
RPH

(9139)

10-100-1  
FORM 10

# OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE JUNE 10 1943

TO REV JOS J DONOVAN S.J. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF LAW 1137 SO. GRAND AVE., LOS ANGELES

FROM

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

CLEAR TEXT  
CODE OR CIPHER  
ACKNOWLEDGE  
PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

OUTGOING HEADING

CQ13 59 USGOVT CQ WASHINGTONDC JUNE 10 1142pm

UNLESS DESIGNATED OTHERWISE, TRANSMIT THIS DISPATCH AS DEFERRED

TRANSMIT

YOUR LETTER IS RECEIVED. MY DUTIES DO NOT INCLUDE THE CARE OF  
TRANSPORTATION REFERRED TO IN THE FIRST PART OF YOUR LETTER.  
HOWEVER I AM VERY WILLING TO HELP IN WHATEVER WAY I CAN.  
COULD YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT PARTICULAR PLACES OTHER THAN  
THE CAPITAL REFERRED TO YOUR FRIENDS WOULD FIND THAT THEIR  
DUTIES IMPELLED THEM TO VISIT.

WILLIAM J DONOVAN

(CONFIRMATION COPY)

OPERATOR'S RECORD

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-38821-1

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Col. J. J. Donovan  
1647 - 16th St., N.E.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

For the purpose of identification I am writing to you in regard to your School of Law, and have been for some time past. I have heard about you ever since you were with the U.S. Army in the war and a similarity of names between me and you. I have been around Washington, D.C. and have been in contact with my work, our points have never crossed.

I have recently been given an assignment to work on the matter and I am referring the matter to you in the hope that you can give me a solution. I understand that you are Director of the Bureau of Strategic Services which amount other things to be in with taking care of transportation and other incidents necessary in travel from the United States to enemy territory. The California Province of the Jesuits has a Mission in China and at present some Jesuits are located there. It is in the neighborhood of Peking. The latest word we have received is that two groups of Jesuits interned at our College at Shanghai. Two of our friends who were in the Mission seven or eight years, returned to the United States about four years ago. They are young men and to be of greater use in China they attended the University for the study of Chinese in their Ph.D. degrees. One, Reverend Paul A. Brian, received his Ph.D. in Oriental Languages, at the University of California, at Los Angeles; the other, Reverend George Dunn, is at present at the University of Chicago and is completing his thesis for his Ph.D. in International Law. His record to date has been one of superior achievement. Both of these men are native Americans but their chief interest is in getting back to China. The advantage all around for such a move is tremendous. They are young, alert, brilliantly educated and could do wonderful work among the Chinese who have high regard for intellectual endowments as reflected in academic distinctions. Before the war broke out for a University, - it was to be called the Nanking Institute under the direction of the Jesuits, - the effect on the Chinese would be tremendous and would be exceedingly valuable for furthering their work when the war is over. Naturally, the Chinese would welcome American missionaries at a time when most of them have left in the interest of discreet safety. The presence, too, of these American Jesuits working zealously in the interest of


JJD:-2

the Chinese would certainly have a diploma or some other relations between ourselves and China are considered. I will elaborate on what it would mean to the Chinese, to the Chinese people and to the Chinese Government were these men not in the line of scenes in this time of stress and strain. For I am sure that they will suggest themselves to you.

You might be interested in knowing that on the recent visit of Madame Chiang Kai-shek to California, Loyola University conferred upon her an honorary degree. It was the only degree she received on her tour although I understand at least twenty colleges and universities offered her the honors of Academe. At the ceremony she responded very generously and spoke of her great regard for the Catholic influence in China and her esteem for the Jesuits.

Now to my immediate purpose in writing you. What can be done to give these men safe conduct to Nanking? Both will be glad and anxious to leave as soon as possible after the middle of August. I think I have given you the situation as accurately as possible, allow and I await with eagerness your reply. I need not assure you that I shall be most grateful for anything you can do to effect this move.

Sincerely yours,



Joseph J. Donovan, Jr.

JJD:g

(24)

The Honorable  
O. Howland Shaw  
Assistant Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Shaw:

This office is dispatching Miss Grace S. Dolowitz, Senior Clerk, to London, England to perform duties at that location in connection with the operations of the London Office of Strategic Services. This employee should arrive in London in the very near future.

It is desired that \$100.00 per month of Miss Dolowitz's salary be paid to her through the facilities of the American Embassy in London, England. This arrangement is to be effective June 1, 1943. Upon date of arrival in London, England, this employee should be paid a quarters and living allowance of \$1134.00 per annum. All of Miss Dolowitz's salary except the \$100.00 per month to be paid in London, England will be paid by this office in Washington, D. C.

During Miss Dolowitz's trip to London, England, she will be entitled to per diem allowances of \$8.00 within the continental limits of the United States and \$7.00 while outside the continental limits of the United States, except that only \$3.00 will be allowed while aboard ship where meals are included in the cost of transportation. These per diem allowances are to cease effective upon date of arrival in London, England.

Vouchers issued in favor of Miss Dolowitz may be honored by the officials of the American Embassy in London, England when presented over the signature of an Authorized Certifying Officer of the Office of Strategic Services. All payments made on behalf of this employee will be reimbursed to the Department of State in accordance with the provisions outlined in Section 7-43 of the Foreign Service Regulations.

It will be appreciated if the Department of State will make the necessary arrangements regarding this employee's financial status with the officials of the American Embassy in London.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

KEWoodring:kmd  
cc:  
General Donovan (2)  
Miss Dolowitz  
Captain Alcorn  
Mr. Sherwood  
Pay-Roll Section  
Mr. Kimbel

Mr. DuRant Lt. Woodring

June 11, 1943

TO: Lt. Commander C. H. Coggins  
 FROM: R. Davis Halliwell  
 SUBJECT: Ossip Pernikoff

With further reference to your memorandum to General Donovan, of May 29th, paragraph 3 regarding the subject, primarily because of the question of this man's security, it does not appear to me to be practicable to give great consideration currently to his use in SO.

Knowledge of his background, attainments, etc. however, are noted, and if, as, and when some specific job arises where it appears that he can be made use of, it is the writer's intention to so act.

It is my belief, however, that this man should be thoroughly investigated by the Schools and Training Branch, and under date of June 8th, I wrote Colonel Baker a memorandum asking that he re-investigate this subject.

The writer called Colonel Baker on the telephone today and suggested that he consult with you on the advisability of using this man in the Schools and Training Branch.

I believe your request to General Donovan stated you "would appreciate a definite decision in this case in order that further plans may be made to utilize his services elsewhere", and would suggest that this can best be answered after Colonel Baker has had an opportunity to consult with you.

For purposes of the record, I am sending a copy of this memorandum to both General Donovan and Colonel Baker.



cc: General Donovan  
 Colonel Baker

R. Davis Halliwell  
 Lt. Commander, USNR  
 Chief, SO

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 3, 1963

SECRET

TO: General William J. Donovan  
FROM: R. Davis Halliwell  
SUBJECT: Commander Coggins' memorandum to you of May 29th re Mr. Harry Lawrence Dougherty and Oseip Pernikoff.

It just so happens that the writer has been talking with the president of Mr. Dougherty's former firm in Thailand, as has Mr. McClure of the SI Section. We will find out from him what he believes are Mr. Dougherty's possibilities.

With reference to Pernikoff, this is the Duane Bureau Agent formerly referred to Colonel Huntington by Commander Coggins last fall. We turned Pernikoff over to Donald Downes, but it now appears he can be useful in other places, and I understand from Coggins that ONI is willing to check him.

I will provide a more precise report on both of these people as rapidly as possible.

Attached herewith is an extra copy of the memorandum if you should care to forward it to Commander Coggins.

*Sup memo -  
also attached*

*[Signature]*  
R. Davis Halliwell  
Lt. Commander, USNR  
Chief, SO

RHH:ET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 1, 1963

SECRET

TO: General William J. Donovan  
FROM: R. Davis Halliwell  
SUBJECT: Harry Lawrence Dougherty

Supplementing my memorandum of this morning on the subject, on whom Commander Coggins forwarded a copy of his application for a commission as a Naval Intelligence Officer, stating that he had learned that this man is highly regarded, a capable and potential officer, whose qualifications are obviously of greater value to OSS than to ONI.

It so happens that the writer has been in contact with Herman F. Scholtz for some months in connection with our Thailand responsibilities, (and incidentally, I believe Mr. McClure is about to secure the permanent services of Scholtz).

Mr. Scholtz has been one of the most prominent Americans in Thailand, was president of the International Engineering Company for whom Mr. Dougherty worked.

Mr. Scholtz came in this afternoon and I quizzed him on the subject of Dougherty with the result he has dictated for me the attached memo.

Scholtz further stated that in his opinion this man was only of modest calibre, is one of the heavy, bulky type, not a self-starter, worked reasonably well under direction but soon wound down if left to his own initiative.

Mr. Scholtz has already recommended to this young man that his talents could best be used by the Army in more or less conventional duty, and it is Scholtz's opinion that the man's experience in Thailand and his other



- 2 -

experience in the Phillippines does not warrant his being rated as particularly good calibre for us.

I am sending you this memorandum in duplicate in the event you would like to pass the original or a copy along to Commander Coggins.

We are passing Dougherty's papers under accession #12260B to the files.

  
R. Davis Halliwell  
Lt. Commander, USNR  
Chief, SO

RDH:ET

cc: Capt. Hoffman

SECRET

July, 1948

TO: Lt. Commander R. Davis Halliwell  
 FROM: Herman F. Scholtz  
 SUBJECT: Harry L. Dougherty

The subject was employed by International Engineering Company for approximately five years. He originally came to our company as a representative of General Paint Company, and after a period of one year, he was employed by us directly.

Mr. Dougherty has a pleasing personality and is honest, but he is the slow-going type who needs prodding occasionally.

He has a slight knowledge of the Thai language and a better knowledge of Spanish, I understand, although not knowing Spanish, I have taken this from his statements.

During his connection with our company, he was stationed in Bangkok and possibly made one or two short trips up country. His business was soliciting orders for paint, building materials, and other items bought by local Chinese dealers. During the period he spent with us, he met quite a few Thai people and has a fair knowledge of their background and social life.

H.F.S.

HFS:ET

SECRET

April 3, 1943

SUBJECT: Orders and Transportation  
THRU: Brigadier General John R. Seane  
TO: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations  
Division, War Department, General Staff,  
Room 3 E 800, Pentagon Building, Arlington,  
Virginia

1. It is requested that air transportation to London be provided at the earliest possible moment for the following personnel:

Captain Russell Grace D'Oench, AUS,  
ASN 0923566

2. It is understood that the War Department has been advised by cable from London, dated March 25, 1943, that Captain D'Oench's dispatch to London has been cleared with the Theater Commander.

3. Attached for transmittal to the Adjutant General is a memorandum requesting issuance of appropriate orders.

William J. Donovan  
Brig. Gen., AUS  
Director

Attachment

SECRET

SECRET

April 1, 1943

SUBJECT: Orders

THRU: Chief, Combined Subjects Section, WD, Room 10740, Pentagon Building.

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Request necessary order directing Captain Russell Bruce O'Connell, 0023566, AUS, to proceed from Washington, D. C. to London, England, reporting on arrival to the Director, Office of Strategic Services, London, England, for permanent duty.

2. It is requested that the OPO WD Gen Staff designate mode of travel in accordance with T/R enclosed herewith.

3. A flat per diem of \$6.00 should be authorized while traveling by air.

4. A baggage allowance of fifty-five (55) pounds while traveling by aircraft should be authorized. It is further requested that additional baggage be authorized to be shipped by vessel of transport to destination.

5. It is further requested that authority be granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such other places as may be necessary in the performance of this mission. The duties to be performed being exceptional, may require more than seventy-two (72) hours at different places for their performance therefore, a delay of not to exceed thirty (30) days at any place where necessary should be authorized.

6. Officer will have in his possession WD WD Form 82, showing inoculations and immunizations required before leaving the continental limits of the United States, and will require physical inspection as prescribed in Army Regulations.

7. Officer should be authorized to wear civilian clothing in the performance of this mission.

8. Request that an APO be designated for this officer while on duty in London.

9. Reimbursement for the expenses incurred in connection with the travel will be made to the War Department by the Office of Strategic Services.

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
Director

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON D C

Ser. No.  
USMO/879

May 7, 1943

From: The Director of Strategic Services.  
To: The Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.  
Subject: Relief for Major Russell Duncan, USMC -  
request for.

1. Major Duncan who has been assigned to the  
Maritime Training Division of the Office of Strategic  
Services is being transferred to the SO Branch to shortly  
proceed abroad.

2. It is requested that a relief be provided for  
Major Duncan to take command of the Maritime Training  
Division of the Office of Strategic Services and ordered  
to report to the Naval Command, Office of Strategic Services.

William J. Donovan

Date Nov 11, 1946To: Major Deering

I saw Mr. Taylor about the attached file this afternoon. He told me that he thought there was really no justification for OSS taking on such a unit and said that he did not want this group attached to PW staff.

I suggest, therefore, that the matter be taken up again with Gen. Donovan. A preliminary check might be made with Dr. Langer but I am inclined to agree with Mr. Taylor that this is not an activity which OSS should or is authorized to engage in.

*DCL*  
D. C. L.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

Date May 11, 1946To: Major Deering

I saw Mr. Taylor about the attached file this afternoon. He told me that he thought there was really no justification for OSS taking on such a unit and said that he did not want this group attached to PW staff.

I suggest, therefore, that the matter be taken up again with Gen. Donovan. A preliminary check might be made with Dr. Langer but I am inclined to agree with Mr. Taylor that this is not an activity which OSS should or is authorized to engage in.

*DCL*  
D. C. L.

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO : General [unclear]  
 FROM : Edward L. Taylor  
 SUBJECT: Atlantic Memorandum [unclear]

DATE: [unclear]

I have attached to this memorandum a copy of a letter from the [unclear] to the [unclear] of the [unclear] particularly that [unclear] it would be useful to have [unclear] attached to it. It is logically it should be part of the [unclear] in some way to that branch. I would like to have [unclear] over, that we will have some [unclear] unit of this [unclear] to the [unclear] and [unclear].

Attachment

E L T



April 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Harold Smith  
 FROM: Cornelius Dubois

When I talked to you some time ago, and when I wrote to you, I was proposing something which may be too drastic to move for the present time. It involved salvaging virtually the entire OWI Bureau of Intelligence, 235 people, and removing it from OWI, setting it up centrally.

Since then I have been working out a much modified proposal, which seems much more practical to those with whom I have discussed it. This proposal involves only 90 people at most and could be launched for less than \$100,000 for its first quarter.

This proposal is based on leaving in OWI the functions which OWI now plans to continue and establishing separately only those functions which, from the point of view of the Government as a whole, are now being neglected and which are needed for a more effective prosecution of the war on the home front.

The attached table shows what has happened.

Enough of the non-statistical research staff is being retained to provide research assistants for the OWI deputies. The media people retained will be able to handle the daily summaries for Mr. Davis and Mr. Eisenhower — and practically nothing else. The field staff of the Surveys Division is liquidated.

The future picture is not too black in the case of Surveys. The facilities retained plus those in Agriculture and the Census and the available private sources should be able to take care of the Government's needs for opinion sampling in the field.

But nobody will be integrating these facilities; nobody will be responsible for overall research planning; nobody will be putting the findings together. And nobody will be putting together the other kinds of facts on the civilian war effort which are avail-

- 2 -

CONF

available but unused all over the Government.

What I propose now therefore is essentially a central clearing house for facts about the civilian war effort. The job would be primarily one of coordinating and reporting the facts which are gathering. The list of raw materials to be used by this unit would look something like this:

|  |  |
|--|--|
| Trend statistics on progress of programs and civilian activity | Now compiled in many agencies. Some need modification. |
| Field Reports  | Now available in every agency that has a field staff.  |
| Opinion studies  | OWI, BAA, Census and private sources                   |
| Correspondence panels  | OWI, CPA, et al  |
| Rumor analysis   | OWI, or Census   |
| Censorship intercepts  | Censorship   |
| Tension area analysis  | Justice, OCD   |
| Foreign influence  | OWI, OES, FAIS   |
| Media influence  | OWI, Army  |
| Group & Organization analysis                                  | OCD, OWI, Justice                                      |

To the extent that existing data are not in usable form, every effort would be made to persuade other agencies to modify their procedures. If this fails, the new unit should have funds to reimburse another agency to do the job right. The Census field staff of 65 supervisors can be used for many such assignments. Funds will be needed anyhow to reimburse OWI or Census or Agriculture for basic trend studies, probably using a panel technique, particularly in the field of post-war planning. (Nobody is responsible now for keeping track of the public's views on the peace).

As I see it now, this job can be done with a staff of 90 people, a personnel budget of \$336,500, other costs of \$413,000 or a total annual budget of \$749,500. The starting rate would be considerably lower. About \$95,000 would be enough for the first quarter. Maybe less. And maybe experience will show that fewer than 90 people can handle the job.

For an additional statement of the reasons why I think this is urgent, I refer you to the attached, which I am considering using as a magazine article.

#8

HOME FRONT REPORT

Restricted

July—, 1943

## OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

April 26, 1945

Brigadier General W. J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:


Thanks for your attention yesterday morning.

Here is the dummy report and descriptive memo. With the papers I left with you it tells the story of the kind of service this government needs to keep itself posted on the home front.

I'm enclosing also the memos I mentioned which include some detail on sources of information.

As to where the job should be done, OWI is the logical but not at the moment the auspicious place. Personally I don't care where as long as the job gets done. Ideally but perhaps not so logically it belongs to the Vice-President, to serve both Congress and the Administration.

Sincerely,



Cornelius DuBois

Fanton Hill, Weston  
Westport, Connecticut

Enclosures



### SCOPE OF REPORTS

In pretty much the same style as the Army Special Services Reports, the reports might follow somewhat the same outline as the attached dummy. This dummy is probably larger than an ordinary weekly report would be, but I have done that on purpose in order to illustrate different types of material.

Pages one and two would be a descriptive summary of the week's contents, so that the administrator can spot the items which it is most important for him to study.

Starting on pages three and four and continuing in several pages in the back of the book would be a rather complete document of the findings of some large study.

From then on the report would be departmentalized.

In participation, it might be that salvage collections are falling off badly, while other indices of public cooperation (blood banks, volunteer attendance, bond sales,) are improving or holding even.

The text would discuss these trends in the light of what are the known reasons for falling off. This could be further illustrated (see pages 6 and 7) by discussing the statistical trends in four cities in terms of non-statistical facts reported in these cities by field representatives. The factors which previously counteracted downward trends in some cities might be applied more generally.

Under the heading of restrictions or compliance, the first item in this dummy would be a discussion of compliance with the rubber and gas program, with pertinent statistics. The second item, illustrated on page 9, would be discussion of the fluctuations in use of ration coupons, followed by a report on the kinds of people who think it is all right to buy at higher than ceiling prices if they can find the goods.

Under the heading of ideas would fall discussion of attitudes toward the United Nations and the post-war world. Included for illustrative purposes in this dummy are an item on popular and press reactions to Wallace's speeches, discussion of trends of people's willingness to continue war-time restrictions after the war in the interests of enduring peace, and a brief report of an intensive exploration of people's personal feeling and kinship toward various other peoples in the world; their feelings about having different nationalities in for dinner, having them marry into the family, etc.

The center four pages of the report, 15 through 18 would discuss spot developments of the week. The map on the center spread might be frankly a teaser, highlighting certain items in order to get the reader to turn to the pages where they are discussed more fully.

On page 18 under the heading of manpower production, four sets of statistics would be put together to illustrate trends in two Hartford war plants, one which has had a bad morale situation which is improving, and one which has had a good morale situation which is apparently deteriorating. Note how putting such statistics together makes the whole mean more than the sum of the parts. Note again how discussion of statistics in the light of observation reports can add meaning.

The headings on the remaining items are enough to illustrate the type of material. The last two or maybe three pages would contain charts and tables of trend statistics which it is important for many readers to know but which are not in this report separately discussed. On the inside back cover would be a list of sources and a reference to detailed reports available in other agencies which could be obtained by those interested in pursuing the subjects further.

February 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. R. Keith Kane

FROM: C. DeBois

SUBJECT: Gaps in the Intelligence Operation - #1

This is the first of two memoranda on the one general subject of gaps in intelligence operations. The second memorandum will discuss gaps in what we are doing. This one is concerned with gaps in how we are handling things we are already doing.

In general, we are well aware of our own technical deficiencies. We have discussed, both formally and informally, several of the steps which we ought to take in order to do our job more soundly.

But we have procrastinated.

We are all, I believe, in agreement that our first technical problem is to apply some kind of sound sampling to our indirect methods, field observations and correspondence. We also have still unresolved the problem of dovetailing two interview techniques, extensive and intensive. We have the problem of measuring areas of ignorance. We have the problem of separating informed from uninformed opinion, considered opinions from snap judgments. We have the problem of overcoming public reticence, or even fear of expression, which has always hampered interviewing procedures and which is likely to get more acute as the war goes on.

Let's consider how some of these gaps might be filled.

1. It may take us some time to get there, but I submit that the way to improve correspondence and regional analysis is, in effect, to merge the two. Each regional analyst should have his own panels of several categories, labor, religious, social workers, newspapermen, businessmen, etc.

We've already discussed this. The main thing is to get going.

The regional analysts can also do a better job for us if they use other devices, although experiments must first be undertaken:

- (a) The inquiring reporter stunt is a perfectly good one, properly used. Ten housewives interviewed on the sidewalk outside the grocery store can tell us a lot about

- 2 -

new point rationing is being put away in the old cities. Ten men interviewed on the street in the Westmore district, and ten in the factory district, can tell us a lot about reactions to major events and statements.

- (b) Bullet boxes - We are experimenting now at Radio City with a short written ballot to be filled in by the respondent and to be dropped in the box. The present one covers only what people want to know more about. The same device can be placed at controlled locations; for example, in grocery stores of different kinds of neighborhoods, beside factory payroll windows, in office building lobbies, etc.
  - (c) Rumor boxes handled in much the same way as above will give us a continuous and systematic measure of the kinds of information which is circulating, and would enable us to report the volume and character of rumors from week to week.
2. Measuring areas of ignorance is part of our original mandate. We have, however, devoted most of our energies to what people think, and very little to what they know and don't know. Some months ago, Bud Wilson experimented with, and partially developed a technique for measuring ignorance. Experiments on this should be accelerated so that we can start informing C.W.I. continuously about the major information gaps.
  3. Months ago, Paul Lazarsfeld recommended to us methods of combining the two interviewing techniques. We all said, "Yes! Yes!" and we actually did succeed in combining them into one division. We haven't followed fast enough on putting the two methods into team harness. Specifically, we need to interview the same people by both methods on the same subject, and we need to go faster in developing precoded opinion questions in a sort of combination technique.
  4. The problem of reticence, or fear, or lip service, in answer to interview questions can be partially overcome by use of written ballots. This method has been tried successfully by several people. The secret ballot in those experiments effectively reduced the number of "I don't know" answers on ticklish questions. The interviewer never knows what the individual has answered.
  5. The problem of distinguishing between snap answers and considered answers, between informed and uninformed opinions, can be got around to some extent by greater use of panels in interviewing. This would be particularly important in a



- 3 -

post-war study where general opinion is not sufficiently crystallized. In order to avoid findings determined by the mental bias of a single, we should adopt double interviews in which the questions are presented to respondents at one interview, and the answers obtained at another. Meantime, the respondent will have been asked to study the questions and think about his answers.

It may well be that we should go much further in developing interview panels and that we should establish more or less permanent panels on several major subjects. But I'd like to suggest that we start by establishing one or more panels strictly for post-war study. These panels should be just large enough so that we can split them into comfortable halves, exposing one-half to a fair barrage of material through the mail and leaving the other half to its own information devices.

6. I am not attempting in this memorandum any questions of media procedure. These are presently being studied and acted on.
7. To improve the scope of our regional roundup we should take advantage of the reports submitted to other agencies by their own men. I have already arranged for Hart to receive all teletype reports from the eight CCA regional men, can easily arrange the same thing at JOD. Similar material is available at MAC, APB, Treasury DMS and other agencies. (This was contemplated in our original plans, but allowed to slide.

CD:102

February 17, 1943

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Mr. P. Keith Kane

**FROM:** C. DuBois

**SUBJECT:** Gaps in the Intelligence Operation - #1

This is the second of two memoranda on the gaps in intelligence procedures. The first one was concerned with some gaps in our methods. This one is concerned with the gaps in our scope of operations.

For over a year, we have been preoccupied with public attitudes and the influences on these attitudes. It was necessary for us to develop our own facilities to do this since nowhere else in the Government could it be done on our scale. But perhaps because of this concentration on facilities which we had to develop ourselves, we have been neglecting other aspects of home-front intelligence which are just as important to O.W.I.

In O.P.F. days, this neglect didn't matter so much. O.P.F. had as its main objective an influence in public attitudes, the stimulation of thinking about the war. But getting people to think is only one of O.W.I.'s major objectives. O.W.I. also aims to make people work, to get their money to work where it will do the most good and the least mischief, to get them to conserve, to share with each other and with our fighters, both American and United Nations. Most of the O.W.I. output is designed to get people to do things rather than to think things. Unlike thoughts, which must be fished for in guided conversations of one kind or another and brought to the surface before they can be measured, acts can be observed.

O.W.I. wants people to work. Then how are job transfers going from nonessential to essential industry? How are shifts within war industry going? What's the trend in absenteeism in different parts of the country? What's the strike trend? How are nurse enrollments going? NAACP? CIVILIAN Merchant Marine? OGD Volunteers?

We should know these answers and report them systematically. We should know at least as soon as anyone else that absenteeism on the West Coast has taken an alarming jump. We shouldn't wait for someone else to tell us and to ask us why. When we know these answers, we will not only be providing a service to O.W.I. and others, we will also be telling ourselves what problems need attitude measurement. And we will often know, without attitude measurements which of the O.W.I. campaigns are being successful because we will know the end result.

- 2 -

O.W.I. wants people to put their money to work for the war. Then how are bond sales going? Stamp sales? Contributions?

O.W.I. wants people to keep their money out of circulation. Then how are underwear sales going? Jewelry? Cosmetics? Fur? There are the major price pressures?

O.W.I. wants people to share with each other. Then how are car pools doing? How about rationing compliance? O.W.I. wants people to share with the armed forces. Then how are blood banks going? How about eyeglasses and binoculars? Salvage collections?

O.W.I. wants people to conserve. How is holiday travel going? How about shoe repairs? Automobile service? Mail to save shipping space?

Most, if not all, of these things can be measured objectively. Most of them are being measured. But they're not being reported in any one place. And in addition to those named above, there are other sets of facts already collected as the results of continuous Government or private studies: juvenile delinquency, for example. We know that at one period of the war it arose sharply in England. We have tales that it has run rampant in Los Angeles. The trends of this and other forms of crime are pertinent to the whole civilian morale picture. So are health statistics, accident rates, hours of work, savings bank withdrawals and deposits, insurance sales, price indices, and many of the facts mentioned more specifically above.

The attached table lists all:

- (1) O.W.I. current campaign and program activities;
- (2) Pertinent facts which ought to be collected from their sources and reported;
- (3) Notation of these sources.

In many cases the logical sources for the information may not have it. For example, the coal industry may not have information on advance orders for next winter's coal and O.P.A. may not have proper information on applications for supplementary gas rations. In such cases, and in some others, it may be necessary to work with the Agency concerned in establishing a panel, a sample of dealers or ration-board clerks who would agree to collect this information for us regularly and pass it on. (Another such panel should be among garbage collectors or hog feeders, since one of the best indices to food conservation would be the amount of food wasted and thrown out in garbage.)

Attitude measurement is of course pertinent to many, if not most, of these campaigns. I have mentioned it here, however, only in those cases where (unless someone is more ingenious than I) we shall have to rely on attitudes alone.

O.W.I. wants people to put their money in work for the war. Then how are bond sales going? "Sleep at night" Contributions?

O.W.I. wants people to keep their money out of mischief. Then how are underwear sales going? Jewelry? Cosmetics? Fur? There are the major price pressures?

O.W.I. wants people to share with each other. Then how are car pools doing? How about rationing compliance? O.W.I. wants people to share with the armed forces. Then how are blood banks doing? How about transfusions and binoculars? Salvage collection?

O.W.I. wants people to conserve. How is holiday travel going? How about shoe repairs? Automobile service? E-mail to save shipping space?

Most, if not all, of these things can be measured objectively. Most of them are being measured. But they're not being reported in any one place. And in addition to those named above, there are other sets of facts already collected as the results of continuous Government or private studies: juvenile delinquency, for example. We know that at one period of the war it rose sharply in England. We have tales that it has run rampant in Los Angeles. The trends of this and other forms of crime are pertinent to the whole civilian morale picture. So are health statistics, accident rates, hours of work, savings bank withdrawals and deposits, insurance sales, rice Indians, and many of the facts mentioned more specifically above.

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- (2) Pertinent facts which ought to be collected from their sources and reported;
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- 3 -

| CAMPAIN   | FACTS   | AGENCIES                    |
|---|---|-----------------------------|
| <b>I. THINK</b>                                   |   |                             |
| 1. Enemy, United Nations, Issues, Fighting Forces | Attitudes                                     | SOI                         |
| 2. Rumors   | Volume and character of rumors in circulation | SOI                         |
| 3. Security of Information                        | Attitudes                                     | (expanded; see other items) |
|   | Actual talk                                   | SOI                         |
|   |   | SOI panel                   |
| <b>II. WORK</b>                                   |   |                             |
| A. Work where you can do most good                |   |                             |
| 1. Armed Services                                 | Volunteers                                    | Voluntary Service           |
| a. WAACS  | Enlistments                                   | Army                        |
| b. WAVES  | "   | Naval                       |
| c. SPARS  | "   | "                           |
| d. WAMS   | "   | "                           |
| e. Nurses   | "   | Red Cross                   |
| 2. War Plants                                     | Student nurse enrollments                     | " " & DHS                   |
| a. Women  | Applications for training                     | USNS                        |
| "   | Women already working                         | MC & Life                   |
| "   | Actual transfers                              | USNS                        |
| b. Transfers                                      | "   | USNS                        |
| "   | Shifts within War jobs                        | "                           |
| c. Special skills                                 | Inquiries & transfers                         | "                           |
| 3. Merchant Marine                                | Enlistments                                   | Maritime Commission         |
| 4. Civ. Defense Corps                             | Enrollments                                   | MC Protective Branch        |
| "   | Attendance                                    | " " (self)                  |
| 5. Cit. Service Corps                             | Enrollments                                   | " Mobilization "            |
| "   | Attendance                                    | " " "                       |
| 6. Victory Gardens                                | Actual Plantings                              | " Committees; Agr.          |
| 7. Farm labor                                     | Recruitment                                   | " & Agr. & MC               |
| "   | Pledges                                       | " & Agr.                    |
| 8. Nurses Aides                                   | Recruitment                                   | " & DHS                     |
| "   | Attendance                                    | " & DHS or SOI panel        |
| B. Wherever you work, keep fit                    |   |                             |
| 1. Nutrition                                      | Knowledge & Ignorance                         | SOI                         |
| 2. Industrial Health                              | Absences                                      | WPA, WMC, BLS?              |
| 3. Industrial Safety                              | Accident rates                                | Nat'l Safety Council        |
| C. And work harder                                |   |                             |
| 1. Absenteeism                                    | Absences                                      | WPA, WMC, BLS               |
| "   | Strikes                                       | Dept. of Labor              |
| 2. Farm Prod. Goals                               | Planting                                      | USDA                        |
| "   | Crop predictions                              | "                           |
| "   | Harvesting                                    | "                           |

**CAMPAIGN****FACTS****AGREEMENT**

3. Lumber Prod. Excess
4. "29% more effective"
5. Prod. incentive

Logging progress  
Source of work  
Current per man  
L. Bureau of Forest Management

Ind. Forestry  
HLS  
eff. 1941, 1942  
1943

**III. PUT YOUR MONEY TO WORK****A. Where it will do the most good**

1. War bonds & stamps

Payroll deductions  
Other sales at place of work  
Other sales  
Sample payments  
" dollar-a-week

Forestry  
" (A. L. L. L.)

2. Income tax

3. Victory tax
4. Red Cross
- Community Chest
- USO

Contributions

AND  
GIFT  
1943

**B. Where it will do least harm**

1. Anti-inflation generally

Prices  
Money in circulation  
Savings Bank deposits & withdrawals  
Rents  
Prices  
Wage rates hourly  
" weekly  
Clothing sales  
Furniture  
Other  
Insurance sales

HLS  
Fed Res  
" "  
HLS, OPA, WPA  
HLS  
HLS  
Commerce  
" "  
Ins. Co's & Trade Assoc

- a. Rent control
- b. Price control
- c. Wage control

- d. Don't spend

**IV. WASTE NOTHING**

1. General conservation

- a. Household equipment

Equip't repairs

- b. Clothing

Shoe repairs  
Garbage for boys

2. Food conservation

3. Fuel

- a. Oil

Conversions

Coal

- b. Household gas

- c. Gasoline

Advance orders for '42-'43 winter  
Meter averages  
Supplementary rations  
Car pool  
Traffic volume

Electrical industry or  
trade press  
BOI panel  
" "

WPA fuel oil industry or  
BOI panel  
Coal industry or BOI panel  
Gas industry  
OPA

Highway traffic adv. Com.  
" " " "

4. Transportation

- a. Autos & tires

Cars in use  
car pools  
tire applications

States; private surveys  
NTAC  
OPA

CAMPAIGNFACTSSOURCES

- b. Trucks & Truck Tires
- c. Consumer deliveries
- d. Buses & Railways
5. Forest fire prevention
6. Shipping space (V mail)

Traffic volume  
Retail delivery volume  
Holiday & weekend travel  
Losses by fire  
Volume of V-mail for soldiers in Army  
" " other mail

ITAC  
ITAC, ITAC or RMI Panel  
DOT  
Forestry Service  
Army

V. SHARE

A. With armed forces and  
United Nations

1. Lend-lease
2. Typewriter procurement
3. Salvage

- a. Iron & steel
- b. Tin cans
- c. Silk stockings
- d. Copper
- e. Victory books
- f. Fats & greases
- g. Rubber
- h. Rags

Attitudes only  
# turned in

Sample collections

" "

(skip it)

Sample collections

" "

" "

" "

" "

ARMY, USN

Army leaders, UNO organizations  
GND Commissions

" "

" "

" "

" "

" "

" "

" "

B. With each other

1. Rationing
  - a. Fuel oil
  - b. Gasoline
  - "
  - c. Sugar
  - d. Coffee
  - e. Canned goods
  - f. Meat
  - g. Shoes
2. Car sharing
3. Housing for war workers
4. Inventory limit

See above

See Above

\*Sales

\*Sales

\*Sales

\*Sales

\*Sales

\*Sales

\*Sales

See above

Vacancies, doubling up

OPA, Census, Secretary panel

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

" " " " " "

VI. OTHER FACTS (Use your own imagination)

FACTSSOURCE

CAMPAIGN OR PROGRAM TO WHICH  
APPLICABLE

Crime Statistics  
Traffic violations

States & Cities; Justice  
States, Cities, AAA

General  
Auto, Gas, Rubber

\*By days or weeks within each ration period.

April 1, 1943

Honorable William C. Bullitt,  
Department of the Navy,  
Office of the Secretary,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

✓ I have your letter about Dobert and I am  
having one of our men look into it.

I hope we are going to see each other soon.

Sincerely,

*File sent to Shepherdson*

William J. Donovan  
Director



*Documental*  
*17 Jan 43*  
*17 Jan 43*  
*17 Jan 43*  
**SECRET**

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan      Date February 19, 1943  
 FROM: Stanley P. Lovell  
 SUBJECT: Freezing of Paper Stocks Made in Enemy-Controlled Countries

Since the Office of Strategic Services is directed to conduct Psychological Warfare, it is deemed a vital function to furnish our agents with adequate enemy paper money and documents. For example, Japanese occupation money (samples attached) is vital to operations in Occupied China.

This office is equipped to produce this money but is unable to procure the raw fibres used by the Japanese in making their currency paper. Specifically the principal fibre ingredient is "mitsumata" fibre which is indigenous to Japan. The "feel" tear-strength and printing quality of this paper has not yet been duplicated by employing American fibres. There exists in American warehouses a small quantity of imported Japanese papers made from mitsumata fibre. These paper stocks can be reworked and rebaten and will then furnish a currency paper of satisfactory quality. Many of these papers may be usable just as they are.

At the same time we will start research to produce the nearest equivalent paper made from all American fibre.

Any attempt by us to buy up these desired papers will start a run by speculators and will divert these stocks to non-essential uses. Further, it seems unwise to burden the paper industry with the problem of making enemy papers while usable stocks are still to be had. We therefore request that a freezing order be issued on all papers of enemy-controlled origin now in the United States.

Please return the attached currency to this office at the earliest opportunity.

Attachments

SPL:acd

*SPL Lovell*

to: Colonel Donovan

Virginia Durand is employed  
in the office of Major Livermore  
and Colonel Pantaleoni.

*Major - 3/5*

Director's Office

(3308)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
411 FIFTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK 17

That report  
however, it  
indicates

CURRICULUM VITAE

I, Francis Dumreicher, born in Vienna on Jan. 29, 1914, came to this country under an immigration visa on Sept. 2, 1939 and have my first papers since 3 1/2 years. I am married, my wife has one child. My father, Baron Hans Dumreicher was till 1919 Secretary of the Austrian Legation and at the 70th was and is living in Vienna. My mother, Marion, born Baroness Burg, divorced and remarried to Count Tattenbach-Vallai is living on her estates in San Jose de Costa Rica. Her mother is American. (Miss Price from Del. Wilmington.)

I followed the regular school schedule, - high school and college in Vienna. Thereafter I attended during a period of 8 1/2 years the Universities of Paris, Vienna, Munich and Zurich. I made my theses on an object of History of Art. My main faculties were: History of Art, Journalism, History, Graphic Arts, Architecture, Literature and Archeology. Furthermore I took courses in commercial art, philosophy, psychology, typography, printing and promotion. I attended the New School of Social Research under Alexey Federitch.

I was first employed as assistant to the professor of art (Prof. J. Gantner) at the University of Zurich. - (1937-1939) Directors assistant of the National Museum of Switzerland. (Research work, lectures, restoration, calculating, estimating, as well as administrative work and photography.) Besides I was art director and reporter of the Swiss Press Co. Zurich. In my free time I did research work in different scientific branches. In America I am employed since 2 1/2 years. First as Art Director of the Robbins Publishing Co. Trade papers and advertising. At present I am art director of Daybreak House and their affiliate Bookbinding & Book Production magazines. Besides I operate my own art studio.

Before coming to this country I spent most of my time in Switzerland, Vienna and Paris. On account of my studies and interests I traveled all over Europe, thereby acquiring an intensive and intimate knowledge of that continent's people, languages, thoughts and customs. I have traveled through England, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia. I have been as a boy in Bulgaria and Rumania. In addition I have traveled considerably in Central America and the U. S.

Following a list of professional specializations and studies:

Journalistic work:

... and scientific research: art, architecture, history.  
Newspaper and magazine work. News reports and commenting.  
Travel reports. Rhetoric.

Organisational work:

Exhibitions. Organisation and planning for publicity.  
Administrative work. Organisational work for advertising, publicity, magazines and book publishing. (I have a good ability in handling people and to get the best cooperation of them. I have a special interest in working on given problems of any sort through to completion).

- 1 -

**Advertising and Promotion:**

Every brand connected with the art department and production department. I can work from rough layout to the finish and have a thorough knowledge of current practices. Poster work. Printing. Engraving and typography.

**Photography:**

Planning and actual work for newspapers, magazines, reports and books as well as for scientific photography. Photography for travels and expeditions. Technical and commercial photography.

**Scientific work:**

On account of my scientific education, practice and steady studies: Art, journalism, architecture, world literature and history.

**Languages:** English, French, German.

(Signed)  
Francis Dumreicher

F. V. Dumreicher  
219 East 71st St.  
New York, N. Y.

March 4, 1943

Mr. Sidney J. Weinberg  
Assistant to the Chairman  
War Production Board  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sidney:

Thanks most sincerely for enclosing the letter from Mr. Robert W. Ducas together with his biographical sketch.

Mr. Ducas talked with Colonel Duxton and subsequently submitted a list of his people in whom it was thought we might be interested. We are now having these names checked for availability by our different Branch Heads. I cannot, of course, tell whether it will be possible at this time to absorb them into our organization because it is our practice to give full latitude in selection of assistants to the Unit Chiefs concerned.

Whatever the outcome of this particular list, you know how much I appreciate your willingness to aid us with your wise estimate of men and your unusual acquaintanceship.

While I understand that Mr. Ducas is not free at present I am also submitting his biographical sketch to the Branch Heads that might be interested.

Most sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

10734 Secretariat

February 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Cecil Barnes

FROM: J. R. Murphy

I discussed this matter with Mr. Neely, who is assistant to David Bowes-Lyon with the British here. He stated that the arrangement with Mr. Dobby was made by the FIS of COI and that Dobby was requested to and did send in monitoring reports from New Delhi. That this service has continued since it was originally commenced and is now being received by the OWI. It would seem that there should be some record of the receipt of these messages and authorization therefor in the former administrative office of FIS. Certainly the Far Eastern Section should have knowledge of it. At any rate, there would appear to be a valid claim against COI.

2/13 Memo from Barnes returned

February 1, 1963

Reverend Emil N. Komora,  
Executive Director,  
The Catholic Committee for Refugees,  
265 West 14th Street,  
New York, N.Y.

My dear Father Komora:

I appreciate very much your letter relative  
to Mr. Klaus Dohrn. I have made inquiries in our  
various sections and I regret to say that we have no  
opportunity to use the talents of Mr. Dohrn.

Thank you for bringing this man to our  
attention.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan  
Director



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

INTEROFFICE MEMO

SECRET

TO : Mr. Tolson, Mr. Boardman,  
Mr. Nichols, Mr. Belmont,  
Mr. Ladd, Mr. Clegg, Mr. Glavin,  
Mr. Harbo, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Tracy,  
Mr. Egan, Mr. Gurnea, Mr. Hendon,  
Mr. Pennington, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Nease,  
Mr. Gandy

FROM : Mr. Winterrowd, Mr. Boardman

SUBJECT:

DATE: 10/10/47

Reference is made to the letter of Mr. Tolson dated 10/10/47, 20, 1947, written by Mr. Tolson to Mr. Boardman, and to the letter of "The Catholic Committee for Refugees" dated 10/10/47, in which we could use the services of Mr. Tolson.

I have made inquiries in the past, and the result is that we do not see how we can satisfactorily use him in S.I.

W. H. Boardman

REF ID: A66666

## THE CATHOLIC COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

100 WEST 110th STREET NEW YORK 25, N.Y.

THE MOST REV. SAMUEL A. STRICK, O.S.A.  
ARCHBISHOP OF CHICAGO

COMMITTEE TO THE MEMBERS

THE MOST REV. JAMES J. CONNELLEY, O.S.A.  
BISHOP OF NEW YORKCABLE ADDRESS  
CATHCOMREFTHE MOST REV. JAMES J. CONNELLEY, O.S.A.  
BISHOP OF NEW YORKTHE MOST REV. JAMES J. CONNELLEY, O.S.A.  
BISHOP OF NEW YORK

IN REPLY REFER TO:

No. 4891

Colonel William Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
630 Fifth Avenue  
New York City

Dear Colonel Donovan:

May we ask your kind and personal cooperation in behalf of Mr. Klaus Dohrn one of the Austrian Catholic refugees under the care of our Committee.

We are addressing this petition to you personally since we feel that Mr. Dohrn has unique abilities and contacts for the government work of which you are Chief. Mr. Dohrn was compelled to flee neither because of his radicalism nor because of race but rather because of his very strong democratic convictions. No less a Nazi than Hitler has acknowledged and declared to Chancellor Schuschnigg that Dohrn was one of his greatest enemies.

Mr. Dohrn has contacts in Germany, Portugal and among allied authorities not generally available to contact men because of their high status in civil and military life. He was a contact man for both the Czech and French General Staffs and is known personally by Empress Zita and Archduke Otto of Austria. Together with Dietrich von Hildebrand he edited the "Christliche Staendestaet" which was assigned by Chancellor Dollfuss principally to combat Nazism in Austria. Mr. Dohrn can read and write German and French and can speak and understand English, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian.

Would it be possible for you to give Mr. Dohrn some work either in an intelligence, psychological or propaganda nature within your office?

No. 4891

-5-

January 21, 1960

Assuring you of our gratitude for whatever cooperation you may extend us in this case since this man is extremely capable in this field, we remain

Sincerely yours,

*Emil N. Komora*

AD/bd

Rev. Emil N. Komora  
Executive Director

ROOM 1409

*PC 201 returned  
(Memo from Bishop to House for 15)*

THE MOST REV. SAMUEL A. STRICKLAND  
ARCHBISHOP OF CHICAGO

CABLE ADDRESS  
CATHCOMREP

IN REPLY REFER TO:

No. 4891

February 4, 1943

Colonel William Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
630 Fifth Avenue  
New York City

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Would you be so kind as to let us know whether or not you have been able to reach any decision concerning our letter to you of January 20, 1943.

With gratitude for whatever courtesy you may extend us in behalf of Mr. Klaus Dohrn who we can assure you merits it, we remain

Sincerely yours,

*Emil N. Komora*

Rev. Emil N. Komora  
Executive Director

AD/bd

1/28/43

Colonel Donovan:

Colonel Goodfellow knows Major  
Dorrance and, while he may have some  
ability, I gathered that Colonel  
Goodfellow doesn't think too highly  
of him.

W.H.V.

January 21, 1943

Major Gordon Dorrance  
5429 Connecticut Avenue  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Major Dorrance:

Your letter of January 20  
addressed to Colonel Donovan has been  
referred to me.

While we do not have any  
position in which your qualifications  
could be used at the present time, we  
will keep you in mind and get in touch  
with you should such an opening present  
itself.

Sincerely,

William H. Vanderbilt  
Commander, USNR  
Deputy Director - Services

To: Commander Vanderbilt

Do you know anything about this  
man?

WJD

WJD

Director's Office

(3308)

## WAR DEPARTMENT

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

Personal and Confidential

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR

WASHINGTON

Colonel William J. Donovan, Chief of  
Office of Strategic Services  
War Dept.  
Washington

My dear Colonel:-

Have you present need of a highly trained and experienced  
intelligence officer, and especially one who is capable of

The officer in question has his "credentials" as a highly trained and  
over 18 years' active and reserve intelligence experience, and has been  
his last official report: has been a member of the War Department  
and other intelligence for over 10 years. He has served in Europe,  
and residence in Europe; served 11 years in the U. S. Army, and  
possesses the highest references and recommendations of his superiors;  
contacts; knows intimately aliens and their habits; and is thor-  
oughly familiar with Military Intelligence, internal security, espionage,  
evaluation and dissemination of enemy and other intelligence.

Yours very truly,

JOHN DONOVAN, Major, U.S.A.





TO: *[Signature]*

1/11/43

Colonel Bonomo

*See check 1/11/43*

There are two extra copies of  
 this further memorandum on  
 Lemigre-Babrouil in case you  
 wish to send one to Fred Dalbeare *sub 1/15*  
 and perhaps give one to Jimmy  
 Dunn.

OSS

SECRET

DCI

EN 8

FROM: DEWITT C. FOOLIE

January 21, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL DONOVAN:

A trustworthy source gives the following account of an interview with Tixier last evening:

Tixier was in a calm mood and said that he had decided to postpone any revelations concerning Lemaigre-Dubreuil until the time seemed entirely ripe. He hoped that Walter Lippmann, who had written a strong article on North Africa in Wednesday's papers, might be persuaded to open the subject of Lemaigre-Dubreuil.

In regard to the Peyrouton affair, Tixier related that both Mr. Sumner Welles and Mr. Elmer Davis had opposed bringing Peyrouton to North Africa, but that Giraud -- backed by Murphy and probably by Eisenhower -- had insisted that only Peyrouton would be able to remove the remnants of Darlanism which were troubling the present administration. In the light of this insistence, Mr. Welles and Mr. Davis withdrew their objections.

Admiral Leahy and Murphy were both said to have favorable impressions of Peyrouton, as they had been united in a common aversion to Laval. Peyrouton also was a close friend of Weygand's; it was through Weygand that Murphy had first come into contact with him.

Giraud, still according to Tixier, had delayed his meeting with de Gaulle for two reasons. He had wanted to present de Gaulle with Peyrouton's elevation as a fait accompli, and he wanted to know the result of any decisions reached by Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. De Gaulle, in a message of January 17, had set a new condition to the proposed conversations: namely, that at the meeting between the two Generals on French soil no foreign observers, British or American, be present.

De Gaulle was convinced that his own position was growing stronger, particularly as a result of the increasingly efficient organization of the underground in North Africa. De Gaulle had only to "press the button" to be assured of action. Tixier, according to his own testimony, had urged that for patriotic reasons this button should by no means be pressed at the present moment.

Tixier explained the coming of the Communist Grenier to London by saying that the Communists took seriously the threat of post-war France's being dominated by reactionary financial and industrial circles -- the same circles that are at present perhaps seeking to gain ascendancy in North Africa. This fear had

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SECRET

led the Communists to abandon their traditional distaste  
for collaboration and to allow one of their members to  
take a seat on de Gaulle's National Committee.

DeWitt C. Poole

January 4, 1944.

MEMORANDUM OF REMARKS BY LEMAIGRE DUBREUIL CONCERNING LEMAIGRE DUBREUIL  
FOR THE AMERICAN CAMPAIGN IN FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

On January 1, 1943, LEMAIGRE DUBREUIL, with address 51 Ave. 1, was in New York, and in the course of dinner and after dinner conversation, L.D. gave following details concerning his activities during the period which followed the French Armistice of 1940 in preparation for the American landing in North Africa.

L.D. is a principal stockholder of the important French peanut oil refinery Lesieur, with a large plant five kilometers from Dunkirk. As the result of the German occupation and intensive bombardment of the Dunkirk area, L.D. on behalf of the Lesieur Company began to make plans to transfer a substantial part of this company's production and refinery activities to new plants, which were to be built at Dakar, Casablanca and Algiers. L.D. says that this plan came to him at the time of the French Armistice, when he was a German prisoner. His desire for revenge against Germany was motivated not only by patriotic ideals, but also because he found it impossible to accept the fact that he had been made prisoner with his mechanized machine-gun battalion (auto-mitrailleuses) at Nogent-sur-Seine, at a time when he believed the Germans to be 160 kilometers away. The personal motive of proving to himself and his immediate friends that he could outsmart the Germans, seems to have played a considerable part in the decision which motivated his future conduct. It is not clear whether he escaped or was released by the Germans; I presume that his release was arranged as one of those leading French industrialists whom the Germans believed would contribute to the economic collaboration so necessary for their plans for the New Europe.

As owner and publisher of the combine, moderate rightist newspaper "Le Jour - Echo de Paris", L.D. had moved his paper from Paris to Clermont-Ferrand in the unoccupied zone. He says that it was his desire at that time to see his paper follow an editorial line which would stress France's national interests and, in every way possible within the strict limitations imposed by the French censorship, maintain an attitude of independence from the trend towards collaboration with the Germans. At first, he was able to do as he planned. However, when Darlan took control of the French Government, stern measures were applied to L.D.'s paper, and it was obliged to cease publication.

SECRET

- 5 -

L.D., still nursing his plan for the transfer to North Africa of his peanut oil interests, was able to visit Paris, where he discussed with Laval at the offices of the "Monsieur", Laval's important Clermont-Ferrand newspaper, the attitude which France should take in securing the reconstruction of its army. L.D. says that Laval at that time believed that an Axis victory was probable, but that he was anxious to maintain an avenue of escape for France towards the camp of the United Nations and, in particular, was interested in maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, so that should a German defeat appear possible, the French army might be reborn with the aid of American arms. L.D. offered to maintain contacts with his old friend Robert Murphy, who was at that time in Algiers. Laval encouraged him to do so, and asked L.D. whether he could not speak to Mr. Murphy about the bitter press attacks against the Vichy Government then appearing in the American newspapers.

In the course of establishing the peanut oil refineries for the Lesieur Company in French North Africa and French West Africa, L.D. had great freedom of movement which permitted him, as he put it, "to travel across French territory many times from Dakar to Dunkirk". He was able to get 4,000 tons of vital machinery and parts for the new African refineries from the Lesieur plant outside of Dunkirk and this, he says, "without the knowledge of the Germans".

On a visit to Algiers shortly after his conversations with Laval, L.D. explained to Robert Murphy that he was desirous of placing his facilities for travel and his knowledge of the French political and military scene at the disposal of the Americans, who must one day become the saviors of France. He told Murphy that if a cable could be sent by Murphy to America, in a code known to the French Intelligence, that this cable would be shown to Laval and that this would be sufficient proof to Laval of his relations with Murphy. L.D. prepared such a cable, stressing Laval's anxiety and resentment at seeing himself so consistently attacked by the American press. Murphy arranged to send the cable, and, as hoped, it was shown to Laval, so that when L.D. returned to Vichy with a copy of the message which he said he had given to Murphy, Laval appeared well satisfied and well disposed to grant complete freedom of travel to L.D.

L.D.'s difficulties with Darlan, and his description of the members of the Vichy Government as individuals who had chosen the path of least resistance in whom little confidence could, or should, be placed, was followed by his statement that towards the end, particularly after the occupation of Madagascar, Laval had become almost more pro-German than the Germans themselves. At this time, Laval appeared to be staggering under the repeated blows of successful United Nations' actions, coupled with an intensification of criticism of his position by all the press in all of the United Nations. Laval was

SECRET



- 3 -

thus driven to take a more and more favorable attitude towards the Germans, to the point that he has today undoubtedly decided that his own fate is entirely linked with the fate of his last friends.

When it became evident that the plans which had been carefully laid in Algiers and in France with certain French generals could be put into operation in the autumn of 1943, L.D. decided with Murphy that the first step in a military sense should be a meeting of an Irish American officer and certain technical experts with certain French General officers, and that this meeting should be held in North Africa. It was decided that the meeting should be held in a native house belonging to a trusted Frenchman at the little town of Cherchel, located on a bay some 115 kilometers to the West of Algiers. The date for the meeting was set as the night of October 30, 1943. L.D. did what he could to dissuade too many French representatives from attending this meeting and even refrained from leaving for Cherchel himself at that time.

L.D. had planned to take the plane from Algiers to Marseilles which left at 8 a.m. on October 22. He hoped at that time to be able to take final instructions to General Giraud. However, through a misunderstanding, the American party did not arrive until the night of October 21, and considerable attention had been drawn to the locality of Cherchel by unusual movements of high French officers in French military cars from Algiers to Cherchel on the successive days. As a result, the local Police Commissioner was about to organize a raid on the house where the meeting took place, and would probably have done so had it not been for the intervention of one of the French officers who was attending the meeting and to whom the Police Commissioner had to report for authorization to make the raid. As a result of a bad storm, there was a delay in the departure of the American party under General Clark, and the incidents which were reported in the press, involving certain loss of clothes and a bag of gold, occurred at that time.

L.D., so as not to arouse undue suspicion, was obliged to take the plane as arranged on the morning of October 22, without knowing whether there had been any miscarriage of the carefully laid plans. He proceeded to Vichy, where he had a conversation with Mr. Laval, which indicated to him that Laval had received no information of anything being afoot in North Africa and, as a result, L.D. took a car which he had kept in Vichy and drove to the neighborhood of Lyons, where he met General Giraud. General Giraud was guarded from a certain distance by German plain clothes men probably attached to the Gestapo. L.D. was able to meet with Giraud and to get him to sign certain papers which Murphy had requested; also, to prepare a proclamation to the

**SECRET**

- 4 -

French troops in North Africa. This was the proclamation that was read at the time of the American landing. L.D. also was able to give Giraud instructions as to the exact locality where an American submarine would fetch him. The indication of this point was shown me on a little pencil sketch which L.D. had in his notebook. The point chosen lay about 1500 meters off the mouth of the Loup River at a point between Cap d'Antibes and Cros de Cagnes. General Giraud was then to be taken to a point at sea, where he was to be met by a hydroplane which was to take him to Gibraltar. It is now known that this plan worked out satisfactorily.

However, General Giraud had wished to persuade General Delattre de Tassigny, who commanded the Montpellier region, and certain other French generals in Southern France to rise at the same time as we invaded North Africa and thus to hold a bridgehead in Southern France until our forces would be able to join them there. L.D. had been told originally that our plan for the North African operation would be put into motion about November 20. When the date was changed to November 7, it became impossible to develop the plan for the bridgehead in Continental France. L.D. in passing indicated that the failure to take him into our confidence as to the change in the date of landing in sufficient time, was an indication of impossible lack of confidence which he did not think was proper under the circumstances.

L.D. on his return to Algiers gave the papers he had prepared with Giraud to Murphy and immediately made the final plans for the civilian uprising which was to seize control of all the key personalities and strategic points in Algiers, coincident with the arrival of the American Expeditionary Force. A group of some 400 French civilians who were determined to help the American attack, had been organized by L.D. with four assistants over a period of months prior to this time. This civilian group had been promised a shipment of small arms, revolvers, grenades, etc., which had not been delivered by the Americans. For this reason, armed with rifles and, in some instances even shotguns, on the night of the American landing according to a pre-arranged plan this civilian militia force, which comprised a number of local de Gaullists as well as other patriots, seized all the post offices, telephone exchanges, police stations, and took prisoner all of the French military and naval leaders in Algiers. They found Darlan with Robert Murphy, so they even took Murphy prisoner and it was not until some hours later that Murphy was released.

Darlan, who was living in the home of Admiral Fournier, was requested to remain on the second floor of the house, and he readily complied. General Juin objected violently to being arrested by a second lieutenant who was cooperating with the civilians. However, he too was taken into custody, and all would have gone well had it

**SECRET**



not been for a new instance of lack of cooperation between the American landing forces and the American civilian representatives who had made the plans with the French patriot groups. The American military forces, according to L.D., probably still distrusting certain of the French civilians who had made the deal with them through Murphy, landed at points other than those which had been previously agreed upon. It so happened that these landings were made at points defended by troops who had been sent to these points because they were not considered favorably inclined to the possibility of a peaceful landing by the Americans. The obvious result was an interchange of shots, which led to some casualties. Had the American commanders landed at the pre-arranged points, from which all French troops had been removed, there would have been no possibility for such an incident.

In the meanwhile, General Juin had managed to evade his captors and had ordered military resistance to the American landing. General Maste (spelling uncertain) then issued a radio appeal to the French troops and their commanders to join the Americans who were arriving in Algiers to defend French North Africa against a German attack, adding the false news that the Germans had already begun an invasion of Tunisia. Through this stratagem, any serious resistance of the French military forces in Algiers was delayed sufficiently long for the Americans to take control of this important city.

Meanwhile, General Bethouard in Morocco had gone to General Nogues to inform him that the long expected American invasion was at hand and that the French troops of that area would certainly not wish to offer any military opposition to the army of liberation. General Nogues immediately called Admiral Michellier and requested him to report on the reported American landing which was to have taken place at 6 A.M. Admiral Michellier reported to General Nogues that French naval aviators scouting off the coast had reported no vessels within 200 kilometers of Casablanca. At this point, news arrived that an American party was landing. General Nogues, believing that this was nothing more than another Commando raid, and that German measures would be extremely severe if the French failed to put up some show of resistance against what was nothing more than an incidental attack, ordered the French forces in Morocco to repel the invasion. Faced with the complete dismay of General Bethouard, who had come to see Nogues with an armed attachment of tirailleurs, General Nogues ordered a tank brigade to surround Bethouard's troops and seized Bethouard, placing him under arrest. Bethouard was sent to Meknes to be tried by a Court Martial, and it was only when Darlan issued his now famous "cease fire" order that Bethouard was released from what appeared to be the certainty of facing a firing squad. According to L.D., this imbroglio was again due to the Americans having landed at points other than those which had been indicated to Bethouard, and having landed at a time hours later than had previously been decided.

**SECRET**

- 6 -

L.D. said that it was to be expected that General Giraud had been detained in Gibraltar with Admiral Eisenhower and that he did not reach Algiers until after the "cease fire" order had been given. According to this view, had Giraud accompanied General Clark to Algiers when the first landing was made, Giraud himself would have been able to have issued his proclamation to the French troops, and there would probably have been even less resistance, and there would probably have been no deal with Admiral Darlan. L.D. refused to explain the reasons why Giraud had not been allowed to proceed to North Africa with the first body of troops, but indicated that he deplored this unfortunate happening.

When Darlan assumed supreme command as High Commissioner for French Africa, L.D. says that he was requested to serve as Assistant Commissioner. He declined, however, because of his antipathy for Darlan, taking the precaution to assure the appointment of one of his own friends as personal assistant to Darlan.

There is little likelihood of French Africa failing to rally wholeheartedly to the side of the United Nations. Darlan's death will not lead to internal rivalries between the other French high commanders, L.D. believes that they are all ready to serve with Giraud in freeing France, and in a strictly military sense they are united and will not allow political differences or political personalities to play any part in their plans. Giraud, according to L.D., is a man who has no interest in political affairs and who believes that any interference of politicians in the present military operations would be deplored by all true French patriots. The only task to be considered at the present time is the defeat of Germany. Giraud will call on all Frenchmen to serve under the French flag in freeing France from the German occupation.

When he was asked as to what Giraud's attitude would be towards General de Gaulle, L.D. said that Giraud would undoubtedly welcome General de Gaulle and the other Free French generals, provided that they came as military aides, not as political office seekers. L.D. said that Giraud was convinced that de Gaulle's modern conceptions of mechanized warfare could be invaluable to the French army, and that he was sure that Giraud would welcome de Gaulle and his followers into a fighting front.

The day prior to L.D.'s departure from North Africa, General Astier de la Vigerie, representing General de Gaulle, arrived in Morocco and appeared to be on the most intimate terms with General Giraud.

In view of General Nogues' first attitude towards the American landing, L.D. was asked whether there would be any difficulty in persuading General Nogues to collaborate with Giraud and to serve under

**SECRET**

his military leadership. L.D. said that he was present when Vignoux first visited Giraud and the two men refused to shake hands although they had been old comrades in arms. After a few moments, they decided that General Giraud and General Vignoux should be left alone in a room. They stayed together for a portion of some three hours, at which time both of them came from the room smiling and apparently on the most cordial terms.

L.D. since he has been in the United States has been shocked to find so much division among the French people resident here. He says that probably 80% of the French people living in the former occupied zone of France can be described as de Gaulleists, whereas some 70% in the unoccupied zone have the same faith in the de Gaulle movement. However, he points out that this is to be interpreted as the reaction of the French people against the Germans and against those who have collaborated with Germany in exploiting and oppressing France. L.D. believes that this loyalty is not a loyalty to General de Gaulle as an individual, or to the Committee in London, but is the expression of the faith of the French people in any leadership which will renew the struggle against Germany. De Gaulle becomes a symbol of the opposition to Germany, and is no longer considered as an individual.

A French general, on French territory, who has taken up the fight against Germany will rapidly become the sole leader of the French opposition. This man is now General Giraud. General de Gaulle should join forces with General Giraud, and the French people will follow almost unanimously. Should General de Gaulle prefer to remain in London, the support of his movement will gradually dry up and the French patriots will look to General Giraud for leadership.

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Washington, D.C.

100-100000

COPY

LEMAIGRE DUBREUIL  
Leading French Fascist

Brother-in-law of Pierre Laguionie of the Printemps Department Store and husband of Simone Lesieur of the Huiles Lesieur family. He was subsidized by both for his fascist activities. He created and was president of the fascist organization called Ligue des Contribuables (League of Taxpayers), affiliated with the Cagoule, among other subversive activities encouraging small tax-payers not to pay their taxes.

At the time of the popular front and of the reform of the management of the Banque de France he was nominated by the stockholders of the Banque de France (deux cent familles) to represent them on the newly formed board from which bankers were to be eliminated. These stockholder appointed a leading fascist in retaliation for the appointment of men such as Jouhaux etc. The title of Regent de la Banque de France of which Lemaigre Dubreuil now boasts was therefore acquired as a result of his political movement.

Lemaigre Dubreuil was on the list of arrests prepared by Georges Mandel when he became Minister of the Interior in May, 1940, when it was proved that Dubreuil had received Germain funds for his anti-governmental propaganda, through the intermediary of Leroy-Ladurie (Banque Worme), official distributor of Nazi funds.

Monsieur Lemaigre Dubreuil was closely connected with LE MATIN (Bureau - Varilla group) and LE JOUR. He helped the Confederation General du Patronat Francais to finance some camouflaged fascist organizations. He represented the transition between the Billiet organizations (political, subsidized by the big industry, but within the law) and organizations which organized fascist agitation, such as the Ligue des Contribuables.

Well-informed people declare that he contributed to the financing of the Cagoule.

It seems that the Bethouart Mission, besides Lemaigre Dubreuil and d'Adler also includes M. Elgaud (sp. ?), who was associated with Galerie Lafayette, a well-known fascist who also worked with LE MATIN and LE JOUR. Also two secretaries named Deschne (sp ?) and C..... The whole group is unquestionably fascist.

It seems that the highest officials in the State Department are now aware of the identity and pre-war political affiliations of the group. Confidentially, Etienne Boegner is active in Washington spreading information about the group and such eminent Frenchmen as Leger and Marlio who are well-posted on the character of the men have already informed the State Department of their connections.

COPY

**SECRET**

January 16, 1943

Mr. Edward Dodd  
Office of War Information  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dodd:

✓ The other day I saw, for the first time, the globe and its stand, which I am told were developed under your supervision.

The globe is extremely striking in its effect and I am confident will be widely used. Please accept my congratulations for having taken the burden of bringing it into being.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan

AR/lde

## LEMAIGRE DUBREUIL

Lemaigre Dubreuil is reported to be the political head of the French Mission which arrived on December 23 from North Africa. Dubreuil calls himself the personal representative of General Giraud. The following information concerning Dubreuil has been received from most reliable sources:

1. Since the Paris Riots of February 6, 1934, Dubreuil has had the reputation throughout France of being actively engaged in anti-democratic maneuvers.
2. He founded and directed the organization called "Ligue des Contribuables". This society was responsible for spreading subversive and disruptive propaganda prior to the outbreak of the war.
3. It is reported that Dubreuil was on the Otto Abetz' list of French citizens who collaborated with Germany prior to the collapse of France. This is commonly believed by the French people.
4. About the time when the final assault was launched on France in May 1940, Dubreuil was arrested by the French Minister of the Interior Mandel. He was arrested because he was receiving funds from the Germans and from the Worms Bank. The Germans have consistently used the Worms Bank for transactions of this kind, both prior to and after the collapse of France. It is alleged that the charges against Dubreuil

Page 2.

were proved, and this is also generally believed by the people of France.

5. Dubreuil has been perhaps more intimately associated with the development of our recent policy in North Africa than any other Frenchman.

January 11, 1943

The following concerning Lemaigre Dubreuil is reported by Murphy. I agree with him.

"Lemaigre Dubreuil is definitely not anti-democratic. Before the war he advocated the reform of some of the negligence, corruption and abuses which were in existence in France prior to 1939, and he is a patriotic Frenchman with an excellent war record. He fought not only in the First World War but also in 1939 and 1940. Lemaigre Dubreuil was actually a Major with a machine gun company at the front at the time when, according to the report you mention, he was supposed to be under arrest by Mandel for receiving funds from Worms Bank and the Germans. I wonder by whom this story was originated and I also wonder whether the originator can claim as good a military record for himself as Lemaigre Dubreuil. Through a marriage to the daughter of Lesieur, he became a wealthy man as Lesieur founded the largest French edible oil business, which brought him to Africa long before the war. For the past two years, Lemaigre Dubreuil has cooperated with me. He established, with my knowledge and approval, a deceptive police record in France. This record showed that he was a collaborationist, and through the months he cultivated Laval, Abets, Dubrinon (Auer and Company) and obtained useful information from them which I included in my State Department reports. Also he functioned as a liaison between myself and General Giraud. Lemaigre Dubreuil is known to me as a courageous, patriotic Frenchman who hates the Germans and Italians with an intelligent implacability and favors the Allies. You especially will find it obvious that a person who has intimate knowledge of and contacts with the Franco-Germans political world and business has been indispensable during the past months. In that connection Lemaigre Dubreuil rendered us the most useful service, and I am grateful to him."



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

Foreign Nationalities Branch

January 17, 1943

MEMORANDUM to the Director of OSS

In connection with the mission to the United States of General Bethouard on behalf of General Giraud a good deal of adverse talk is being heard in French and American circles. Some indications are given below of the sort of thing which is being said. To determine the proportion of truth, if any, contained therein would require investigation beyond the competence of this Branch. Allegations are reported, therefore, simply as they are heard and with every reservation.

The situation gains cogency from the fact that M. Adrien Tixier, head of the Fighting French Delegation, has indicated to a newspaper man his own belief in the substantial accuracy of the gossip and his intention to "break the scandal" soon in London or Washington.

The gossip centers about M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil, who accompanied General Bethouard. M. Lemaigre-Dubreuil is said to be chairman of the important French lubricating oil corporation Huiles Lesueur, having married Lesueur's daughter.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil (the gossip continues) represents himself as a staunch democrat and fighter for freedom. Indeed he helped

- 2 -

**SECRET**

in the planning and execution of the North African campaign. His background, however, is asserted to be questionable. He founded the reactionary "League of Taxpayers" which had a part in the Paris disorders of February 6, 1934. He is believed to have maintained contact with the Cagoulauds.

Following the armistice, it is said, he traveled between Paris, Vichy and North Africa, having for this purpose the visa of the German-Italian Armistice Commission. He is supposed to have exported lubricants to Tripoli and to have been one of the principal furnishers of Rommel in this regard. Asked in Washington about these transactions he is reported to have answered that they were no more objectionable than the American shipments of scrap metal to Japan.

Among Lemaigre-Dubreuil's financial associates are said to be Leroy-Ladurie of the notorious Banque Worms and once a minister in the Government at Vichy; also M. Poze, earlier of the Banque Nationale de Crédit and described now as Minister of National Economy in Algiers. Poze is reputed to be an old friend of Laval and to have been associated with him financially in 1931. He was connected with the founding in the same year of the Banque Nationale pour le Crédit et l'Industrie. Poze is alleged to have conferred with the Nazis in Paris at the end of October. Then he returned to Algeria and was appointed by Darlan to be Minister of National Economy (the story goes on) while still maintaining his position with the Algerian branch of the bank last mentioned.


**SECRET**

Lemaigre-Dubreuil is said to have been accompanied on his trip to the United States by a certain M. d'Adler. The latter's real name is reported to be von Adler and he is alleged to be an Austrian Jewish baron connected with the Schnitzer Bank.

On January 14 this general set of allegations was discussed by a newspaper man with M. Tixier, head of the Fighting French Delegation. M. Tixier, not unnaturally, seemed disposed to accept them as substantially accurate. He told the newspaper man that, when he learned that Lemaigre-Dubreuil had signed an agreement on behalf of Giraud with the Board of Economic Warfare, he at once dispatched a special courier to London to report to General de Gaulle. He added that he intended also to talk without delay to Mr. Milo Perkins and to Vice President Wallace. He is reported to have remarked further that he intended to bring this "scandal" into the arena of public discussion. He did not know, he said, whether the scandal would break first in England or in the United States.


According to the newspaper man in question, Tixier added that he knew quite certainly that Pierre Pucheu and Paul Baudouin, also of the Banque Worms, are now in North Africa. From another source the newspaper man had heard that while they were in New York Lemaigre-Dubreuil and d'Adler offered former friends in New York participation in a financial corporation now formed in North Africa and designed to obtain a monopoly of trade between North Africa and the United States.


DeWitt C. Poole




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DR









8 April 1944

Mr. Emerson P. Schmidt,  
Chamber of Commerce of the  
United States of America,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Schmidt:

Your letter of 7 April 1944, recommending  
Mr. Lawrence Dreiman is being referred to our  
Personnel Procurement officers. They will get  
in touch with Mr. Dreiman and secure whatever  
information is necessary in order to determine  
whether there would be a place in OSS for him and  
whether a transfer could be arranged.

Thank you for having called him to  
our attention.

Sincerely yours,

GE Edward Buxton,  
Acting Director.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
WASHINGTON

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC PROGRESS  
EMERSON P. SCHMIDT  
ECONOMIST AND SECRETARY

April 7, 1944

General William J. Donovan, Director,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
25th and E Streets N.W.,  
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Donovan:

Mr. Lawrence Dreiman, now a sergeant at Camp Clark, Nevada, Missouri, has virtually completed his work for a Ph.D. in economics and is interested in having his experience and talents utilized more effectively than is now the case. He asked me to get in touch with you, hoping that you might have some useful work for him.

In case you are interested in him, I shall be glad to tell you more or you can get in touch with him at Camp Clark.

Yours very sincerely,

*EP Schmidt*  
EMERSON P. SCHMIDT

1170/1235

12 475  
10 August 1948

Mr. Frank G. Ragsdale  
San Antonio Light  
San Antonio, Texas

Dear Mr. Ragsdale:

In General Demovan's absence I am writing to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 26 July with its enclosure of a copy of the letter you wrote to Congressman Rankin regarding Mr. Earl Drew.

Although due to current budget limitations we are unable either to send an investigator to San Antonio or to reimburse Mr. Drew for his expenses on a trip East, this organization would be interested in interviewing him any time he should come to Washington.

Thanking you again for your interest, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

O. C. DORNING, JR.  
Lt. Col., AUS  
Assistant Director

PFP:etr

Date 28 July

LIMUT. THRU

Isn't this a matter  
for the Secretariat.

*Q. G. B., Jr.*

*AWS:*

*For act  
in absence W.D.*

*RS*

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)



SAN ANTONIO 6, TEXAS  
July 26, 1946

OFFICE OF THE  
MANAGING EDITOR

Major General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
Twenty-fifth and E Streets  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I am sending to Congressman John A. Rankin, member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

I believe the story that Mr. Earl Frank Drew has to tell is equally as valuable to your operation as it is to this House Committee.

It alone will explain the many puzzling things in the world political picture. Only with this knowledge can the actions of the German, Swiss, Austrian, Danish and Swedish Red Cross be really understood. It is the answer to the Duke of Coburg-Gotha.

It makes clear the riddle of the Russian Church.

It makes reasonable the Free German--Pan German efforts to Sovietize the world.

It explains our troubles south of the Rio Grande all the way to the vast Patagonian ranches of the Prince von Schaumburg-Lippe.

As an American, a former reserve officer and a newspaperman I urge you to designate someone to get this man's story. You have nothing to lose by listening. I think America has everything to gain.

Respectfully submitted,

*Frank G. Regedale*  
Frank G. Regedale

July 26, 1948

Honorable John M. Rankin  
Member of Congress  
House Office Building, Room 386  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Congressman Rankin:

This letter is addressed to you in the sincere belief that the information offered is vitally essential to your investigation of un-American activities. Without it, any real understanding of the purposes behind the actions and maneuvers of the Communists and their associates is impossible. Without that understanding, a mere recital of actions and incidents is almost meaningless and altogether futile.

I would call your attention to Mr. Earl Frank Drew of this city.

Mr. Drew is a naturalized citizen of German birth. He served in the United States Army during World War I and has a son in our Army now. For the past 20 years he has been trying to tell various officials of our Government what he knows of the world conspiracy in which the war still raging is but an incident.

His information is not merely the ideas of a crackpot, but is the knowledge instilled into him as a youth when he was schooled to play an important part in the plot. He has added to this 26 years of study and documentation of the drama as it has unfolded.

I have known Mr. Drew casually for several years. During the past two and a half years I have talked with him almost daily. I can assure you of his soundness and of his sincere desire to be of service to this country.

In addition to intimate knowledge of the plans and purposes behind the world conspiracy, Mr. Drew has made it his business to follow closely the actions of the conspiratorial leaders in this country and in all Latin America. This information he has given to the FBI and other government agencies as it was received. But nothing ever has been done about it.

Congressman Rankin #

7-25-45

He has transmitted his information to military intelligence officers. It undoubtedly reaches in German files. This information included such things as immediate reports on the activities of Freiherr von Spiegel, submarine commander who surveyed the Texas coast just before the war. Drew even obtained and turned over to investigators for the Dies Committee credentials he succeeded in obtaining from von Spiegel, appointing him as a German agent. Still no one would take his information seriously.

He reported to a member of Congress personally within an hour after Dr. Ernst Wendler, former Nazi consul General at New Orleans, told him of the German plans in 1938 to try out expropriation of oil properties in Bolivia and, if it worked there, to put it in force in Mexico. Dr. Wendler was then on his way to Bolivia to initiate the action.

He reported in full of the activities of J. N. Davis, Eastern States Oil Company and Petroleum Mexican in the conspiracy which transferred hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil and gasoline (the latter refined in the United States) to Germany and Japan prior to our entry into the war. He reported the impending murder of Davis---still carried in the records as a heart attack.

He has made it his business to follow and report the business dealings of "friends of Germany" in the United States throughout the war, reporting them despite the discouraging regularity with which his reports were ignored.

The story he has to tell now is, I sincerely believe, an important one for your committee and for the people of the United States. However, he would not be a sensational witness. For his own protection he could not be a public witness.

I believe his story would be most important to you as background for other investigation work, hence I make bold to suggest that it merits an interrogation by your most intelligent and competent investigator. His report could be most valuable if not confined to a mere questioning and answers, but a digest of an extended questioning, analyzed against the facts reported in the newspapers and uncovered in your own investigations. It would be helpful if the investigator was adept in the German language as much of the documentation is in that language.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank G. Magdala



OSS FORM 40814

16. 14 8 R  
Date 2 June 1945To: Mr. Cheston

Attached is a letter from Mr. Drew and a proposed reply for your signature. The poems referred to in the letter were forwarded to Dr. Langer for translation when they were received in March.

Dr. Langer discussed them with General Donovan, and it was decided that they were not to be translated. They have been reposing in General Donovan's files since that date.

I have checked with Dr. Langer who did not read the entire set of poems but who tells me he read enough of them to feel that they have no value for our purposes.

*A. W. Sulloway*  
A. W. Sulloway

Office of the Secretariat

(9139)

16-179  
D. C. F. Jones  
Jag. 1. 1. 1.  
9 June 1945

Mr. H. F. Drew  
Post Office Box 161  
San Antonio 6, Texas

Dear Mr. Drew:

I am writing in General Denevan's absence to acknowledge your letter of 5 June 1945. In accordance with your request we are enclosing the poems which Mr. Frank G. Ragsdale forwarded to General Denevan in March.

Sincerely,

Charles S. Cheston  
Assistant Director

Enclosure

AWS:egp

Postoffice Box 161  
San Antonio, Texas 78201  
June 5, 1945

Major General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
Twenty-fifth and B. Streets  
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Donovan:

Some weeks ago Mr. Frank J. Hagsdale of the San Antonio Light forwarded to you, at my request, some poems in German which I hope have been helpful.

As he may have informed you, for more than twenty years I have been a student of the operations of the conspiracy for world control of the Secret Fursten Bund. I was taught the history, plans and purposes of this group of princes as a youth in Germany, and only escaped playing a part in it through fortuitous circumstances connected with World War I.

From time to time since 1920, when I became a citizen of the United States, I have tried to tell what I know to various officials of our government with little success. For the past two years I have been engaged in writing a book, detailing the background and operations of the conspiracy.

Recently, in digging through my files, it has struck me that some of my data might be useful right now in setting up the program for handling the Germans as a people and as a nation. A small part of this information was contained in an article recently completed in collaboration with Mr. Hagsdale on "The Lehms". A copy of this has been transmitted to you through Eighth Service Command Military Intelligence.

If it appears to you that this information might be helpful to the government, please indicate the proper person or agency in this vicinity to be contacted.

Meanwhile, if you have no further use for the original copies of the poems referred to above, I would appreciate their return since I would like to use some of them in a contemplated magazine article.

This letter is written partly at the suggestion of Lt. Col Frank Chapa.

Sincerely yours,

*E. F. Drew*  
E. F. Drew

1 April 1946

Mr. Frank G. Ragsdale  
San Antonio Light  
San Antonio, Texas

Dear Mr. Ragsdale:

I am writing to thank you for the German poems which you enclosed with your letter of March 19. We very much appreciate your interest in giving us an opportunity to study them.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

AWS:

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Lt. John W. Auchincloss

FROM : William L. Langer

DATE 29 March 1945

SUBJECT:

With reference to your note of 27 March attaching certain poems which the General had asked to have translated,

I discussed the matter of translating these poems with General Donovan on yesterday and I am returning them to you herewith at his request.

*William L. Langer*  
William L. Langer  
Chief, Research and  
Analysis Branch

Attachments-2

*For Lt. Auchincloss  
Langer  
100*

000 1000 0000

Date 27 March 44

To: Mr. O'Donnell

Merian:

A copy of this letter, and the original enclosures, have been forwarded to Dr. Langer with the request that a translation be prepared, in accordance with the General's instructions.

JWA  
JWA

Office of the Secretariat

(9339)

W. B. Bump

Will you have  
this translated



AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

March 19, 1946

OFFICE OF THE  
MANAGING EDITOR

Major General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
25th and B. Streets  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Donovan:

The enclosed poems, in the German language, were turned over to me by Mr. Frank Drew, a naturalized citizen of this country who believes that they should be of value to the United States. They are being forwarded to you partly at the suggestion of Colonel Frank Chapa of Military Intelligence.

I have known Mr. Drew for two years and have had many conversations with him during that time in connection with a book detailing the background of the Celtic conspiracy for world control which we are writing. I am convinced of his sincerity and of his loyalty to the United States. I am convinced also that because of his education and training in Germany prior to 1915 he has great ability to analyze events and foretell the actions of the enemy.

I do not speak or read German, but from the translations of these poems which I have seen I believe that a careful study of them should be made by your office.

Respectfully submitted,

Frank G. Ragsdale



ANTONIO LIGHT  
Independent Newspaper  
San Antonio, Texas

March 19, 1945

William J. Donovan  
Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

General Donovan:

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Frank G. Ragsdale

9 March 1944

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Mr. Herbert K. Gaston, Chairman,  
Interdepartmental Committee on  
Employee Investigations,  
Department of Justice,  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gaston:

I have your letters, one dated 17  
February 1944, respecting Leon Matthew Drossoff  
and the other, dated 18 February 1944, relating  
to Carl Aldo Marzani.

In the case of each of these employees,  
I have been informed that eligibility for Federal  
employment has been affirmed by the Civil Service  
Commission on appeal. It is our understanding that  
in the course of such appeals, the Civil Service  
Commission considered the question of any Communist  
affiliation of the employees in question.

Since the decision was in favor of  
eligibility for Federal employment, it would not  
seem that any further action by this office is  
required.

Very truly yours,

William J. Donovan,  
Director.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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